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2ABSTRACT
An abstract of the dissertation of EmmaJean Williams for
the Doctor of Philosophy in Urban Studies presented January
25, 1995.
Title: Implementing Community Policing: A Documentation
and Assessment of Organizational Change
Four research questions guided this documentation
and assessment of the Portland Police Bureau's conversion
to community policing. These questions generated a
description of the events and circumstances that created
the perceived need for change in the Bureau's role and
function; a search for justification for selecting community
policing as an alternative policing approach; a comparative
analysis of past attempts to implement innovative change
of a similar dimension in police organizations; and an
assessment of the process by which the Bureau implemented
this new policing strategy.
The findings indicate that the prominent factors
driving this change are first, the limitations of
conventional policing tactics against emerging new patterns
of crine and disorder; second, an intensification of public
interest in quality-of-life issues; and third, an increase
3in the numbers of progressive police officers that are
influencing change in the traditional police culture.
The process by which the Bureau effected changes in
its organizational structure and design to accommodate
community policing strategies was assessed using theoretical
guidelines abstracted from the organizational change
literature. This assessment led to a hypothesis that
innovative change which is incongruent with organizational
traditions and culture must be implemented
organization-wide, in an "all-or-none" fashion, to maximize
the probability that the change will become
institutionalized. The Bureau's inadvertent adherence
to most of the guidelines suggests that a pattern may exist
to guide the implementation of innovative organizational
change.
It was also found that the traditional bureaucratic
policing structure has been relaxed, but remains
quasi-bureaucratic in character, as a function of retaining
the traditional military rank structure.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Broad Overview
In January, 1990, the Portland Police Bureau joined
an expanding group of police organizations adopting an
alternative policing strategy called community policing.
Community policing is generally defined as
a new philosophy of policing, based on the concept
that police officers and private citizens working
together in creative ways can help solve contemporary
community problems related to fear of crime, social
and physical disorder, and neighborhood decay. The
philosophy is predicated on the belief that achieving
these goals requires that police departments develop
a new relationship with law-abiding people in the
community, giving them a greater voice in setting police
priorities and involving them in efforts to improve
the overall quality of life in their neighborhoods
(Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990, p. 5).
The introduction of problem solving as a policing
strategy shifts the focus of police work from reactive
law enforcement to proactive problem solving. The shift
in emphasis from law enforcement to problem solving
represents a major change from what is commonly known as
traditional policing, to a community policing approach.
Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux (1990) claim that this change
represents the first major police reform in over half a
century (p. ix).
The Pqrtland Police Bureau's organization-wide
transition from traditional to community policing presents
a unique opportunity to study the process by which one
police ageqcy is implementing this historic reform.
Tradi ~.ional policing is described as "incident-driven"
(Eck and Spelman, 1987). For example, the police routinely
respond to repeat calls for service to chronic problem
locations 1 • Yet, each call for service is treated as an
isolated incident. IBy tradition, the police have not
considered the social conditions that underlie chronic
call locations to be part of their domain of responsibility
(0. W. Wilson and McLaren, 1977; J. Q. Wilson, 1968).
In contrast, the community policing problem-solving
strategy se~ks to discover and address the underlying
circumstanc~s or situations that generate crime and
disorder, 0; that allow chronic problems to persist2 •
This approa.~h, called "problem-oriented policing," was
pioneered by Herman ~oldstein (1979). Problem-oriented
policing is often distinguished from the community policing
approach. pescribing these differences, Roberg and
Kuykendall (1993) claim that problem-oriented policing
is
• • • an attempt to base police responses on
systematic analysis of crime and related problems
rather than respIDnd to each case as a separate
event (p. 74). (This approach is] concerned with
identif~ing and ~olving problems rather than just
specifi~ criminal incidents, with or without input
from th~ community (p. 472).
2
3In contrast, the community policing approach is:
• • • a type of police role that emphasizes public
interaction and concern for community problems.
• • • an approach to police work that attempts
to bring the police and community into closer
contact by establishing a working partnership
between the police and the community (p. 466).
This comprehensive approach to public service delivery
is not confined to public safety. Osborne and Gaebler
(1992, p. 50) provide numerous examples of other kinds
of government agencies, at all levels of government, that
also are beginning to shift ownership and control of public
services away from the exclusive administration of
government bureaucracies, and into the communities.
The philosophical and strategic differences between
traditional and community policing require a reconfiguration
of the bureaucratic organizational structure that has served
the traditional policing model.
The Traditional Policing Model
Bureaucratic structure. The traditional policing
model operates under the classic principles of bureaucratic
organization. Early twentieth-century reformers believed
that these principles were universal in nature and
represented "one best way" to organize for maximal
productivity and efficiency (Taylor, 1911).
The traditional, bureaucratic organizational model 3
is characterized by:
A hierarchical, pyramidal power structure that
extends between a single head at the top and a
4broad base of personnel at the bottom (Staff Report,
1974). It is assumed that only the chief executive
and other top-level officials possess the information
and skills required for rational decision-making.
Street-level personnel who perform the actual
work are expected to act in accordance with
directives, rules and regulations issued by the
top command. This managerial arrangement cannot
accommodate participatory decision-making by
lower-level personnel.
An assumption that the organization has exclusive
responsibility for the dispensation of the types
of services the organization provides (Osborne
and Gaebler, 1992).
A standardized system of delivery for a limited
set of services. Requests for personalized services,
or for services that are not formally provided,
receive only perfunctory attention (Wilson, 1989).
The assumption that administrative efficiency will
translate into effective and equitable delivery
of services, giving precedence to internal procedure
over substantive effectiveness (Goldstein, 1990).
The use of short term costs and benefits as a
measurement of organizational effectiveness (Kelling
and Moore, 1988).
The bureaucratic structure remains the dominant
5organizational arrangement among police agencies, although
for the past three decades other local government agencies
and private sector organizations have been moving toward
flatter (Drucker, 1989, pp. 209-211), more flexible and
participatory organizational structures (Peters and
Waterman, 1982).
Consequences of bureaucratization. The bureaucratic
structure is reinforced in police organizations by a
quasi-military4 management structure. The military
tradition was introduced into policing during the
Progressive Reform era at the turn of the century. The
entrenchment of this tradition in the organizational culture
of the police is considered to be a major impediment to
both past and present attempts to implement innovative
operational changes in policing (Klockars, 1985). In
addition to creating a military-style, disciplinarian
management structure, the bureaucratization of municipal
police agencies eliminated many of the social services
the police once provided. Police services became singularly
focused on law enforcement.
The bureaucratic structure of police agencies is
designed around a single core technology - the automobile.
When street patrol officers are performing tasks outside
of their patrol cars, they are officially considered to
be "out of service." Officers are encouraged to dispense
with such tasks as quickly as possible in order to return
6to their patrol car and to "i.n-service" availability for
radio dispatch (Moore and Kelling, 1983). The heavy
reliance on the patrol car and on the 911 emergency dispatch
system has served to isolate :the police from the community
and to confine police-citizen encounters to situations
of conflict or crisis.
As a consequence, mutua~ly antagonistic attitudes
have developed between the pdlice and citizens (Bittner,
1970). The public h~s come bo view the police as
adversaries rather tnan allies (Wilson, 1968), and the
police have develope~ the pe~ception that citizens are
hostile toward the pplice function (Blumberg, 1985, p.
16) and hold persona~ hostile feelings toward individual
police officers as w~ll (Tauber, 1967, p. 95). This problem
is compounded by the common administrative policy of (a)
rotating beat areas ~nd shifts, preventing officers from
becoming familiar with neighborhood characteristics and
crime patterns, and (b) limiting the amount of time an
officer may spend in idle conversation with ordinary
citizens (Vaughn, 19'1; McElroy, Cosgrove and Sadd, 1992).
The Changing Environment !
Changing patterrys of crime and disorder. Until the
late 1970s (with the exception of the civil disorder that
erupted during the 1'60s), the pattern of crime and disorder
in America's cities ~emained relatively stable (Kelling
and Moore, 1988). This stability was marked by the virtual
containment of street crime and disorder within specific
7geographic boundaries or "districts." Such districts were
maintained both by zoning regulations and by government
neglect. Informal "containment-by-neglect" policies
functioned to maintain the districts as cultivated
"seedbeds" within which the police could conveniently locate
suspects for whom arrest warrants had been issued (Krohn,
personal communication, 1991). The concentration of
problems in certain well-known districts informed
law-abiding citizens of areas to avoid, and other parts
of the city remained relatively free of visible incivilities
(Hunter, 1978).
An overall decrease in crime during the decade of
the 1980s (Bureau of Justice, 1991, p. 92) was a welcome
trend for the police. The widespread fiscal retrenchment
that occurred in the 1970s reduced the number of police
officers by as much as 25 percent in some cities. The
respite was short-lived, however. Although, during the
1980s, serious crime decreased by as much as 26 percent
(U.S. Department of Justice, 1994), incidents of low
priority5 street crimes and disorderly behavior increased
markedly (Goldstein, 1990, p. 131; Moose, 1993, pp. 1-2;
Skogan, 1990, p. 34; Webber, 1991, p. 115). The incursion
of these problems into previously stable neighborhoods
led to an increase in calls for police services. The
reduced capacity of the police to deal with these problems
permitted their entrenchment in a greater number of
8neighborhoods throughout the cities (Jones, 1980).
In addition to a legalistic focus, neglect and resource
constraints, several other factors contributed to the
changing pattern of crime and disorder. During the late
1960s and early 1970s, state and federal appellate court
decisions decriminalized many minor offenses, such as public
drunkenness, vagrancy, disorderly conduct and many juvenile
status offenses (Kelling, 1987, p. 91). These rulings
placed further constraints on the weak order maintenance
services of local police. For example, Skogan (1990) notes
that in 1960, 52 percent of all non-traffic arrests involved
drunkenness, disorderly conduct, vagrancy, and suspicion
(p. 89). By 1990, this number had decreased to 12 percent
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1991). Furthermore,
the deinstitutionalization of mentally challenged persons
during the 1980s, with little provision for their health
care, increased the numbers of homeless persons living
on city streets (Goldstein, 1990, p. 46).
The absolute increase in the numbers of persons with
a perceived potential for disorderly behavior swelled beyond
the capacity of previously delineated districts, resulting
in the spill-over of these populations into historically
stable neighborhoods (Goldstein, 1990). The pervasiveness
of street disorder in America's cities over the past two
decades (Webber, 1992) was fueled in the mid-1980s by the
emergence of crack cocaine and violent, territorial youth
gangs, further challenging the resources and the core
tactics pf traditional policing.
As ~ consequence of the declining effectiveness of
traditiopal policing tactics against these new patterns
of crime and disorder, and the resultant increase in public
criticis~, police organizations across the country are
being pr~ssured to search for alternative policing
strategi~s. As this search has progressed, an increasing
number of police organizations have found that they must
expand their organizational domain to formally include
a range 9f order maintenance tasks that were not previously
consider.d to be part of the official police function.
The shift in social perspectives. Nearly a-_.,
quarter-~entury ago, Schon (1971) described the emerging
conditio"s that American police organizations are now
~xperienGing in their task environments. Schon observed
~ trend toward exponential growth in the magnitude and
pervasiv~ness of change that would expose the present
generatiqn to "social perspectives" unprecedented in human
~istory (p. 182).
The change in social perspectives that has occurred
~ince th~ traditional bureaucratic model of policing took
form has created a different public than the one policed
~s Ii ttlE~ as threE~ decades ago (see e.g. Bedeain, 1980,
p. 317; qunningham, 1972 ; Naisbitt, 1982 ; Rosengren, 1975,
p. 277; Qsborne and Gaebler, 1992). At the beginning of
9
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this century, few Americans had a high school education.1
By mid-century, the average American adult had a hi~h school
education, but was employed in unskilled, manual laQor
(Drucker, 1989). By 1980, three-quarters of the wo~k force
was employed in skilled or semiskilled jobs that required
some college or specialized training. The implicat~on
of this change for the police environment is that a greater
number of American families can now look beyond the concerns
of daily life than at any other time in history (Osqorne
and Gaebler, 1992). Americans are turning their at~ention
to the aesthetic appeal and quality of life in their
environments.
Hays (1976) notes that increased expectations, and I
greater concern for the quality of everyday life, are
directly correlated with higher educational attainment. I
Social problems that previously were believed to be
insoluble became focal public concerns during the 1980s.1
Mounted on the growing concern by the middle class for
the poor and for ethnic minorities that occurred during ,
the 1970s (Fogelson, 1977), are concerns for victims of
crime, domestic violence, and child abuse, reflected in
the increase in self-help groups and private-interest
coalitions (Naisbitt, 1982; Manning, 1984). Further
evidence of this trend is the active and widespread ~oncern
for environmental and health issues that has emerged ovett
the past two decades.
11
Shifting social perspectives are being observed also
within police ,organizations. McCreedy (1987) describes
these changesJ Among those he lists are: first, widespread
militant unionization occurred during the 1970s as a direct
result of the rule-driven, disciplinarian quasi-military
management st~ucture of traditional police organizations.
Officers began demanding a participative role in the
decisions that directly affected their work (p. 83).
Second, until the 1970s, police officers were predominantly
white males whose primary interests were directed toward
maintpining the status quo. The entrance of females and
racia~ minorities into the field introduced a diversity
of interests and perspectives. As these officers earned
promotions to higher ranks, they began influencing police
sensitivity toward a plurality of interests.
Third, thbse entering law enforcement during the 1970s
received their l educations in less authoritarian, free and
open 9lassrooms. These individuals were more resistant
to authoritarian leadership than the preceding generations
of of~icers. This progressive officer began introducing
new m~thods oflmanagement that have gradually influenced
chang~ in the operating philosophies of the police (Staff
Repor~:, 1974).1
Wycoff's (1988) studies support these observations.
Her r~search has found a general increase in job
satis~action among officers assigned to foot patrol beats
12
- reintroduced in the early 1980s - providing opportunities
for closer interaction with citizens. She claims that
this finding reveals a shift in the norms and values of
the police culture. Earlier, Blumberg and Niederhoffer
(1985) attributed this change to the increase in salaries
and fringe benefits that resulted from unionization in
the 1970s. They claimed that this change began attracting
college graduates who introduced "a set of competing values
that are at odds \vith a number of traditional police values"
(p. 142). And like McCreedy, they noted a positive impact
on police culture of women and racial minorities who entered
the police work force in the 1970s.
Couper (1991) also supports these observations, noting
that those entering policing today bring a different set
of job expectations and values to the profession than their
predecessors: "They want and expect to be part of a team"
(p. 23).
Police response to the changing environment. Osborne
and Gaebler (1992) maintain that the present changes
occurring in police organizations reflect a "reinvention"
of the role and function of government in general. These
authors claim that the driving force behind this
"reinvention" is akin to the Kuhnian6 concept of a
"paradigmatic shift." Such shifts occur when world views
change out from under accepted practices. Schon (1971)
characterizes such shifts as naturally-occurring crises
13
that result from broad social changes such pS those
described above (p. 55).
Moore and Stephens (1991, p. 109) clai~ that crisis
in the public sector is equivalent to private sector
bankruptcy. Either the bankrupt organizati9n shuts down
for good, or else it is "restructured into ~ profit-making
enterprise." These authors maintain that
• • • something like this is what happens in
a police department • • • when expectat~ons and
assumptions are undermined (p. 111). • powerful
forces have begun to undermine the notiQn that
crime fighting is the only way to use the assetsl
of a police agency for the benefit of sQciety (p~
31 ) •
It is not possible to identify all of the social,
economic, political, and other factors that have influenced
the role redefinition and organizational re~tructuring
taking place at all levels of government. ~ach typelof
government organization interacts with a un~que taskl
environment and is thus influenced by differential factors.
However, Osborne and Gaebler suggest that tne single 'most
influential factor in bringing about the "r~invention"
of government is retrenchment (see also Drucker, 1989).
Public service organizations are under pressure to search
for innovative ways to maximize the effectiveness of I
shrinking resources. In the case of police organizations,
the present and popular choice among alternatives is Ithe
community policing approach.
14
The Justification for Change
According to Kelling and Fogel (1987), police analysts
generally point to three major reasons for the apparent
shortcomings of traditional policing tactics in dealing
with the changing environment: first, traditional police
organizations are primarily structured to accommodate the
patrol car as the core technology of policing. The three
core tactics of traditional policing - preventive patrol;
rapid response to calls for service; and investigations
- are intricately bound to this core technology, limiting
the choices for alternative police roles (p. 168).
Second, the inaccessibility of officers who are
confined to their patrol cars prevents flexible interaction
with the community. Officers thus lose access to important
information that the community may possess about "\vho is
in the community, the identity of criminals living there,
what kind of 'action' is going on, and who is and is not
involved" (p. 168). Kelling and Fogel's contention that
information gathered from citizens is the single most
important factor in the solution of crimes echoes the
opinions of other prominent police analysts 7 •
Third, citizens oftentimes are unwilling to cooperate
with police processing of criminals because of the distrust
that develops as a result of having only negative encounters
with the police. In many neighborhoods, the police are
viewed as an "invading force," and their "intervention
15
is often ~erceived as illegitimate, intrusive, resented,
and on oc~~asion, resisted" (Wilson, 1968a, p. 169). (See
also Webster and Connors, 1992).
Thes~ examples underscore the restrictions that the
core technology of traditional policing places on the range
of police tactics~ In turn, the limited set of tactics
restricts the choices of activities and behavior of the
police to those which exclude interaction, and
informatiqn-sharimg, with law-abiding citizens.
The Community Policing Approach
The ~resumed merits of community policing. In 1988,
the u.S. Oepartment of Justice began publishing a series
of report q on community policing. These reports were
generated from numerous executive sessions held at Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government. Leading experts
on policiQg issues focused on community and problem-oriented
policing as alternatives to traditional policing methods.
These reports were distributed to police officials, policy
makers, and scholars throughout the country, generating
a debate about the merits of change.
The reports claim that community policing promises
to remedy the limitations of traditional policing by
providing a broader range of formal services than law
enforcement alone.1 It is also claimed that greater policing
efficiency can be achieved by shifting some of the costs
and responsibility for public safety to the cOITUnunity
16
(Murphy, 1988b). Further, community policing proponents
claim that it is "smarter ll policing because (a) the
proactive problem-solving component can eliminate repeated
response to chronic problem locations (Brown, 1989); (b)
it can reduce the opportunities for crime by addressing
the underlying conditions that generate crime and that
allow crime to persist (Wilson and Kelling, 1984); and
(c) in many cases, it can reduce reliance on the criminal
justice system altogether, and on the use of coercive force
(Goldstein, 1987b, p. 10).
It is theorized that the achievement of community
policing objectives tends to revitalize declining
neighborhoods by integrating police services with other
public and private services in a comprehensive approach
to solving neighborhood problems (Trojanowicz and
Bucqueroux, 1990; Wilson and Kelling, 1982; Wycoff, 1985).
However, although troublesome pockets within neighborhood
communities have been brought under control by problem
solving, it is yet to be demonstrated that community
policing can revitalize neighborhoods. Chronic problems
of crime and disorder are associated with deep-seated
socioeconomic, political, and educational problems, and
with differences in cultural values over which the police
and individual neighborhood communities have no control.
Nevertheless, early skepticisms of the long-term
effectiveness of community policing (see e.g., Manning,
17
1988, and Mastrofski, 1988) have been overshadowed by the
I
enthusiastic endorsement of community policing by many
criminal justice schQlars, practitioners, and by the
I
endorsement of the f~dera[ government (Grine, 1994;
Rosenbaum, Yeh, and Wilkinson, 1994, p. 331).
I
Changing the bureaucratic structure. Elements of
"
the traditional bureaucratic structure restrict the range
of police behaviors and activities. Therefore, fundamental
changes in the bureaucratic structure of traditional police
I
organizations are necessary to accommodate community
I
problem-solving strategies. Community policing
organizations are dev~loping toward an organizational
I
structure and design that:more closely resembles the
I
emerging "entrepIieneu:l='ial'~model of government agencies
described by Osborne ~nd Gaebler (1992). This new
organizational anrang~menu is characterized by:
• Decentralizatiop of Idecision-making authority to
the lowest Ilevet of Iresponsibility in the
organization. rhis Ichange is based on the notion
that those lin t~e onganization who provide the actual
services ane in the Ibest position to know how their
tasks shou~d be perfiormed9 (Archambeault and Fenwick,
198 3, p • 9 )1 •
• A shift from cl,iming sole responsibility for the
provision of services to that of catalyzing citizens
I
and commun~ties toward self-help and community-based
I
18
problem-solving •
• A strong emphasis on customer service •
• A shift in administrative focus from a preoccupation
with operational efficiency to a concern for the
substantive problems in the organization's task
environment. This concern is expressed in research
efforts to identify the essential nature or
characteristics of a particular community that tend
to generate the need for a disproportionate amount
of the services that are provided by the organization.
This approach represents a shift from providing
services after problems occur, to seeking ways to
prevent the problems from occurring in the first
instance (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Goldstein, 1990) •
• Customer satisfaction and long-term improvement
in the organization's task environment as indicators
of effectiveness.
New organizational structure and design. The Portland
Police Bureau (1990) declared its intention to adopt this
new organizational arrangement in its original Community
Policing Transition Plan:
The Police Bureau is committed to fostering a
proactive organizational climate that rewards its
employees for initiative, innovation, citizen
involvement, and consensus building in problem
resolution. The Bureau encourages decentralization
of Bureau resources and delegation of decision making
to those persons or units most impacted by the
identified community safety problem. • •• police
officers will be catalysts who bring the necessary
resources to bear on specific community safety problems
19
throughout Portland. • •• Citizens and police officers
will mutually participate in, and be responsible for,
strategy design and problem solving that emphasizes
comprehensive responses to criminal incidents (p. 6).
Comparing Traditional and Community Policing
Major differences. The community policing approach
is, both operationally and philosophically, a major
departure from the traditional policing model that has
dominated American municipal police for most of the
twentieth century. Many of the differences are claims
and assumptions yet to be borne out:
• The separate but related functions of law enforcement
and order maintenance are integrated and expanded
such that the segmented subunits within police
agencies all are tasked with achieving the overarching
goal of long-term improvement in the safety and
quality of life in the total community. Community
policing "streamlines and refines traditional policing
methods" as it is integrated into a total package
of police services (Kueckler, 1992, p. 12).
The community policing concept represents a major
philosophical change, not only about the nature of
policing, but about the nature of the garden variety
street crimes (Gibbons, 1987, p. 231) that consume
the greater part of the law enforcement function
of local police. Instead of being viewed by the
police as nuisances, these crimes are now viewed
as symptoms of deeper socioeconomic and demographic
20
problems in the parti~ular neighborhood community
in which they occur. Thus, the police have publicly
declared that because they cannot control the root
causes of crime and di.. sorder, Ithey cannot control
crime. Because crime and disorder are generated
by the community, the communiby must share in the
responsibility for itEi control. The "blue curtain"
of insularity is removed, and Ithe community is
expected to participa~e in the identification of
problems, prioritizin~ police services, and work
in partnership with tqe police in problem resolution.
Police service delivery is no longer standardized.
Instead, police servioes are designed to target the
unique needs and problems of individual neighborhood
communities (Brown, 1989) •
. The quasi-military management structure is relaxed
to take advantage of a "ne\.., breed" of police officer.
Today's police officers are better educated and more
accepting of change and diversity. They are likely
to be female and/or a member of an ethnic or cultural
minority, bringing a broader range of values and
interests to modern police forces (McCreedy, 1987).
• Individual skills and creativity are tapped by
decentralizing decision-making: authority to the patrol
officer, and/or creating lateral coordination between
and among ranks, and o~ganizational subunits.
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• Permanent assignments replace the tradition of
shift and beat rotation. Officers are encouraged
to become thorough~y familiar with the lifestyles,
problems, and peop:le in a neighborhood community
(Goldstein, 1990). Mutual trust is fostered between
the officer and th~ neighborhood residents through
joint effort to adpres$ neighborhood problems •
• Investigative functions are decentralized. Detectives
are permanently as~igned to precinct stations or
police ministation~ fon the purpose of coordinating
their expertise with the working knowledge of street
patrol officers to dev~lop a knowledge base about
neighborhood patte~ns of crime and disorder. This
change is an effor~: to Ibecome "customer-oriented"
and remedy dissati~facbionwith the casual police
response to low-pr~orit¥ problems such as household
burglary, car prow~s, and thefts.
Expanding the organ~zational domain. Finally, the
most significant departur'e iSI the expansion of the domain
of the police to include the roles of advocate for the
community, and political activist. Reiss (1985) touches
upon this expanded role in his discussion of police
involvement in actively planning for social change and
planning the future of society. In the past, the police
have not become involved in the policy decisions that
oftentimes hindered police effectiveness. For example,
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the implications for public safety in issues such as design
layouts for private shopping malls and high density
apartments, public transportation planning, zoning of adult
entertainment establishments, liquor and other licensing
decisions and so forth, have been outside the domain of
the police. In other words, in the past, the police have
been passive recipients of the policy making and management
decisions of others. Crime prevention and problem solving
through front-end involvement in environmental design and
management policies has been identified as the "crux" of
community policing (Garvey, personal communication, 1992;
Merrill, personal communication, 1993).
Reiss calls attention to the novelty of this new role
for the police:
Police organizations are given largely to
deterrence rather than compliance law enforcement
and attending to 'serious' rather than 'soft' crime
matters. Yet what matters most in the communities
•.• are matters of compliance with the law and
control of soft crime. • • • Failure to comply
with regulations governing the health, welfare
and safety of communities may be far more
consequential to collective life than are major
crimes by offenders called criminals (p. 68).
Reiss further notes that implicit in the term
"community policing" is the assumption that the problem
of law enforcement is not "isolated from the problems of
a community and its residents and from their quality of
life" (p. 68). This observation echoes Schon's (1971)
comment that many of the social ills in urban communities
are left unattended because there are no corresponding
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public service agencies to deal with them (p. 182).
Thus, the expanded domain of the police includes
education and training for corporate and business
communities, private security organizations, and other
local and state public service providers in responsible
management of practices that impact not only on police
effectiveness, but on the safety and quality of life in
the community as well. In addition to training, community
policing organizations monitor management practices and
impose service sanctions to ensure compliance8 (also see
Bayley, 1988, p. 230).
In summary, the police are being pressured, by changes
taking place in their task environments, to rethink their
role and function in society (Brown, 1989). Police scholars
and commentators have boldly suggested specific changes
that they believe the police need to make to increase their
effectiveness in dealing with the changing patterns of
crime and disorder in urban communities (see e.g., Geller,
1985, and Goldstein, 1979, 1990, 1993). Although the
specifications for change are clear, adopting organizations
are left with the question, How do we get from here to
there?
The Present study
The Scope of this study.
In 1990, the Portland Police Bureau published a
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transition plan to guide a gradual, organization-wide
conversion to community policing over a period of five
years. This study, a documentation and assessment of th~
conversion process, covers only the first four years of
this plan. The ultimate success or failure of the plan
therefore, cannot be determined by this study.
Limitations
The Portland environment contains many unique
characteristics which have proved to be especially
facilitory for the implementation of community policing.
These unique features limit the reliability of generalizing
the findings of this study to other adopting police
organizations. For example, the Bureau was spared the
problems of organizing community involvement by a
pre-existing city agency, the Office of Neighborhood
Associations (aNA). Established in 1974, this agency is
tasked with (a) providing crime prevention services, and
(b) coordinating citizen participation in local government
affairs. Evaluations of other community policing project~
all have pointed to community organizing as a major obsta9le
to implementing community policing (Grine, 1994; McElroy,
Cosgrove and Sadd, 1993; Reiss, 1985; Williams and Sloan,
1990).
aNA's Crime Prevention Specialists and other staff
members assumed the task of organizing and coordinating
community involvement in the Bureau's transition to
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community policing from the outset.
other unique features include
• the broad-based support of the Bureau's adoption of
community policing by city, county, and state public
officials;
• the implementation of community policing organization-
wide, without first carrying out a pilot project to test
its effectiveness.
• the extraordinarily high percentage of Bureau police
officers who are college-educated. Sixty percent of
the force is college-educated compared with 6 percent
nationally (Reaves, 1990).
the high level of citizen participation in the planning
and design of community policing, and in the on-going
strategic planning process.
• the decision to not use a split force, or special unit
of community policing officers. All of the Bureau's
employees, both sworn and non-sworn, are actively
involved in community policing.
Research Questions
The following questions will guide this documentation
and assessment of the Bureau's change process:
1. What events or circumstances created the perceived
need for change in the role and function of the Portland
police?
2. By what process, and by whom, were alternatives
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to the trapitional policing approach selected?
3. Wpat structural organizational changes were
effected fpr the purpose of maximizing the probability
of successtul institutionalization of the community policing
approach?
4. By what pr9cess did organizational restructuring
and redesi9n take place?
Why this study is Important
The 1~94 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act promis~s federal funding and technical assistance for
state, county, and local police organizations presently
adopting, qr planning to adopt the community policing
approach. The Act promises that funding will be made
available ~o
• develop ,and establish new administrative and
managerial systems to facilitate the adoption of
community-oriented policing as an organization-wide
philosophy (p. 9).
The most recenb literature indicates that community
policing is still in the developmental and experimental
stages (Clqrk, 1994;1 Rosenbaum, 1994). Although the
literature is rife with suggestions about the types of
changes needed to implement community policing (see e.g.,
Brown, 1989; Goldstein, 1993; Kelling, Wasserman and
Williams, 1989; Kenn.edy, 1993; Sparrow, 1988; Stipak, Immer
and Clavadetscher, 11994), few guidelines are available
to assist adopting organizations in the change process.
There are no communilty policing projects currently in
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operation which can recommend themselves as general "models"
for organizational redesign (Goldstein, 1993; Rosenbaum,
1994) •
It is hoped that the present study may serve to
enlighten the field of police studies about the elements
of successful implementation of innovative change in police
organizations by identifying both the strengths and
shortcomings of the Bureau's implementation process.
Theoretical Considerations
Organizational change. The general theoretical issues
underlying the introduction of innovative organizational
change are those of discovering (a) the kind of
organizational structure that will support and sustain
the planned change; (b) a process by which restructuring
can be achieved, and (c) a process by which the innovation
itself can be introduced that will maximize the probability
of successful implementation.
Bedeain (1980) claims that the process of
organizational change is
one of the least developed areas of
organizational study, despite research dating
back some 30 years. Therefore, no integrated
theory of organizational change exists; nor are
the attendant problems associated with the dynamics
of the change process understood in more than
a rough and ill-defined manner (p. 293).
Absent a theory to guide organizational restructuring,
police agencies adopting the community policing approach
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are challenged to discover, through trial-and-error
practice, the kind of organizational structure and design
that will support and sustain the planned change, and the
process by which the change can be accomplished.
This does not, however, rule out a theoretical analysis
of the innovative changes presently taking place in police
organizations. Numerous post hoc analyses of past attempts
to implement innovative change in police organizations
are available to inform present-day police administrators
of factors that may be necessary to consider to enhance
the probability of successful organizational change. In
addition, a pool of knowledge exists about organizational
change in general. This information may be useful in
guiding decisions about the kinds of changes required,
pitfalls to avoid, and the process by which change can
be effected.
Theoretical Guidelines
Requisite structural Changes
The accumulating knowledge about the human dynamics
of organizations provides strong evidence that the structure
of organizations is a major determinant of employee
behavior. Bolman and Deal (1992) echo Schon (1971, p.
34) in their assertion that "most 'people' problems really
stem from structural flaws rather than flaws in individuals"
(p. 355). Sandler and Mintz's (1974) claim that this is
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"nowhere more dramatically illustrated than in the field
of law enforcement" (p. 458) was recently supported by
Wycoff and Skogan's (1994) evaluation of the Madison,
Wisconsin's community policing project.
Several structural features of traditional policing
organizations have been identified as impediments to the
adoption of community policing. These are (1) the
quasi-military management structure (Auten, 1985; Kelling
and Moore, 1988; Klockars, 1985; Manning, 1988), (2) reward
and promotion criteria (Reiss, 1985a; Sparrow, 1988), and
(3) recruitment and training practices (Brown, 1989;
Goldstein, 1993; Mastrofski, 1988).
The quasi-military management structure imposes a
punitive style of supervision that is a disincentive to
risk-taking and creativity necessary for the problem-solving
orientation of community policing. In addition to being
strategically incompatible with community policing, it
is incompatible also with the internal goals of
decentralization and empowerment. Reward and promotion
criteria must be congruent with the customer focus of
community policing that requires employee recognition for
quality job performance. Recruitment policies must be
compatible with the principle that public servants should
represent the cultural and ethnic diversity of the
communities they serve. Training must include leadership
and community service skills.
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Organizational Change Process
Margulies and Wallace's (1973) in-depth analysis of
the organizational change process produced the following
propositions:
Planned change efforts are more likely to be
successful if initiated and supported by top
management.
Change will flow more smoothly when those who will
be affected are brought into the change process
at the earliest possible stage.
Successful change requires time and repeated
effort.
Bedeain (1980) adds a fourth essential element to Margulies
and Wallace's list of propositions:
Progress is closely monitored to enable mid-course
corrections.
Sparrow (1988) confirms several of these implementation
guidelines for police organizations. He also cautions
police executives that community policing should not be
treated as a policy change issued by a top-down directive.
Rather, the chief executive
will require outside help in changing the
organization;
will need to identify outside pressure groups,
and curry their support for the change before s/he
can convince the organization to adopt the change.
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Kimberly (1981) refers to s~ch change strategies as
"tactical guidelines" for adoptiqn and implementation
of innovative change, and cautio~s decis~on-makers to keep
in mind that
• • .an organization is a social system comprised
of actors with varying inte~ests and priorities and
any particular innovation iqtrudes on a previously
negotiated set of agreement~ about how these interests
and priorities are to be aCQommodated. ••• extensive
involvement of participants • • • in the design of
the implementation strategy should ~e encouraged in
order to shape their expect~tions about how their
roles will be affected (p. 93).
Internal Resistance to Change
Numerous guidelines are available to help change agents
deal with internal resistance to change.: Roberg and
Kuykendall (1990) maintain that:
The ultimate success of any organizational change
depends on how well the organizatio~ can alter the
behavioral patterns of its e~ployees (p. 385).
Griener (1967) reviewed the organ~zational change literature
and concluded that successful alterationlof employees'
behavior hinges on two key factorp: (1) a redistribution
of power within the organization puch that traditional
top-down decision-making practicep move toward greater
use of shared power, and (2) the ~equisibe redistribution
of power occurs through a developmental process of change
(p. 126), i.e., through supportin~ structural changes.
Griener found that once it i~ agreed that power-sharing
will be the rule, successful chan~e is enhanced through
a number of specific and interrel~ted phases:
Pressure for change is directed at top management
by key, influential actors both inside and outside
the organization.
The assistance of an outside, expert consultant
is sought early in the change process.
The problem is diagnosed through collaborative
discussions, coordinated by the outside consultant,
and involving personnel at all levels of the
organization.
Alternative solutions are selected by collaborative
discussion, also coordinated by the outside expert,
among relevant actors, both inside and outside
the organization.
Experiments are carried out to test the new
solutions.
The positive results from experimentation with
the new solutions are used as reinforcement to
encourage greater acceptance at all levels of
the organization of the use of shared power as
an approach to introducing change.
Kimberly's (1981) review of organizational change
resE~arch contributed additional guidelines, many of which
concur with those already listed:
The change advocate must have an influential ally.
Top management must be committed to the change.
The nature and purpose of the change should be
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expressed clearly to reduce ambiguity.
Change agents should be able to manage conflict
effectively in order to coordinate as much
consensus as possible.
Users must be involved in the design of the
implementation9.
New roles are created to facilitate the integration
of new activities resulting from the change.
In their review of the literature, Lewis and Greene
(1978) also developed a list of factors specifically related
to resistance to change in police organizations. Their
findings support Kimberly and the others:
Key actors must agree about the goals of the planned
change.
Key actors must agree about the expected benefits.
Those whose jobs will ultimately be affected must
be included in the planning and development of
the change.
Goals must be clearly stated.
In addition, these authors confirm Griener's emphasis on
the importance of monitoring the implementation process
so that necessary changes can be effected on a timely basis
to undergird the implementation success.
Bolman and Deal (1991) maintain that change agents
must be aware of the interdependency of structure and
culture. In addition to generally supporting the guidelines
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developed by the pioneering studies of organizational change
mentioned above, these authors stress the need to invest
heavily in training at the same time that roles are being
redefined:
Cr~ating new roles and developing new skills need
to b~ done in concert. Retraining people without
revi~ing roles or revamping roles without re-educating
peop~e almost never works (p. 375).
Fina~ly, in his review of the literature, Griener
(1967) notes three factors commonly present in failed
attempts to implement innovative change:
1. The decision to change was made unilaterally and
issue4 as ,a directive from top management.
2. Pqwer~sharing was limited to group decision-making.
3. S~nsitlivity training was introduced as a way to
chang~ behavior and garner acceptance of the
plann~d change.
Organizationa~ structure and Design
In a pioneering study of organizational structure,
Lawrence ~nd Dorsch (1970) developed a set of propositions
pertainin~ to Istructural design:
Th€lre is no "one best way" to organize.
or~anizational structure is shaped by contingencies
of technology, size, environment, strategic choices
by management, and other factors which may vary
wi~h organization type.
An organization's structure and design is contingent
upon the kind of environment in which it operates.
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Bureaucratic structurep ane appropriate for stable,
predictable task envirpnments for which tasks can
be routinized, and inappropriate for unstable,
turbulent task environmenbs in which tasks are
situationally determin~d. '
Bureaucratic structure~ willI respond to an increase
in environmental insta~ility by differentiation.
The degree of complexity in the structural design
of an organization will mirror the degree of
complexity in the orgaijization's domain and task
environment.
The internal functioniqg, or organizational
capacity, must be cong~uent with the demands of
the organization's tas~s, technology, external
environment, and the n~edslof its members.
Although these propositions were developed over two
decades ago for industrial organizations, they have remained
viable references for contemporary organization analysts
such as Bolman and Deal (1991), Mmre and Wegener (1992);
Rainey (1991); and Roberg and Kuy~endall (1990).
Summary of Theor~tical Guidelines
These numerous propositions and guidelines - derived
from theory, empirical observations, and case study analyses
- will serve as the framework forlanalysis of the Bureau's
change process. The following is la summary list of these
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guidelines:
Reguisite structural Changes
1. The quasi-m~litary, authoritarian managerial
arrangement must be replaced by a participatory
management ~tru~ture.
2. The criteri~ fot rewards must emphasize quality
service.
3. Promotions qriteria must be based upon a
demonstrateq ability to carry out community
policing strategies, competency, and leadership
skills.
4. Recruitment poltcies must include seeking qualified
candidates who neflect the cultural and ethnic
diversity of the community served.
5. Training must include community policing skills.
Role redefinition must take place concomitant
with retraining.1
Organizational Change Pro'cess
6. The chief exscutive should initiate the change
process by eplisting an outside consultant or
expert to act as a neutral-party change-agent
to assist in developing and coordinating the
change proceps.
7. The chief eX\9cubive must be committed to the
idea that chpnge is necessary, and committed
to the alterpati¥e selected.
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8. Goals must be clear.
9. Relevant actors and groups from both inside
and outside the organization must be included
in the planning and implementation processes.
10. Once the problem is diagnosed and alternatives
are agreed upon, experiments are designed to
test the innovations.
11. Successful change requires time and repeated
effort.
12. Progress must be monitored to enable mid-course
corrections.
Internal Resistance to Change
13. In the case of innovative change in police
organizations, public support for the change
must be garnered before the planned change
is introduced into the organization to help counter
internal resistance.
14. A redistribution of power must be effected
within the organization, i.e., decision-making
authority must be pushed down to the lowest
level of responsibility.
15. Power redistribution must occur through a
developmental process of change rather than
by sudden and arbitrary appointment.
16. Those directly affected by the change should
be brought into the change process at the
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earliest possible stage.
17. The nature and purpose of the change should
be expressed clearly to reduce ambiguity and
resistance.
18. Role redefinitions must take place concomitant
with retraining.
19. Experiments are carried out to test the innovation.
20. Positive results yielded by the experiments
are used to reinforce the change and encourage
acceptance at all levels of the organization.
Organizational structure and Design
21. The kind of organizational design required to
develop the capacity to achieve organizational
goals is contingent upon the kind of environment
in which the organization operates: Bureaucratic
structures are inappropriate for turbulent,
unstable task environments.
22. There is no "one best way" to organize.
23. Bureaucratic structures will respond to an
increase in environmental instability by
differentiation and integration.
24. The degree of complexity in the organizational
design will mirror the degree of complexity in
the organization's environment.
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study Assumptions
In addition to those already cited, a number of
scholars, police commentators, and organization analysts
support the propositions and guidelines set out above (see
e.g., Brewer and deLeone, 1983; Germann, 1969; Kerr, 1976;
Lynn, 1987; McCreedy, 1987; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992;
Weston, 1976; Wilson, 1989). Understanding that "no theory
drawn from past experience may be taken as literally
applicable to this situation" (Schon, 1971, p. 231), the
summary guidelines are not assumed to be a reliable
analytical tool for projecting the success or failure of
the Portland Police Bureau's change process. Rather, the
use of these theoretical guidelines is intended to inform,
and to contribute to the growing body of knowledge about
the process of organizational change among police agencies.
Organizational theorists typically do not distinguish
between public- and private-sector organizations. The
organizational charts of both public and private
organizations generally reflect similar designs with regard
to hierarchical managerial arrangements, division of labor,
and internal differentiation reflected by subunits and/or
organizational divisions to separate administrative support
functions and operations.
Although Rainey (1991) argues that critical differences
exist in both the internal and external environments of
public and private organizations10 , he also agrees that
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all organizations are affected by the contingency fa9tors
discussed earlier (see also, Goggin, Bowman, Lester ~nd
O'Toole, 1990, and Lynn, 1987). It is assumed therefore
that any differences that may obtain between public ~nd
private organizations are irrelevant to the present ~tudy.
Each participant interviewed in this study is a~sumed
to have provided as accurate an account of their exp~rience
as possible. It is acknowledged, however, that individual
experience and self-interest shapes individual realities
and perspectives. Therefore, the data collected from
interviews and conversations with participants in th~
Bureau's change process has been cross-validated, ei~her
in interviews, conversations, or written documentatiqn
of the change, to the greatest extent possible.
Definition of Terms
• Differentiation refers to the establishment of
subunits, staffed with personnel who are speci~lly
trained to deal with a specific problem or set of
problems.
• Goals are the intended outcomes to be achieved by
the tasks an organization performs, and which qefine
its role in the environment.
Integration is the process of coordinating the efforts
and activities of all subunits toward achieving
organizational goals.
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• Organizational capacity is the ability of an
organization to coordinate its structure, routines,
and personnel to carry out the tasks necessary to
achieve a specified goal or set of goals (Goggin
et al., 1990).
• Organizational culture consists of an abstract set
of rules, beliefs, customs, myths, skills, and
patterns of relationships that are constructs of
the nature of the actual or perceived roles and
status of members.
• Organizational domain locates the organization in
its environmental niche, and includes the range of
products and services offered.
· An organizational set is comprised of all
organizations which provide the same type of product
and/or service for a similar customer base.
• Organizational structure consists of the arrangements
and relationships of those elements that make up
the design of the organization. Elements include
the formal assignment of responsibility and authority
(roles); patterns of communication; hierarchy of
power; span of control (the ratio of supervisors
to subordinates); rank; formal rules; task
organization; and material rewards.
• Organizational subunits refer to various
organizational segments in which similar tasks are
compartmentalized, and precincts located in separate
geographical locations. These subunits are
hereinafter referred to as "responsibility units"
(RUs) in keeping with Bureau vernacular •
• Tasks represent the actual work (output) that an
organization performs to achieve its policy goals.
• Task envirorment consists of those parts of the
·environment that are relevant to goal setting and
goal attainment. The task environment of police
organizations include "customers"; the penal code,
state statutes and local ordinances that fall under
the jurisdiction of the police; political officials
and social and interest groups which scrutinize police
operations, including the media; employees; and any
other relevant actors, groups, or situations affected
by the police in their day-to-day operations.
Rosenbaum (1994) accurately observes that:
At this moment in history, there is no simple
definition of community policing, either in theory
or in practice (p. xii).
To illustrate this observation, the following definitions
of community policing have been abstracted from the
literature:
"The ultimate definition of community policing is what
the Department and the community agree it to be"
(Montgomery County Police Department, 1991).
"Community policing is an operating philosophy (values
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and attitude) rather than specific tactics. [AJ
proactive complemept to the traditional (reactive)
approach of answer~ng emergency calls. Community
policing also stre~ses crime prevention, problem
solving, and coopefation b~tween the police and community
and other agencies" (Seatt~e Police Department, 1991).
"Community policin~;r is a partnership between the police
and citizens to improve the quality of life. [NJot
a program or addit~on to t~aditional policing. It is
an umbrella that encompasses a broad range of techniques
and resources II (Te~pe Arizona Police Department, 1991).
liThe basic idea is to make public safety a community
responsibility. [rJhe police officer becomes a
catalyst for community self.-help" (Osborne and Gaebler,
1993, p. 50).
"Community policin~ is not a program. [ItJ is a
philosophy, a styl~ and a method of providing police
service and managi~g the police organization. The
police are bonded ~o the community through the
development of strt~ctured, 'working partnerships II
(Vaughn, 1991, pp. 15-17).
"••• a police/community coalition against crime and
disorder. Police Qecome facilitators and catalysts
for ad hoc groupin~s of neighborhood associations,
schools, businesse~, government agencies and other
institutions II (Burqen, 19921, p. 31).
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"Community policing relies on an intimate relationship
between police and citizens" (Kelling and Moore, 1988,
p. 21).
" ••• an inte~active process between police officers
assigned to sp~cific beats • • • to mutually develop
ways to identify problems and concerns and then to assess
viable solutiops by providing available resources from
both the polic~ department and the community to address
the problems apd/or concerns" (Oettmeier, 1988, p. 126),
(Houston) •
" ••• police ~trategy and tactics are adapted to fit
the needs and +equirememts of different communities.
[W]here there is a diversification of the kinds of
programs and s~rvices on the basis of community needs
and demands • , • and where there is considerable
involvement of the community with the police in reaching
their objectiv~s" (Reiss, 1985, p. 63), (Baltimore
County, Maryland).
"Communi ty pol~.cing [is] a philosophical position which
holds that the goals o£ policing, the conditions which
it addresses, the services it delivers, the means used
to deliver the~, and the assessment of its adequacy
should be form~lated and developed in recognition of
the distinctiv~ experience, needs, and norms of local
communities as well as the dictates of the law "
(McElroy et al~, 1993, p. 7), (New York City).
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"••• a cooperative approach to working with citizens
and other agencies based on the concept of shared
responsibility for community security" (DeWitt, 1992),
(Seattle).
"Community policing is just simply working very closely
with your citizens. So it's just working hand in hand
with the folks and knowing you're out there to be their
friend" (Sadd and Grinc (1994, p. 36), (Norfolk,
Virginia).
End Notes
1. For example, a 1986 study in Minneapolis found
that 5 percent of the locations to which the police were
summoned represented 64 percent of their total calls for
service (Sherman, 1987). A similar study of the Edmonton,
Alberta police department found 74 percent of the calls .
were generated from repeat-call locations (Hornick, Burro~s,
Tjosvold, and Phillips, 1990), and in New York City, 10
percent of the addresses to which the police responded
generated 60 percent of the total calls for service
(McElroy, et al., 1993). (Also see End Note 2).
2. An example of incident-driven policing is provid~d
by Goldstein (1990): In 1988, a police sergeant in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, became aware that officers
had been dispatched to a single address 505 times in six
months on a complaint of loud noise. The sergeant
accompanied the officers on the next call from the addres$,
a building which housed a neighborhood bar and apartments~
The sergeant discovered that it was not noise, but rather
the vibrations created by jukebox speakers, which were
attached to a common wall between the bar and the
complainant's apartment. Eager to cooperate with the
police, the bar owner moved the speakers to an outside
wall and the calls to the police stopped (p. 81).
3. The purpose of identifying and classifying the
type of organizational structure typical of traditional
policing is to provide a basis for comparison of the type
of organizational structure perceived to be necessary to
accommodate community policing.
4. For a detailed description of the military
characteristics and practices of police agencies, see
this
See
1966;
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Archambeault and Fenwick (1983, pp. 3-12). An historical
overview of the military model is provided by Fogelson
(1977).
5. Low priority incidents are classified as
non-emergency. Examples include public drunkenness;
prostitution and soliciting, drug use and drug marketing,
noisy parties, and barking dogs, to name a few.
6. The Kuhnian concept of a paradigmatic shift in
science is commonly invoked by a variety of disciplines
to explain revolutionary change. Basically, the concept
describes a confrontation between theory and reality.
New discoveries which conflict with a prevailing theory
create a crisis that in turn establishes a demand to explain
the incompatibility, and to take compensatory action. (See
Kuhn, 1970).
7. Although not empirically demonstrated, it is
commonly supposed that information provided by victims
and witnesses is the single most important factor in the
solution of crimes. See e.g., Friedmann, 1990, p. 82;
Kelling and Fogel, 1987, p. 168; Kelling and Moore, 1988,
p. 10; Sandler and Mintz, 1974, p. 460; Skogan, 1990, p.
15; Skolnick and Bayley, 1986, p. 23; Trojanowicz, Gleason;
Pollard and Sinclair, 1987, p. 11; Webber, 1991, p. 120;
8. For an example of the use of service sanctions
to enforce compliance, see description of the Neighborhood
Response Team (NRT) program, (see page 160).
9. Organization analysts have been aware of
basic tenet of organizational change for decades.
e.g., eoch and French, 1948; Lewin, 1952; Watson,
Hersey and Blanchard, 1972.
10. A few of the more distinctive differences are
that (a) activities are often coercive and monopolistic
requiring the organization itself to exercise sanctions
against independent action. This is because participation
in the consumption and financing of public services is
mandatory; (b) the organization functions under the onus
of unique public expectations for fairness, responsiveness,
honesty, openness, and accountability; and (c) there are
more intensive external political influences on decisions,
e.g., public opinion, and interest group and constituent
pressures (Rainey, 1991, p. 133).
CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Organizational Change
This review is not intended to exhaust the literature
on organizational change. Rather, it is a compendium of
major innovative changes in police organizations that,
similar to community policing, represent a potential for
effecting fundamental change in the traditional
organizational structure and culture of the police.
Dimensions of organizational change. The magnitude
of organizational change varies, depending upon the type
of change, and its purpose. This dimension of
organizational change is referred to as either incremental,
or innovative. Incremental changes modify or augment
existing routines, patterns of organization and behavior,
or policies. These are "shallow" changes (Ledford, Mohrman,
Mohrman and Lawler, 1989, p. 10) that amount to
"orientations" which tend to reinforce the basic structure
and core values of the organization (Tushman and Romanelli,
1985, p. 176). Incremental changes "graft new programs
onto old philosophies, organizational designs, and
management practices" (Roberg and Kuykendall, 1993, pp.
419-20).
Innovative changes introduce new routines, patterns
of organization and behavior, and policies that may
represent "transformational" change (Egri and Frost, 1991,
p. 184) where "strategies, power, structure and systems
change" (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985, pp. 173,179).
Innovative changes are sometimes revolutionary.
Revolutionary change challenges the basic assumptions and
realities around which an organization is structured, and
which gives form to an organization's culture. Gersick
(1991) describes revolutionary change as a "recreation"
during which the organization must be "dismantled" and
a subset of the systems old pieces, along with
some new pieces, [must] be put back together into
a new configuration, which operates according to
a new set of rules (p. 19).
Although the definitions of incremental change and
innovative change clarify their differences, the
distinctions become less clear when innovative change is
adopted piece-meal. A change may, by its nature, qualify
as an innovative change, but when adopted by a single
organizational subunit rather than organization-wide, it
becomes, in effect, incremental. Examples of this
distinction among police organizations are innovative
"add-ons" (Walker, 1993, p. 40) such as police-community
relations units, neighborhood policing teams, and foot
patrols that operate within the parameters of existing
structures, philosophies, and operations (Trojanowicz,
1990, p. 7). Although they have the potential to alter
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the organization's fundamental structure and culture, the
change effects are confined to the operating units adopting
the change.
It is vital to consider the relationship between an
organization's structure and culture when examining
innovative change in police organizations. The structure
of police organizations, similar to other bureaucracies,
strongly contributes to the formation and character of
the police culture (Wilson, 1989, p. 170). Bolman and
Deal (1990, p. 375) state that it is critical to consider
how structural change intrudes upon deeply-rooted symbolic
agreements and ritual behavior (see also Kimberly, 1981,
p.93).
All organizations are organized around a core, or
fundamental "deep structure" that Gersick (1991)
characterizes as
a set of choices a system makes about (1) the
basic parts into which its units will be organized,
and (2) the basic activity patterns that will
maintain its existence (p. 13).
These parts and activity patterns are shaped by formal
assignments of authority and responsibility, formal patterns
of communication, and a formal organization of activity
(Lynn, 1987, p. 82). Organizational structure also includes
the configuration of hierarchical levels, specialized units
and positions, and formal rules governing these arrangements
(Rainey, 1991, p. 98), providing clarity to roles and
relationships (Bolman and Deal, 1991, p. 377).
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Organizational culture differs from structure the
way that personality differs from the physical body. An
organization's culture consists of a "persistent, patterned
way of thinking about the central tasks of, and human
relationships within an organization" (Wilson, 1989, p.
91). This way of thinking is constituted by the values,
norms, rituals, stories, and symbols that reflect the
meaning and significance of the organization's activities
to its employees (Lynn, 1987, p. 82).
Internal Resistance to Change
Resistance to change is natural among all types of
organizations (Bedeain, 1981, p. 291; Schon, 1971).
Referring to organizations in general, Kimberly (1981)
notes that
innovation imposed on an organization in absence
of internal receptivity is like heating a stone
and waiting for the birth of a chicken. A
fundamental incompatibility exists between the
intervention, the target of the intervention, and
the desired outcome (p. 84).
He warns that not everyone in the organization is seeking
chickens, and that particular attention must be given to
the varied nature of resistance among organizational
members. Bolman and Deal (1991, p. 375) agree, stating
that change affects more than roles and skills. It alters
power relationships and undermines existing agreements
and pacts (see also Kimberly, 1981, p. 93).
There is broad agreement among police commentators
that internal resistance to change is a major limiting
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factor to introducing innovative change in :police
organization~ (see e.g., Couper, 1991~ ~oldstein, 1990~
Guyot, 1979~ Holdaway, 1984~ Sparrow, MQore and Kennedy,
1990~ Thibau;lt, ILynch and McBride, 1990~ Wycoff and Kelling,
1978).
Not all organizational change is r~sisted. Incremental
changes that make the job of policing e,sier and which
enhance the ,ff~ciency and performance qf the employees
are welcomed (Goldstein, 1993, p. 3). ~herefore, for the
purposes of this review, it is assumed ~hat only changes
which repres~nt 'a maj or departure from ~he ·traditional
role and funqtion, and therefore confliqts with the norms
and values ofc the organization's cultur~, are resisted.
There i~ a convergence of opinion ~hatl the poli~e
subculture i~ particularly powerful in its ~bility to resist
change (see ~.g., Goldsmith, 1990~ Manning, 1977~ Punch,
1979~ Reuss-Ianni and Ianni, 1983~ Rubenstein, 1973~
Thibault, Lyqch and McBride, 1990~ and Van Maanen, 1974).
Opinions div~rge however about the nature and source of
this resistaqce.: Skolnick and Bayley (1986~ p. 5) claim
that the pow~rfu~ pull of the law enforcememt tradition
elicits resistance to any type of change that threatens
this tradition. i Sparrow, Moore and Kennedy: (1990, p. 51)
concur that the mission of crime control and law enforcement
lies at the heart of police officers' self-image. Policy
changes that are incongruent with the st~ong cultural values
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that have developed around this self-image threaten the
very foundation of the police culture. Roberg and
Kuykendall (1990, p. 383) list investments of time, energy,
experience, misunderstandings, and group norms as the
sources of resistance (see also Albanese, 1989, p. 429;
and Kerr and Kerr, 1972, pp. 4-6).
Negative attitudes toward the community also may lead
to resisting changes that involve a closer relationship
with the public. Steinman's (1986) survey of street patrol
officers in two cities empirically demonstrated Olivet's
(1977, p. 157) hypothesis that the autocratic style of
the quasi-military management structure is the basic
determinant of negative attitudes of officers toward the
community. Police officers may also reject working closely
with the community because of the strong cultural values
of loyalty and secrecy (Cox and Fitzgerald, 1983, p. 7).
Goldstein (1993, p. 5) identifies secrecy as the backbone
of the police culture. Police officers are "compelled
to bend the law and take shortcuts" in order to do their
job. Maintaining remoteness from the general public shields
these activities from public criticism. Thus, the police
perceive innovative changes that include developing a
collaborative, working relationship with the community
as an intrusion into the customs and traditions of their
culture (Shernock, 1988, p. 84).
Moore and Stephens (1991, p. 23) claim that the stable,
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bureaucratic organizational arrangement helps to compensate
for the unstable and:unpredictable working environment
in the field. Perceived threats to this stability elicit
strong resist~nce.
Mentionep earlier, internal resistance to change can
vary among inpividuals and groups within an organization
depending upop one's Iperceived career investment and
pQlitical pos~tion (Bolman and Deal, 1991, p. 377). For
example, the most pobent opposition to change in police
organizations occurs lat the middle-management level
(lieutenants, captains, and commanders) (Kilmann, 1990,
p. 10). Skog~n (1990) maintains that the decentralization
of decision-m~king authority (sharing power) required by
the community policing approach threatens the role of
mid-managers in the command hierarchy. He also claims
that "middle I11anagement succeeded in killing earlier
innovations like [Neighborhood] Team Policing which took
a\'1ay their pmiler" (p. I 123). Troj anowicz and Bucqueroux
(1990, p. 350) agree, observing that "middle managers are
the group with the greatest power to help or hurt"
innovative chqnge1 •
Until re~ently, police commentators and analysts paid
little attent~on to the relationship between leadership
abilities and resistance to change by middle management.
Goldstein (19~4, p. 5) is critical of the casual attention
that is given to training and reorientation of management
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and supervisory personnel under conditions of innovative
change. Bolman and Deal (1991, p. 76) claim that this
is a common oversight in the organizational change process.
Topscott (1993) asserts that resistance by middle managers
to community policing is as much a function of not
understanding the concept as it is obstinancy to the change
per see
The Madison, Wisconsin2 police agency anticipated
strong internal resistance toward its plan to adopt
community policing. When the project began in 1987, the
chief, schooled in organization development, sought to
minimize the problem of internal resistance by fully
involving the employees 3 in formulating and planning the
change.
Madison's pilot project listed three goals: (1)
employee participation in the organization's decision-making
process; (2) the dismantling of the quasi-military
managerial arrangement and replacement with lateral
coordination of activities and resources through
collaborative teamwork; and (3) implementation of community
policing organization-wide. The strategy was to minimize
resistance by linking employee job enrichment with the
improvement of service delivery, and thus to encourage
acceptance of the fundamental change in policing philosophy
by the officers (Police Foundation, 1987).
The power of internal resistance to changes initiated
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by a top-down directive is exemplified by the early-1970s
experience of the Dallas, Texas police agency. The Chief
sought to introduce a change that, similar to community
policing, was contradictory to the basic managerial and
operational philosophy of traditional policing. Sparrow,
Moore and Kennedy (1990) provide a detailed description
of this attempted change that included (a) adopting a
customer-orientation, (b) shifting the focus of police
activities from law enforcement to crime prevention, (c)
eliminating the quasi-military management structure, and
(d) opening the police agency to public scrutiny and review
of police operations.
The Chief's proposal received strong political support.
However, within two years, he, along with most of his
command staff, were fired. His plans were sabotaged by
ranking officers within the organization. "It is probably
true," states Moore and Stephens (1991), "that more police
executives have been fired by their subordinates than by
their mayors" (p. 109). The officers were not consulted,
nor were they involved in the formulation and planning
of the change. Although his ideas were progressive, the
chief was a product of police culture and did not understand
the importance of power-sharing and of involving those
who would be most affected by the change in the
decision-making process (Wycoff and Skogan, 1994). Reiss
(1985) and Sparrow (1988) remind police leaders that
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successful change cannot be accomplished by bureaucratic
mandate.
Sparrow cautions police leaders that if key individuals
are left out at the beginning of an innovative change,
they may well become a stumbling block at some later stage
(p. 6). He states that because community policing is "an
entirely different way of life for police officers," the
task faced by the chief executive is "nothing less than
to change the fundamental culture of the organization"
(p. 2). Wilson (1989) humorously suggests that
changing a culture is like moving a cemetery;
not only is it difficult to do but some think it
is downright sacrilegious (p. 368).
The tasks and style of policing required by police-
community relations units, neighborhood team policing,
foot patrols, and currently by community policing, are
incongruent with the prevailing organizational structure
and quasi-military, bureaucratic management philosophy
(Walker, 1984, p. 78). The experience of earlier attempts
to implement innovative changes without consideration for
this incompatibility informs contemporary police
administrators about some of "the structural issues that
may arise" and of the need to "work to realign roles and
relationships" (Bolman and Deal, 1991, p. 382).
The most recent and notable example of the power of
internal resistance to change is the failure of community
policing in Houston, Texas in 1992. This 10-year project
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served as an important model for many of the programmatic
elements adopted by Portland and others. However, a review
of the planning (Oettmeier and Brown, 1988), implementation
(Skogan, 1990), and management (CRESAP, 1991) of the project
finds that virtually all of the theoretical guidelines
and criteria for successful implementation were violated.
Internal dissension within the agency prevented integration
of the community policing concept among the various
responsibility units, affecting the quality of service
in the field. For this reason, the project also lost
credibility with Houston's public officials and the
community.
Finally, both police scholars and practitioners agree
that if innovative changes that challenge the principles,
philosophy, and values of the fundamental deep structure
and culture of traditional policing are to succeed, they
must become the operating philosophy of the entire
organization (see e.g., Braiden, 1994; Brown, 1989;
Goldstein, 1989; Harmon, 1993; Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux,
1994; Williams and Sloan, 1990). The lesson may lie in
Gersick's (1991) discovery that in all types of
organizations, "fundamental change cannot be accomplished
piece-meal, slowly, gradually, and comfortably" (p. 34).
Innovation in Police Organizations
Carl B. Klockars claims that the pace of change among
police organizations is greater than in most other types
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of organizations (Rosen, 1994). However, the changes -
both incremental and innovative - to which this noted police
critic refers have left the fundamental structure and
culture unchanged. Indeed, in their 1986 study of
innovative change in police organizations over the previous
two decades, Skolnick and Bayley found the traditional
bureaucratic structure intact, characterized by a
hierarchical organization, quasi-military management
structure, and centralized decision-making (p. 7). Kelling
(1990, p. v) shares Klockar's opinion that police
organizations change more than other public service agencies
but also notes the recurrent pattern of failure in these
attempts.
"'Real' innovations," says Wilson (1989, p. 225),
"are those that alter core tasks." Innovative changes
which have the potential for affecting the core tasks,
and therefore the deep structure, of police organizations
can be divided into two broad categories: One category
contains reactive-adaptive changes such as police-community
relations and neighborhood team policing. These programs
were developed in response to the police-community relations
crises that emerged out of the 1950s and 1960s civil rights
movement (Walker, 1993, p. 34). The other category includes
proactive, research-based changes: specifically, foot
patrols and community policing, developed in the 1970s
and 1980s. The former are based on normative assumptions
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of what should work. The latter are driven by
empirically-derived evidence questio~ing the effectiveness
of the traditional core tasks of the police (Kelling, 1985).
Reactive-Adaptive Changes
Police-community relations (PCR),. PCR p~ograms were
established in the late 1950s and early 1960s in response
to public criticism over the differe~tial treatment of
minorities by the police (Kelling an~ Moore, n988, p. 8).
The programs were confined to special units (Trojanowicz,
1990, p 7). Whisenand and Ferguson (1989) describe PCR
and Neighborhood Team Policing programs as reactive
responses to the "tide of negativism pnd lack of confidence
in the police" (p. 258).
Kennedy (1987) reviewed the PCR program implemented
in Los Angeles - a year after the 1965 Watts riot - to
gather intelligence (p. 3) from commupity leaders on the
"anger and unrest festering in Watts" (p. 2). I The Community
Relations Officers were tasked with d~voting full-time
to intensive outreach to representative leaders of social
and business organizations in minority neighborhoods.
Similar programs were implemente~ across Ithe country
in cities that had experienced riots, or were perceived
to be at risk for rioting. All were ~hort-lived, and were
severely criticized, both from within the organizations
in which they were established, and f~om outside as well.
For example, Skolnick and Bayley (1988) claim that
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PCR programs failed because they broke with the strong
cultural traditions of insularity and remoteness from the
public. Police officers viewed PCR as a concession to
rebellious minority groups (Bittner, 1973, p. 356). They
called community relations officers, "social workers,"
and viewed their tasks as "minority coddling" (p. 357).
Bittner (1973), writing for the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders, refers to a University of
California study of PCR programs which claims that the
programs were implemented to improve the image of the police
rather than improve relations with the community, and were
therefore "public relations puff" and "a con game" (p.
1 08) •
Trojanowicz (1990, p. 8) compared PCR with community
policing and concluded that the PCR programs were "a narrow
bureaucratic approach to a specific problem, rather than
a fundamental change in the overall mission" of the
organization. So even though PCR programs were innovative,
because they were add-ons, they were, in effect,
incremental.
Neighborhood team policing. Neighborhood team policing
(NTP) programs were the first major effort by police
organizations to break with the tradition of insularity
and remoteness and develop a formal, collaborative
relationship with the public. Trojanowicz (1990, p. 8)
claims that NTP sprouted the seeds of community policing,
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agr~eing with Reiss (1985, p. 62) that the concepts of
NTP presupposed the core ideas and ~trategies of community
policing. McElroy, et al., (1993, p. 91) cite several
important similarities between the ~wo lapproaches: (1)
permanent beat assignments; (2) int~ns~ve interaction
between tea~ members and residents ~nd Imerchants in their
neig~borhood beat areas; (3) an emp~asis on response to
the peeds and desires of local neig~borhood residents,
and (4) decentralization of decisio~-making.
In addition to similarities between NTP and community
poli9ing, there were similarities between NTP and PCR.
Thesip were: ( a) strong public criticism' as the impetus
for geveloping the programs; (b) the goal to improve crime
cont;ol through better community relations and more
effe9tive police organization (Sherman, Milton, and Kelly,
1973~ p. 61); and (c) the failure of the programs to endure.
There are differing perspective~ about the cause of
NTP', failure to become a permanent policing strategy.
In a study of New York City's NTP prpgram, Bard and Shellow
(197~) point to the absence of reinfprcing structural
chan~es as the primary reason for thip ptogram's demise.
Robe~g and Kuykendall (1990, p. 399) claim that the program
fail~d becau~e management did not involve the employees
in t~e planning process, and did not alter employee
behaviors tOI the extent necessary fo; effective
impl~mentati6n.
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Several criticisms identify NTP as incrementally
implemented: Sherman, Milton and Kelly (1973) found that
in the seven cases they studied, strategies were confined
to special units and implemented without pre-planning;
goals were vague; and tasks and roles were ambiguous.
Silverman (1978) evaluated Cincinnati's NTP program and
found that the major problems with implementing NTP as
an add-on were: (1) the traditional rewards structure did
not provide recognition of NTP accomplishments, and (2)
in most cities, the design of NTP programs bypassed unit
commanders by placing lieutenants in full authority to
manage the team's work assignments and hours. Command
officers felt that their power of authority was being
usurped and placed restraints on NTP activities that
eventually undermined the programs (pp. 34-39). Walker
(1993, p. 45) attributes the failure of NTP also to its
use as "an innovative means to a traditional end," i.e.,
an additional law enforcement tool peripheral to the
day-to-day operation of "real" police in the community
(Trojanowicz, 1990, p. 7).
other criticisms are that, in some NTP programs, the
change was a top-down decision in which middle-managers
(lieutenants and captains) were neither consulted nor
involved in the planning and implementation of the programs
(Roberg and Kuykendall, 1990; Walker, 1993). Reiss (1985)
criticizes NTP because team members did not involve the
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community in probJem resolutions, using "'doing to'
strategies rather than 'working with' strategies" (p. 63).
Butler (1979) evaluated several of the NTP programs
and, in his opini9n, the primary reasons for their failure
to endure were (a) the absence of rewards; (b) the unchanged
self-concept of Nrp members as crime fighters; and (c)
the absence of commitment among mid-level management.
Walker (1993) sug~est5 that the important lesson that NTP
holds for community pmlicing, is the need to alter the
traditional quasi~military management structure. Goldstein
(1993) agrees, stqting that
the initiat~ves iassociated with community policing
cannot surviv~ inla police agency managed in
tradi tional Wqys. I If changes are not made, the
agency sets i~self up for failure (p. 5).
The failure of po~ice4community relations programs of the
1950s and 1960s, qnd NTP of the 1970s, attests to the
difficulty of introduding innovative changes that (a) are
incongruent with ~he organization's fundamental deep
structure, and (b) break with the traditions of the
organizational culture.
Research-Based ch~nges
Foot patrols. F~ot patrol programs were initiated
in response to extensive empirical research during the
1970s that tested, and called into question, the
effectiveness of the core tactics of traditional policing.
Specifically, these studies examined preventive patrol
(Kelling, Pate, Dieckman, and Brown, 1974); rapid response
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to calls for service (Pate, Bowers, and Parks, 1976); and
follow-up investigations (Greenwood, Chaiken, and
Petersilia, 1977).
The June 1987 issue of the American Journal of Police
summarizes evaluations of the several major foot patrol
programs. Greene (1981) notes that none of the evaluations
included assessments of the implementation process. Nor
were the programs examined in context with organizational
change. A major finding however was the serendipitous
discovery of increased job satisfaction among many of the
foot patrol officers.
Another discovery of foot patrol experiments was that
the informal contacts between the foot patrol officers
and law-abiding civilians tended to establish trust. It
was found that citizens became increasingly cooperative
in reporting crime and providing other important information
to police officers with whom they had close personal contact
(see e.g., Archambeault and Fenwick, 1983; Skogan, 1990;
Trojanowicz and Bucqueroux, 1990). This finding reminded
police leaders that the level of trust and support of the
community determines the effectiveness of the police
(Fisher, 1993)4. In the final analysis, foot patrols were
found to be nonessential to crime control, but important
for improving police-community relations (Brown, 1989).
Community policing. Brown (1989) classifies police
community relations, neighborhood team policing, and foot
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patrols as the first of two phases in the present-day
evolutionary change in American police organizations.
The first phase included recognition of the limitations
of the traditional policing model, followed by widespread
experimentation with a variety of innovative alternatives.
The second phase involves building upon and refining the
knowledge developed during the first phase and incorporating
t~is knowledge into a new philosophy and style of policing.
Brown characterizes the Phase One programs as
time-limited; initiated with special units and in special
districts; producing promising results, and then fading
within the organizations that initiated them (p. 4). Brown
concluded that the programs failed to endure because of
the mismatch between the important principles of community
policing and the traditional organizational values and
philosophy of the experimenting agencies. His assertions
are supported by Walker (1993) in his comparative analysis
of neighborhood team policing and community policing.
structural impediments to innovative change. In
addition to reinforcing the theoretical guidelines for
change developed in Chapter I, post-hoc analyses of these
failed attempts to introduce innovative change in police
organizations have led police analysts to conclude that
the traditional bureaucratic structure of police
organizations cannot accommodate the community policing
philosophy (see e.g., Goldstein, 1990; Klockars, 1985;
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McElroy et al., 1993; Reichers and Roberg, 1990; Sparrow,
1988; Wilkinson, Rosenbaum, Bruni, and Yeh, 1994).
The quasi-military management structure (Aut~n, 1985;
Kelling and Moore, 1988; Klockars, 1985; Manning, 1988),
reward and promotion criteria (Reiss, 1985; Sparrow, 1988),
and recruitment and training practices (Brown, 198~;
Goldstein, 1993; Mastrofski, 1988) are of particulqr concern
(Trojanowicz, 1994):
The quasi-military management structure i~pos~s strict
discipline on officers. Within this arrangement,i ~he
primary role of superior officers is one of en~uriqg
obedience to rules and regulations. This punitive style
of supervision is a disincentive to creative apprmaches
necessary to the problem-solving orientation o~ cmmmunity
policing.
Reward and promotion criteria, based on l~w enforcement
tasks, are earned on the merits of quantitativ~ production I
such as the number of citations and arrests, apd the number
of cases cleared (indicating good investigativ~ techniques I
and/or strict adherence to civil rights). The customer
focus of community policing requires that reward and
promotion criteria also be based upon the qual~ty; in
addition to the quantity, of job performance.
Training and recruitment policies focus o~ the law
enforcement role and provide little or no training for
the service-related tasks that dominate a patr91 of~icers
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activities (American Bar Association, 1973). By tradition,
recruitment has focused on "the spirit of adventure rather
than the spirit of service" (Brown, 1989, p. 2). As a
consequence, conventional police training has not included
leadership and community service skills.
Finally, in their evaluation of New York City's
community policing initiative, McElroy et al., (1993)
describe the structural implications of introducing
community policing tasks into police organizations. A
"reconsideration of virtually all departmental operations
and structures" is forced by the implementation of community
policing "at even a modest level" including
the nature of the agency's mission;
the basis for an agency's claim to legitimacy;
the nature of the agency's relationship to the
political and social environment;
the services offered;
the service delivery strategies used;
criteria and processes through which resources are
allocated;
the roles of officers;
coordination of tasks and management processes;
the methods used to assess control and reward
performance;
and the values, goals, objectives, and procedures
involved in training (p. 186).
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Community Policing Models
The Variety of Community Policing Initiatives
Although pol~ce analysts and practitioners are in
general agreement about the meaning of the community
policing philosOP0Y (Webster and Connors, 1993), the
operational expre~sion oflthe philosophy has taken many
forms (Goldstein, 1993). I The integration of community
policing approach~s into an already widely diverse
organizational se~ explains the bulk of the variance.
This diversity has been variously attributed to the local
character of economic and Ifiscal conditions (Greene, 1981);
demographic composition, political ethos and governmental
structure (Sherman, 1980);1 variations in cultural lifestyles
(Davis, 1985); and differences in leadership (Kennedy,
1987).
The following selected community policing projects
reflect the variety of wa~s in which this innovative
policing approach ~s being implemented:
Gresham, Oregon. The Gresham Police Department adopted
, '
community policing in January, 1993. The initial problem
that the police derartmen~ faced was organizing citizen
participation. Because it! is one of the fastest-growing
cities in Oregon, ~ost of Gresham's residents are recent
immigrants. The d~partment addressed this problem by
patterning its com~unity organizing after that of Santa
Ana, California in which the city was divided into community
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zones, and a community policing contact center was
established in each zone.
Two community policing officers (CPOs) are permanently
assigned to each contact center. The CPOs are relieved
of regular street patrol and devote full-time to working
with community residents on public safety and
quality-of-life issues. Each center is supervised by a
lieutenant, and citizens volunteer to assist neighborhood
residents who come into the centers seeking information
or assistance.
The department established a Chief's Forum similar
to Portland. Each community zone is represented by a
citizen-member of the Forum. The Forum members act as
liaisons between the department and residents of the
community zone in which they reside. Police officers
complain about the low turnout to community and Forum
meetings. However, it has been the experience of other
adopting agencies that communities of interest (Trojanowicz
and Bucqueroux, 1994) form around particular problems,
and once the problems are resolved, interest dissipates
(Inman, personal communication, 1990).
Similar to other adopting agencies, the Gresham police
have proceeded with implementation on a trial-and-error
basis. As one CPO explained:
We're learning as we go. It's like building a
hospital, hiring nurses and doctors and getting all
this equipment together, and then realizing you never
sent your doctors to medical school (Fentress, 1994).
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Similar to other organizations using a split-force
or special unit of CPOs, jealousy and dissension has
developed among district patrol officers and the CPOs.
Regular patrol officers believe that they are doing the
"real police" work while the CPOs get all of the attention.
New York City5. New York City's Community Patrol
Officer Program (CPOP) is relatively simple. The program
was designed by the Vera Institute 6 . Special units of
community police officers (CPOs) are assigned to each of
the city's 75 precincts. CPOs are removed from regular
patrol duties and devote full time to community organizing
and problem solving.
CPOs serve as "planners, problem solvers, community
organizers and an information exchange link" (McElroy,
et al., 1993, pp. 10-11). Their principal role is to
organize police-community problem-solving partnerships
at the local neighborhood level.
Seattle, washington7 • Seattle is an unusual example
of a police agency forced into community policing by intense
and consistent public pressure. Local merchants organized
citizen pressure groups in response to an increase in
drug-related crimes in their communities. After a two
year lobbying effort, these groups persuaded the City
Council to mandate citizen participation in police affairs.
The mandate was issued in the form of a Public Safety Plan
that was placed on a city ballot and approved by the voters
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in 1989. The Plan was drawn by a management consulting
firm hired by the city to recommend improvements in public
safety.
The Plan mandates funding for the integration of a
Citizens' Crime Prevention Council and a Citizens' Advisory
Council into each precinct to serve in both a participatory
and advisory capacity. The Seattle police Chief struggled
throughout this process to retain the Department's autonomy
and conventional organizational arrangement. Unable to
do so, the Chief resigned. He was replaced by a Chief
amenable to the community policing concept. According
to DeWitt (1992), the agency is presently undergoing
organization-wide conversion to community policing.
Aurora, Colorad08 • Aurora's organization-wide
transition to community policing began with a pilot project
in 1983. Similar to Portland, Seattle and many other
adopting agencies, the precipitating factors were an abrupt
invasion of crack cocaine, youth gangs and pervasive street
disorder that quickly overwhelmed conventional policing
tactics.
The project began with an experimental unit of five
Police Area Representative (PAR) officers who served as
liaisons between the police, and citizens and public and
private service providers. The success of this pilot
project prompted the chief to attempt full transition to
community policing. He contacted the National Center for
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Community Policing ~t Mich~g~n Stat~ University (MSU) for
assistance in persopnel traiping and orientation. The
MSU team suggested the formation of la Core Team of bureau
employees to coordipate the ~lanned Ichange, and the
establishment of em~loyee advisory groups to assist with
further planning an~ design. By 1990, the PAR program
was expanded to cov~r all of the agency's patrol districts.
Santa Ana, California~. Simil~r to Houston, Santa
Ana broke most of the rules tor success in the process
of converting to community !p9Iicing.! This case may inform
researchers about the relati9nship between the size of
the organization an~ the pow,r of internal resistance to
maintain the status quo. Santa Ana has fewer than 400
officers.
The Chief adopted the c9mmunity policing philosophy
agency-wide in the ~arly 1980s without consulting the
personnel. He nameql the proj ect, "community-oriented
policing" (COP). The agency uses civilian Public Service
Officers (PSO) to hqndle the bulk of the community policing
tasks. Unarmed PSO~ drive pqtrol cars and carry out all
of the police funct~ons that do not require the use of
force. For example~ PSOs re~pond to crimes not in progress,
and incidents of st~eet diso~der, investigate traffic
accidents, and orga~ize and ~ustain community involvement
in public safety af~airs.
Sworn officers are assi~ned to substations which also
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serve as community centers. Officers serve an area for
a minimum of 18 months and operate full-time from the
substation site. Although the personnel strongly resisted
the change, the business community and political officials
supported the change. The officers launched an unsuccessful
attempt to oust the Chief in 1984 by a union vote of "no
confidence." In addition to claiming that "a chief that
is beloved by his men isn't doing a good job" (Skolnick
and Bayley, 1987, p. 20), concerning the opposition of
the employees, the chief remarked, " ••• in the absence
of respect, fear will do nicely" (p. 49).
Houston, Texas 10 • In 1982, Houston was targeted by
the National Institute of Justice as one of two cities
in which to experiment with fear-reduction strategies 11 •
Four major programs were developed for the one-year
experiment. These programs were retained when the Chief
of police sought to convert the entire agency to
"Neighborhood-Oriented Policing" (NOp)12 beginning in 1984.
One of the programs involved the assignment of a
Directed Area Response Team (DART) to each police district.
DART is tasked with the role of public relations and
developing an array of different strategies, including
going door-to-door, to cultivate the trust of neighborhood
residents in their district.
Another program, Project Oasis, was developed to
specifically address quality of life issues through
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neighborhood revitalizatiop efforts. A program called
the Community Organizing R~sponse Team (CaRT) was designed
to assist in organizing repidents around the specific needs
of particular neighborhoodp • Finally, a positive
Interaction Program (PIP) ~as meveloped to provide citizens
an opportunity to particip~te in police policy issues.
When the decision was made in 1984 to adopt Nap
agency-wide, an additional pro~ram - the Neighborhood
Response Team (NRT) - was ,stablished in each district
also. NRT officers work o~t of neighborhood substations
and are tasked with addres~ing:specificproblems in high
crime areas.
San Diego. San Diego adopted the problem-oriented
approach as an additional +aw enforcement tool. The
strategy is implemented at the Ilevel of the patrol officer
"with minimal direction frqm supervisors and command level
staff" (Moose, 1993, p. 33). Officers are encouraged to
identify problems in their beat areas and are responsible
for coordinating the resources 'for problem resolution.
Citizen participation in problem solving is limited
to providing information (Gapow~ch and Roehl, 1994, p.
145). Moose (1993) critici,zes 'San Diego's restriction
on citizen involvement, clgiming that failure to involve
citizens in solutions risk~ continued police isolation,
and unrealistic expectatioqs by the public that the police
"handle the problems" (p. 34).
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Summary
This chapte~ reviewed examples of both innovative
and incremental organizational change. Innovative change
alters the funda~ental organizational structure and culture.
Incremental changes enhance the existing structure and
culture. Innovative changes are difficult to
institutionalize, especially if implemented piece-meal,
and in the absen~e of supporting structural changes.
Employee re~istancelto change is natural among all
types of organiz~tions. IResistance is particularly powerful
among police org~nizatio~s because of a long history of
strong cultural traditions.
Past attempts to introduce innovative change in police
organizations have failed for a number of reasons. Four
major innovation~ - police community relations; neighborhood
team policing; fqot patrdls; and community policing - were
reviewed. It wa~ concluded that these programs violated
many of the theo~etical guidelines for successful
organizational cqange.
The various definitions of community policing, and
selected communi~y policing initiatives were reviewed to
illustrate the v~riety in the organizational arrangements
and applications of community policing. Houston, New York
City and Santa Al1a use police substations (community contact
offices) similar to Portland to enhance police accessibility
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in the neighporhood~ they serve. All of the agencies
reviewed use a variety of patrol strategies, including
bicycle, hor~e, and Ifoot patrols. All engage in some form
of community organizing, and work in cooperation with other
city agencie~, and private groups and organizations, to
solve problerlls.
The org,nizational arrangements vary from the use
of specially trained units to the training of all police
personnel. All of the adopting agencies decentralize
decision maktng in varying degrees. And all consider their
proj ects to ~)e "in progress."
Although the community policing phenomenon began with
municipal po~ice agencies, in the past three years the
philosophy hqs been embraced by the Federal Bureau of
Investigatio~ (Tofoya, 1993), and some state police agencies
and county sqeriff'sl offices (Morrow, personal
communicatio~, 1993)1. In addition, community policing
has "replaceq crime control [traditional] policing as the
dominant ideqlogy and organizational model" of policing
across the eqtire country of Canada (Murphy, 1988, p. 177).
Other aqopting agencies include Los Angeles, Tulsa,
Philadelphia, the ma]ority of major urban areas in Texas
and Florida, municipalities in the San Francisco bay area
including Saq Francisco, Oakland, San Jose, and Sacramento,
and Chicago, Detroit, and Boston, to name a few. A recent
survey reveals a trend toward the universal adoption of
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some form of community or problem-oriented policing among
American police organizations (Trojanowicz, 1993).
Finally, in addition to reflecting local community
characteristics13 , the variety of ways in which community
policing is being implemented also reflects a differential
emphasis on problem-solving. For example, the community
policing literature frequently refers to Newport News,
v~rginia14 and Baltimore County, Maryland15 , yet these
are not, by definition, community policing agencies.
Rather, these agencies, similar to San Diego, use
problem-solving as an additional law enforcement tactic
in the control and prevention of crime and fear of crime
(Eck and Spelman, 1987).
End Notes
1. This discussion does not intend to imply that
all middle-managers are resistant to adopting the community
policing approach. Middle managers introduced community
policing into the Portland Police Bureau. Also, it must
be kept in mind that those who accept the change are not
necessarily progressives, nor are those who resist the
change necessarily traditionalists. The sources of
resistance are many and complex and do not hinge solely
upon anyone factor. See Dunham, 1984; Kotter and
Schlesinger, 1979; Schon, 1971; Watson, 1987.
2. For a description of Madison, Wisconsin's community
policing project, see Police Foundation (1987), and Osborne
and Gaebler (1992). Madison's Chief of police, David C.
Couper, has published several papers that reflect the new
progress~ve viewpoint among many police chief executives.
These are: "Comparing two positions on the future of
American policing," American Journal of Police 9
(1990):161-169; "Police department learns 10 hard quality
lessons," Quality Progress .!.Q (1990):37-40; and "The
customer is always right," The Police Chief 58 (1990):
17-23. -
3. See End Note 9, Chapter I.
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4. See End Note 7, Chapter I.
5. New York City's CPOP experiment is detailed by
McElroy, et al., 1993. Also see Pate and Shtull, 1994.
6. The Vera Institute was established early this
century by industrialist Louis Schweitzer, who was concerned
about youth who were detained in jail while awaiting
adjudication. The Institute was named after Schweitzer's
mother. The Vera Institute assists with research in ways
to improve the New York state criminal justice system.
7. DeWitt (1993) describes the developmental process
in implementing Seattle's community policing project.
8. For a detailed description of the history, and
planning and implementation of community policing in Aurora,
see Williams and Sloan (1990).
9. For more information about Santa Ana's unique
community policing approach, see Davis, 1985, and Skolnick
and Bayley, 1986, 1988.
10. Houston's NOP initiative is discussed at length
by Brown, 1985, 1989, 1989a; Brown and Wycoff, 1987; Greene
and Mastrofski, 1985; Goldstein, 1990; Houston Chronicle,
1992; Oettmeier and Brown, 1988; Walker, 1993; and Witkin
and McGraw, 1993. CRESAP (1991) carried out an evaluation
of NOP.
11. The National Institute of Justice sponsored a
study of Newark, New Jersey and Houston, Texas to test
the effect of selected community policing programs on
citizens' fear of crime. A summary report is provided
by Pate, Wycoff, Skogan, and Sherman (1986).
12. As a result of a negative evaluation of the NOP
project (CRESAP, 1991) and a dramatic rise in crime rates,
the project was discontinued. A new chief was appointed
in 1992 who declared, "The words 'neighborhood-oriented
policing' are cuss words around here now" (Witkin and
McGraw, 1993, p. 29).
13. Crank and Lewis (1991) examined the contingencies
for implementing structural changes to support and
accommodate the community policing approach. They ruled
out organization size and "urbanism" as possible limiting
factors. Other studies that have examined the relationship
between the structure of police organizations and
environmental contingencies include urban-rural differences,
Meagher, (1985), and Wilson, (1968).
14. For a description of problem-oriented policing
in Newport News, Virginia, see Eck and Spelman, (1987);
Freeman, (1989); Goldstein, (1990); and Sparrow, Moore,
and Kennedy, (1990).
15. Problem-oriented policing in Baltimore County,
Maryland is described by Eck and Spelman, (1987); Riechers
and Roberg, (1990); Sparrow, Moore, and Kennedy, (1990);
and Cordner, (1988).
CHAPTER III
RESEARCH DESIGN
Methodology
Studies of innovative change in police organizations
typically have focused on outcomes and their effects
(Greene, 1982), or on post hoc analyses of selected
processes in the implementation of innovative change (cf
Wycoff and Kelling, 1978; Williams and Sloan, 1990; McElroy,
et al., 1993). The strategies by which police organizations
develop the capacity to implement innovative change has
received little attention (Wycoff, 1988).
Patton (1987, pp. 18-19) maintains that a study of
innovative change calls for a dynamic approach that is
process-oriented. Qualitative research methods are
well-suited for such an approach. The qualitative approach
permits a richer description of program implementation;
an analysis of major program processes; and a description
of different types of participants and different kinds
of participation (p. 7).
Data Needed. Griener and Barnes (1970) note that
while the underlying purpose of organizational change is
to facilitate the achievement of organizational goals,
the overarching objectives are (1) to change the way the
~o
organization adapts to its external environment, and (2)
to change the behavioral patterns of its employees (p.
2). The focus of this study is the process by which these
two elementary organizational changes occurred. Toward
a deeper understanding of both how and why this change
occurred, it was necessary to (a) trace the sequence of
events in the Portland Police Bureau's environment which
led to the decision to adopt a different approach to
policing; (b) identify the process by which community
policing was selected as an alternative; (c) document the
planning process wherein decisions were made about how
this new policing approach would be adapted to the Portland
environment; and (d) attempt to assess the Bureau's
organizational change process within a theoretical
framework.
Data sources. Because the focus of these inquiries
is on process rather than outcome, the research design
followed that suggested by Patton (1987):
The qualitative-naturalistic-formative approach
is • • • especially appropriate for programs
that are developing, innovative, and changing,
where the focus is on program improvement [and]
facilitating more effective implementation.
[Because] ••• As an innovation, or program
change is implemented, it frequently unfolds
in a manner quite different from what was planned
or conceptualized in a proposal. Once in
operation, innovative programs are often changed
as practitioners learn what works and what does
not (p. 18).
Qualitative data were used throughout this study.
Quantitative methods are well suited for assessing
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incidents of change, but are impractical fo~ studying change
processes that are on-going and dynamic. A~~hough process
evaluations can, in many cases, be quantifi~d and analyzed
by statistical methods, that methodology wo~ld be better
suited for evaluating the effectiveness of the individual
community policing programs that were implemented during
the Bureau's change process, than for asses~ing the
development of organization-wide change.
The naturalistic component of the thre~~pronged
approach suggested by Patton requires that ~he observer
record the activities that transpire in the change process
without intervening in or manipulating the process (p.
13). The formative component involves a de~cription of
the development of the program - not how th~lprogram
operates, but rather, how the organizational: capacity to
implement the change develops over time.
This study pursued the qualitative datal sources,
suggested by Patton:
1. In-depth, unstructured, open-ended inter~iews.
2. Review of documents and records.
3. Field observations.
Data collection. The interview process I began with
a telephone call to the Bureau to learn the mames of the
staff persons in tha Community Policing Division most
familiar with the history and development of:the Bureau's
conversion to community policing. The call was referred
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to Sgt. David Austin. Sgt. Austin had been involved with
the project from its beginning. He had carried out the
bulk of the preliminary research on the concept of community
policing; assisted Tom Potter in coordinating the
development of the Community Policing Division; and was
one of the key persons responsible for coordinating the
planning and development of the Bureau's 5-Year Transition
Plan.
During a series of interviews, Sgt. Austin described
the sequence of events that led to the Bureau's adoption
of the community policing approach, and furnished the names
of other key persons whom he knew to be involved in the
project's development. Interview appointments were arranged
with these persons by telephone. During the in-person
meetings, the participants were asked to describe their
involvement and experiences in connection with the planned
change. Careful notes were taken. Where appropriate,
•
and with the participants' permission, the conversations
were tape-recorded and later transcribed verbatim.
The participants were asked for the names of other
key persons whom they believed could provide additional
information about the event(s) in which the participants
were involved. The persons referred were contacted and
interviewed in the same manner for the purpose of (a)
acquiring as much detail about the events as possible and
(b) cross-validation of the accuracy of recall of each
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person interviewed.
In addition, numerous interviews were carried out
with t~e Chief, Assistant Chief and Deputy Chiefs, and
varioul? other Icommand officers for the purpose of acquiring
insight into bhe style of leadership directing the change
proces~. The Ilatter were selected by referral from other
participants for their interests and involvement in
partic~lar aspects of the change process. All of the
interv~ews took place in the participants' work offices.
s~t. Austin and other Community Policing Division
person~el provided unrestricted access to all planning
docume~ts, inbernal communications, journals, committee
report~, performance audits, correspondence, and various
other 40cuments pertinent to this study. This material
was carefully reviewed to gain as clear and accurate an
unders~anding as possible of the sequence of events, change
proces~es, programs, and various other factors involved
in the transition process.
Oq-site observations were made of the geographical
areas ~nvolved in each of the Bureau's three demonstration
projec~s for the purpose of acquiring insight into the
operat~onal expression of the changes that were being
effect~d in the Bureau's organizational structure.
Preconqitions in these and other areas involved in intensive
targeting of police resources were obtained from the final
writte~ reports describing the projects' activities.
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other field observations included attending various
Neighborhood Association Coalition meetings attended by
Neighborhood Liaison Officers, in-service community policing
training, and ride-alongs with district police officers.
Analysis of Data
The summary guidelines and propositions for
organizational change outlined in Chapter I, pages 35-38
will serve as the theoretical framework for analysis of
the Bureau's change process.
CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
The Developmental Phase
Chapter I explored the broader social changes believed
to be influencing the present change in policing philosophy.
This section documents the expression of these social
changes in the Portland community. It is important, in
any effort to understand innovative change in organizations,
to understand the context both out of which it is born,
and into which it is introduced (Kimberly, 1981, p. 95).
The Setting
Portland, Oregon is an inland port city situated at
the confluence of the Willamette and Columbia Rivers.
Portland's population of about 489,000 is part of a larger
metropolitan area of approximately 1.5 million people.
The demographic profile is 84.6% Caucasian, 7.7% African
American, 5.3% Asian, 1.2% Native American, and 1.2% other.
The city is sectioned geographically into North, Northwest,
Northeast, Southwest, and Southeast sectors.
Each of these five sectors is served by a police
Precinct. The Northeast and Southeast Precincts were added
in the summer of 1994. The sectors are dotted with numerous
community policing contact offices, and several police
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minis~:ations. :When the Portland Police Bureau (PPB)
adopt~d community policing in 1990, there were 1.7 police
offic~rs per 1~000 population. In June, 1994, there were
appro~imately :2.0 officers per 1,1000 population. The
Burea4's officer demographic pro~ile is 91% Caucasian,
4% African American, 1% Native American, 2% Hispanic, and
incluqes 15% females.
Similar td other U.S. cities, Portland experienced
an abrupt change in the pattern of crime and social disorder
during the mid-11 980s. During the l period 1984 - 1985, the
number of drug houses inl:reased exponentially from "a few
to several hundred" (Bla.;::kburn, p,ersonal communication,
1990) and daytime street prostitution became common. In
1984, calls for service ;lncreased 14 percent, and increased
again in 1985 by 21 perc~nt. A marked increase in reported
crimes paralleled other V. S. cities, including all eight
Index Crime categories 1 • And although the increase in
seriou~ crimes was a cau,e for concern, it was the incursion
of vis~ble drug dealing ~nd daytime prostitution into
previously stable neighb9rhood communities that incited
portlapd's citizens to a9tion. Their action was not
motivated by fear of cri~e, but rather by concern for the
quality-of-life and for the economic stability of their
commun;i ty.
Ip 1986, crack coca~ne drug marketing and Los
Angelep-style youth gang~2 introd~ced new crime problems
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into the city. During that same year, the Mayor declared
a fiscal emergency and reduced the Bureau's budget ten
percent, resulting in the layoff of 16 officers. The courts
and jails were at capacity and many felons were being issued
citations in lieu of arrest (Clark, 1991). A 1986 Bureau
survey of comparably-sized police agencies around the u.s.
found that, on average, the PPB received 67 percent more
calls for service per officer; PPB officers spent 27 percent
more time per shift answering calls, and 25 percent less
time handling each call (Kennedy, 1988, p. 26). This
information confirmed that, similar to other u.s. cities
in the mid- to late-1980s, Portland's police officers spent
most of their time "running from call to call" (Eck and
Spelman, 1987, pp. 1-2; Goldstein, 1990, p. 19).
Neighborhood government. Portland is one of the few
cities in the u.S. with a public agency tasked with
. coordinating citizen involvement in government affairs.
The Office of Neighborhood Associations (aNA) oversees
an active network of ninety-six neighborhood associations
and 29 business associations. Seven District Coalition
offices, staffed with paid employees and managed by a
volunteer citizen's board, oversee from six to twenty
Neighborhood Associations each.
During the 1970s, the PPB developed a Crime Prevention
Division with funding assistance from the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA). Services included Block
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Home, Locks, and Telephone Reassurance Programs, and Victim
Call Back for senior and disabled citizens. When LEAA
assistance was discontinued in 1983, the City picked up
the funding and charged DNA with responsibility for the
City's crime prevention services. DNA's crime prevention
activities focused primarily on Neighborhood Watch programs.
Since the crime prevention programs of DNA and the PPB
did not overlap, there was little coordination of
activities, information exchange, or collaboration between
the two organizations.
Drug and prostitution problems were not new to
Portland. As early as the 1960s, the area hardest hit
by these problems was a neighborhood overseen by the
Peninsula Neighbors District Coalition (PNDC). This large
working-class community is bisected by North Interstate
Avenue, once the interstate highway. North Interstate
is now a neighborhood business district and houses 13 aging
motels that once served interstate travelers. By-passed
by the Interstate 5, the motel owners compensated their
loss of business by accommodating the drug and prostitution
trades. These problems grew to crisis proportions when,
in the mid-1980s, the city experienced a sudden and rapid
growth in the incidents of the use and sale of crack cocaine
and tar heroin. During this time, drug marketing and
prostitution spilled over to the daytime hours and the
associated crimes of burglary, theft, and assault began
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to penetrate adjacent residential neighborhoods. The
exposure of neighborhood children to open drug dealing,
discarded drug paraphernalia, and acts of prostitution
incited the community to action.
~ecalling the problems in this area, former Chief
of Police, Torn Potter, said that in 1966, as a new recruit
assigned to night duty at the North Precinct, he saw open
p~ost~tution while patrolling North Interstate. He asked
his p~rtner what was being done about it. His partner
repli~d that they wrote field reports and made arrests.
In 19~7, when the Chief returned as commander of the North
Preci~ct, he noticed that the area had deteriorated to
even worse conditions than he remembered, with open
prostitution and drug dealing at all hours of the day and
night~ He asked the officers what was being done about
the p~oblem, and they replied that they wrote field reports
and m9-de arrests. "Twenty-one years later,1I said the Chief,
lithe ~ame methods were being used and the problems had
only ~Jotten worse."
rhe PNDC staff reported that district officers often
were tnvited to attend Coalition meetings to be appraised
of th~ community's concern over the growing problems, and
to as~ for their help. However, the police consistently
justi~ied neglecting these problems on the basis that
budge~, legal, and administrative constraints limited their
respo~se to life- and property-threatening incidents only
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(Grimsrud, person~l communacation, 1990). As early as
1978, the PNDC st~ff obtained 135 signatures on a petition
requesting the Maxor to di~ect the Bureau to "do something"
about the problem~ The Mayor did not respond. Absent
police restraint, the problems grew steadily worse and
in the mid-1980s, when they began spilling over to daytime
hours, and to adjqcent residential neighborhoods,
business-owners aqd families began moving out of the area.
The introduc~ion of alchange agent. By 1985, the
effects of the cr~ck cocaime epidemic had spread throughout
Portland. Prosti~ution, drug dealing and related street
crimes and incivilities es~alated in the city's inner
northeast neighborhoods. That same year, DNA's Northeast
District Coalitio~ (NDC) Crime Prevention staff obtained
a federal grant far assistance with developing
community-based strategies ito deal with the problems.
In 1986, the funds were used to hire Ed Blackburn, an
applicant from outside the :Portland area, to coordinate
the effort. Blackburn was lappointed program manager at
the NDC, and a short while :later, became the Crime
Prevention Manager for the :central DNA office at city hall.
Blackburn was skilled lin community organizing and
public relations. He brought with him a philosophical
view that street c~ime and :its associated problems require
comprehensive solutions. ~he introduction of this new
leadership led to ~ major change in DNA's approach to crime
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prevention - from an emphasis on defense and protection
to an emphasis on proactive, community-based
problem-solving. Blackburn also introduced a different
style of conducting business with both City Hall and the
Police Bureau. In the past, the Neighborhood Association
meetings attended by city and police officials had been
confrontational and unproductive. In the future, the
meetings would focus on finding common ground upon which
the differing agendas of the community and public officials
could be discussed.
In the summer of 1987, under Blackburn's direction,
the PNDC Crime Prevention staff coordinated a group of
residents living near North Interstate Avenue to begin
documenting all observed illegal activities. The national
newspaper serving the ethnic community to which the motel
owners belonged was sent photographs and documentation
of the drug and prostitution trade at the motels. The
story made front-page news. Nearby residents documented
drug dealing and liquor sales to minors at a local service
station franchised by a nationally known oil company.
Confronting City Hall. The PNDC staff compiled the
evidence into a report. They planned a meeting for early
December to present the evidence to the Mayor, City Council
members, the local police Precinct Commander and his
management staff, the motel owners and members of the
community. The staff selected this date because December
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is the month in which the City renews and issues liquor
licenses. It was hoped that the evidence of illegal
activity at the local service station would convince the
Council not to renew the station's beer and wine license.
To avoid the disorganization and nonproductivity of past
meetings with public officials, the meeting agenda contained
a mission, a list of goals, and a plan for action. These
were aimed at finding something that the city, the police,
and the citizens would be willing to commit to (Grimsrud,
personal communication, 1991).
Over 500 citizens met at a local elementary school
and presented the officials with the evidence they had
collected. The agenda stipulated that the meeting would
not adjourn until an agreement to solve the problem was
reached by all parties. As Precinct Commander, future
police Chief Tom Potter promised to meet with the district
officers to try and devise a strategy to address the
problem. To hold the police accountable, the PNDC staff
provided the police and city officials with a proposed
action plan and requested that Potter meet with them once
a month for the next six months to report on the plan's
progress.
The First Police-Community Problem-Solving Partnership
Later, when Potter met with officers to discuss an
action plan, one of them suggested that a written agreement
be drawn up and signed by the motel owners, community
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representatives and the district officers. The agreement
would be designed to force the illegal activity out of
the motels through stricter registration procedures,
restrictions on room occupancy, and strict enforcement
of the City's trespass ordinance. The neighbors and motel
owners would agree to report drug dealers and prostitutes
to the police, and the police would agree to conduct monthly
compliance inspections. At their next meeting, all of
the parties involved signed the agreement. The police
also attempted - without success - to (a) get the state
to provide free advertising for the motels on their freeway
service advertisement signs, and (b) convince the Portland
Development Commission to issue loans for rehabilitating
the motels. The neighbors helped the motel owners clean
up their properties to present a neater appearance, and
contacted a nearby shipyard and hospital to ask that they
refer overnight visitors to the motels.
As chief, Potter recalled,
When we took the North Interstate problem back to
the precinct, I asked for some ideas about what we
could do. Mike Bell immediately came up with the idea
of a written agreement. He knew what was needed.
He'd known all along. The community would have to
be involved.
It is important to note that the Chief confessed that
he and the officers were skeptical that their plan would
work, and were therefore surprised at the outcome.
The outcome. The City Council declined renewal of
the service station's liquor license. The PNDC staff
94
notified the oil company headquarters of the station's
illegal activities and the company canceled the station's
franchise. The combined efforts of the police and the
citizens led to an 80 percent reduction in calls for service
to the motels. The following summer, the community held
a "recognition and appreciation" picnic for the police
officers and motel owners, and later, the motel owners
repaid in kind. The success of this partnership agreement
prompted Blackburn to suggest that the police enter into
similar problem-solving partnerships with the six other
Neighborhood District Coalitions. This initial
police-community problem-solving partnership would often
be referenced as an example of the effectiveness of
community policing.
An unanticipated consequence of targeted
problem-solving is displacement. Although the problem
was resolved for the North Interstate neighborhood, it
was in fact displaced to a business district in the East
Precinct's jurisdiction. The Commander of the East Precinct
contacted Potter to inquire how a similar partnership effort
could be developed in his Precinct. In turn, the success
of this second effort, and a third, led to a dramatic
reduction in the number of circuit prostitutes visiting
Portland. The Bureau's statistician documented a
thirty-eight percent overall reduction in reported street
prostitution in Portland within a year (Beedle, personal
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communication, 1992). What impressed the Mayor and Council
members most about these efforts was that the problems
were resolved without the need to make a major number of
arrests3.
During this time, under Blackburn's leadership, the
Crime Prevention Staff in the various District Coalition
offices developed in sophistication and began taking the
lead in coordinating police-community problem-solving
partnerships. ONA would prove to be one of four primary
facilitating factors that lead to the implementation of
the community policing concept in Portland:
1. A strong, active network of neighborhood and business
associations.
2. The development of a strong constituency among African
American community leaders.
3. An influential constituency within the PPB that desired
change.
4. The strong support of local and state political leaders.
"These factors, plus a perceived crisis, had to come
together to make it happen," said Blackburn.
Throughout 1988, the Bureau gradually became more
interactive with the ONA Crime Prevention staff. The police
gained important public relations skills from this new
relationship, and acquired an appreciation for the abilities
of "civilians" to assist in solving both crime- and
noncrime-related problems. The crime prevention staff
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at both the PNDC and the NDC remained in Iclose contact
with the personnel at North Precinct through the formation
of the first citizen's foot patrol in Portland in May,
1988. The patrol was formed to be the "eyes and ears"
for the police, to monitor the motels on North Interstate
for compliance violations, and to try and stem the
infiltration of crime into surrounding neighborhoods.
~s Precinct Commander, Potter st~ongly opposed the
idea pf a citizen's foot patrol becaupe o~ concern for
the personal safety of the patrol mem~ers as well as the
potential for vigilantism. The group wasl adamant however
and invited Potter, the Mayor, and th~ City Council members
to accompany them on a patrol. Havin9 dohe this, Potter
becam~ convinced that the patrol coul~ be an effective
addit~onal resource for the police. He arranged for
offic~rs from the North Precinct to a,sist in advising
and training the patrol members. The Neighborhood
Assoc~ations held garage sales to rai,e funds to purchase
distinctive caps and jackets. Donati9ns from local business
owner, permitted the purchase of hand~held radio
transmitters. IThis group served as a model for the
formation of numerous other citizen fqot ~atrols throughout
the c:j.ty.
+n November, 1989, a General Ord~r was issued by the
Burea~ recognizing citizen's foot pat~ols:and establishing
proceQures for: training and police as~istance.
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Introduction of the Community Policing Concept
In October, 1988, Blackburn arranged for Potter to
travel to Japan to observe the Japanese style of community
policing. With funding by the Milton Eisenhower Foundation,
a group of police representatives from around the nation
spent two weeks in Japan. The purpose of the trip was
to evaluate the Japanese policing style to determine whether
similar training, community services, and early intervention
programs for juveniles could be adapted to American policing
to improve effectiveness.
Potter was especially impressed by the total
integration and immersion of the police officers into the
community. Japanese police officers work in close, mutually
supportive relationships with the neighborhood residents.
Japanese citizens police themselves - and the police.
Potter returned to Portland with the message that crime
and disorder are not "police" problems, they are "community"
problems. As such, he continued, they require the efforts
of a close working relationship between the citizens and
the police, reinforcing what he had learned working with
the North Interstate neighborhood community (Potter,
personal communication, 1992).
The following month, the Mayor attended a National
Mayor's Conference where community policing was the main
topic on the agenda. Numerous mayors described successful
community policing projects in their cities. The Mayor
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returned convinced that the PPB should pursue this new
approach to policing. He hoped that it would help to rescue
the city from a crisis of public confidence, in both the
police and city officials, that had grown steadily worse
since the early 1980s. Furthermore, bad relations had
developed between police officers and City Hall over the
appointment and firing of two police chiefs in rapid
succession, and there were bad relations between City Hall
and the African American community over perceived violations
of affirmative action requirements.
The nascent organizing of California-style youth gangs
in mid-1986 compounded Portland's crime problems. A gang
literally had taken over Columbia Villa, a public housing
project in north Portland. Portland's first drive-by
shooting occurred at the project in the summer of 1987.
The local media were strongly critical of both City Hall
and its leadership, and of the decline in police
effectiveness.
Traditional policing tactics had little effect on
the gang problem that developed in the Columbia Villa public
housing project. In 1987, the Housing Authority of
Portland, frustrated with the Bureau's response to Columbia
Villa's problems, hired the Multnomah County Sheriff's
Office to police the project and to oust the "Columbia
Villa Crips." The deputies established an office in the
project and organized tenant committees. Foot and bicycle
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patrols were ~nstituted and a number of on-site social
services were brought in. The sheriff's action plan for
the project wpuld later serve as an important model for
a demonstratipn p~oject by the Police Bureau's North
Precinct in a troubled public housing project called Iris
Court.
Meanwhil" a retired former Bureau Chief, Richard
D. Walker was wor~ing as an aide to a city council member.
Walker had retire~ from his position as Deputy Chief of
Police in 198$. In 1988, the Mayor appointed Walker Chief,
trusting that he 90uld help repair the damaged relationship
between the B~rea~ and City Hall, and to help stabilize
the badly-demqralized Bureau.
Shortly ijfte~ his appointment, Walker issued a memo
to RU manager~ an~ supervisors requesting suggestions for
improving ope~ati9nal efficiency. This memo was in response
to a critical perf-ormance audit in April, 1987, by the
City Auditor'~ Off-ice. Toward a remedy for the Bureau's
inefficiencie~, t~e audit recommended that, through
"informed part:.icit>ation," the Bureau, City Council, and
the community mutqally establish a police service level.
Deputy Chief pave Williams, then a lieutenant, suggested
that the Bure~u p~oceed with the Auditor's suggestion by
soliciting input :£from the community. "This process," said
Williams, "will fqrce an examination of what we do and
how we do it," anq lead to a "realignment of community
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expectations and the Bureau's mission."
Williams maintained that the recent increase in the
political power of the community was a "window of
opportunity" for the Bureau to involve the community in
the proposed change process. Among the objectives listed
in the proposal were to (a) create a team effort in
determining the community's policing needs, (b) realign
the Bureau to meet service level goals and objectives based
on community needs, and (c) provide a responsive police
service to enhance community livability. Finally, Williams
suggested a means for developing a budget plan that would
accommodate implementing his objectives. This suggestion
eventually led to the development of the community policing
strategic planning process (See Appendix A).
Williams would later serve as a member of both the
informal, small work group (see below) and the formal
Community Policing Work Group, where the influence of his
ideas was readily apparent.
Formation of a small work group. Upon returning from
Japan, Tom Potter briefed the Mayor and Chief Walker on
his observations, and offered a series of recommendations
for improving the Bureau's services 4 • The Mayor and Chief
selected Potter to begin planning for the Bureau's
conversion to community policing. Potter began by forming
a small group of individuals whom he knew and trusted.
The group included the East precinct commander with whom
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he had collaborated over the displacement of drugs and
prostitution from North Interstate; the lieutenant who
suggested a "team effort" to increase the operating
efficiency of the Bureau for the purpose of enhancing the
livability of the community; several other officers with
whom Potter had worked closely; the police statistician;
and the ONA crime prevention manager.
The purpose of the meeting, and of many that followed,
was to discuss the feasibility of implementing community
policing in Portland. Was it practical? How could it
be achieved? A member of the group, Sgt. Dave Austin,
researched the literature on community policing and compiled
a reading list for the group's review. He also researched
and prepared a synopsis of a score of community policing
projects in progress around the country.
The core concepts with which the group began were
(a) the police cannot control crime without the help of
the community, and (b) problem solving "just made good
sense and was definitely a more efficient approach to
controlling crime than reactive response" (Noelle, personal
communication, 1992). The group's major concern was that
past attempts to "reform" the bureau had been successfully
blocked by internal opposition. Blackburn suggested to
the group that they take advantage of the increasing
political influence of the community to counterbalance
the anticipated internal resistance to the planned change.
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It is apparent that a "coincidental convergence of
interests" (Moskowicz, personal communication, 1990) came
together in Portland that included "the right people in
the right place at the right time" (Williams, personal
communication, 1992). A summary and chronology of these
events are as follows:
• 1984: Mayor Clark was first exposed to the
community policing concept when he viewed Forces
of Order, aired on Oregon Public Broadcasting, which
compared the Japanese and American policing styles.
Tokyo was used as a "good" example of policing, and
Portland served as a "bad" example of policing (J.
B. Clark, personal communication, 1990). Clark did
not broach the subject with the Bureau however because
of the poor relationship he had with the Bureau and
because of the Bureau's budget cuts (Kennedy, 1993).
• 1986: Ed Blackburn was hired by ONA's Northeast
District Coalition to serve as program manager and
to develop community-based solutions to street crime
and disorder.
• 1986: Tom Potter became commander of the Police
Bureau's North precinct.
• 1986: The Sheriff's Office was assigned responsibility
for public safety at a large public housing complex
in North Portland. The sheriff established a system
of comprehensive service delivery that later became
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a model for the Bureau's first community policing
demonstration project.
• 1987: Ed Blackburn attended a National Crime
Prevention Conference in Miami. Part of the agenda
dealt with "community-oriented policing." There
he met Dr. Lynn Curtis, Director of the Milton S.
Eisenhower Foundation, at the conference and this
relationship led to Potter's trip to Japan in
November, 1988 to observe that nation's community
policing model.
• 1987: GNA's Penninsula Neighbors' District
Coalition coordinated a meeting, attended by ov~r
500 community residents, city officials, and motel
owners to resolve the problems of drugs and
prostitution that were causing economic decline(
and interfering with the quality of life in are~
neighborhoods. This effort led to the first
police-community partnership agreement, and a d+amatic I
reduction in reported crime in the targeted are~.
• 1988: Mayor Clark attended a National Mayor's
Conference where the main agenda item was commufiity
policing.
• 1988: Commander Torn Potter traveled to Japan with
the Milton S. Eisenhower Foundation to observe
community policing. Upon returning horne, Potte~
was directed by the Mayor and Chief Walker to b~gin
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planning far a Bureau-wide conversion to community
policing •
• 1988: Assistant Chief of Police Dave Williams, then
a lieutenant, suggested that the community be allowed
to jointly determi~e a police service level with the
objective of aligning police services with the needs
of the community, and enhancing the quality of life in
the city.
Summary: Developmental Phase
The limited effectiveness of traditional policing
tactics to depl with \the changing pattern of crime and
disorder in Pprtland led to a greater involvement of the
Office of Nei9hborhood Associations (ONA) in dealing with
street crime. Crime IPrevention Coordinators atone of
ONAs seven Di~trict Coalition offices obtained a federal
grant to hire a program administrator to develop
community-bas~d strabegies to deal with the problem.
The new ,dminisbrator became an important change agent
by introducin~ problem solving as the principal crime
prevention st~ategy among ONA's crime prevention staff.
The new probl,m-solving focus led to the first cooperative
problem-solving partnership with the Portland Police Bureau
to target dru~s and prostitution in a specific neighborhood.
Meantime~ the concept of community policing was gaining
widespread national attention as an alternative to
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traditional policing methods. The success of the first
police-community problem-solving partnership agreement,
and a coincidental convergence of interests and individuals
led to the receptivity of the Bureau to consider community
policing, and its problem-solving orientation, as a viable
alternative to traditional policing methods.
The Planning Phase
The planning process proceeded through a formative
stage, a problem definition stage, and a design stage.
The Formative stage
Meeting frequently, the small work group gradually
identified a wider constituency, both inside and outside
the Bureau. By the end of January, 1988, 34 persons had
been recruited for a Community Policing Work Group. This
Work Group consisted of members of the original small work
group, the Chief, Mayor, City Council representatives,
DNA Crime Prevention Staff, representatives from other
city agencies, sworn and non-sworn police personnel, the
director of the Citizen's Crime Commission, representatives
of other private citizen's groups and not-for-profit social
services, and Portland State University staff.
The Work Group was charged with creating a preliminary
workplan to describe how the Bureau intended to develop
and implement the community policing approach. In January,
1989, the Work Group produced a concept paper. The Paper
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explained the reason for the need to implement community
policing in Portland and included a tentative definition
of community policing. It also included examples of
community policing problem-solving strategies that already
had taken place in partnership with the community, and
a brief proposal for a five-year strategic planning process.
The paper was distributed to all Bureau personnel, city
council members, select community leaders, and individual
citizens and citizen's groups. Recipients were asked to
respond with comments and suggestions about the preliminary
concept of community policing.
The drafting of the concept paper was a major step
in the planning process. The paper acknowledged the
limitations of both the traditional, reactive policing
style and of the overburdened justice system. It also
pointed out the need to form a working relationship with
the community to more effectively address the issues of
crime and disorder. The group prepared the following
tentative definition of community policing:
Community policing is a philosophy which recognizes
the interdependence and shared responsibility of the
police and community in making Portland a safer, more
livable city. The partnership jointly identifies
community safety issues, determines resources, and
applies innovative strategies designed to create and
sustain healthy, vital neighborhoods (Portland Police
Bureau, 1989).
The paper referred to the success of the first
police-community problem-solving partnership in reducing
both reported and observed drug and prostitution activity
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on North I~terstate Avenue as an example of community
policing.
Four "important elements" of community policing were
identified:
1. Community Involvement, defined as community-established
priorities for anti-crime efforts involving the community,
the police, and other city agencies.
2.- Problem;solving Orientation, explained as the expansion
of problem-solving Icapabilities to all police personnel
to more successfully and completely address chronic crime
problems.
3. Community-based Deployment strategies, described as
a process fpr bringing the police physically closer to
the communit.y to increase accessibility.
4. Increased Police Accountability, to be accomplished
by identify~ng individual police officers who would be
responsible for working with citizens on community-defined
neighborhoo~ problems.
The pa~er announced that a strategic planning process
would be in~tiated whereby the Bureau, in partnership with
the total c9mmunity~ would redefine the Bureau's role,
responsibil;ities, and relationship with the community.
This proces, would also include a joint evaluation of
community n~eds andl expectations, and Bureau strengths
and areas of neededl improvement. The evaluation would
be accompli,hed through surveys, community meetings, work
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groups, and seminars.
The st~ategic planning process would produce a
five-year p~an of action that would delineate the
incremental steps t~ward full, organization-wide conversion
into a full~servicefr community policing agency. Finally,
the paper l~sted the guiding principles of the community
policipg ph~losophy, gleaned from extensive research of
the cOlmnuni~y policing literature, and a review of other
commun~ty pQlicing programs being initiated around the
country. Tnese principles were identified as: community
orient~tion, prevention, creative problem-solving, service
orient~tion, commitment to professionalism, accountability,
and pa~:-tnership.
The original small work group did not have a definite
project design in mtnd when deciding to adopt the community
policiNg approach. ',Their options for change were:
(a) a prob1e~-solving orientation whereby citizen
involv~ment would be limited to the identification of
proble~s; tb) a splft force, wherewith a special unit of
traineQ community police officers, relieved of patrol
duties~ would devote full time to community policing tasks;
and (c) an lo~ganiza~ion-wide conversion to community
policing.
T~e Work Group reviewed the two most widely studied
projec~s: Ho~ston, Texas, and Madison, Wisconsin. The
Group qoted powever 'that neither of these cities involved
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the community in the initial planning process and neither
had yet adopted community policing agency-wide. Both cities
had opted for a split force of community policing officers
and regular street patrol officers. These two features
were typical of the pioneering community policing programs
that were being initiated around the country. The Summary
Reports of the Houston and Madison projects noted that
the special assignment of community policing officers had
created internal dissension, and had adversely affected
officer morale. However, the Work Group found that the
underlying theory, philosophy, and values of both programs
were compatible with what they hoped to achieve.
The next step in the planning process took place the
following month, in February, 1989. A questionnaire was
distributed to all Bureau employees to solicit suggestions
about how a "Portland version" of community policing should
be defined and designed. The responses revealed a good
deal of skepticism about the relevancy and the permanency
of the planned change (see page 174).
Outside expert assistance. In April, 1989, the Bureau
contracted with a faculty member of Portland State
university's School of Urban and Public Affairs to act
as planning consultant. In consultation with the Community
Policing Work Group, the consultant drafted a preliminary
flow chart that outlined a four-phase sequential planning
guide, with timelines for accomplishing each phase:
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Phase 1. A definition phase to be accomplished by early
summer, 1989, in which the community would participate
in defining the new police role.
Phase 2. A design phase to be completed by early fall.
Phase 3. The development of a transition plan by early
winter.
Phase 4. A five-year implementation period that would
include on-going strategic planning (See Appendix A) to
begin immediately after acceptance of the transition plan.
The strategy was to have a round of community
involvement during each phase of the plan, and to compile
and incorporate the recommendations obtained during each
round for presentation at a public hearing before the City
Council. The Council would either accept, deny, or revise
the proposal. If the proposal was accepted, the Council
would prepare a resolution (see Appendix B) declaring its
acceptance and mandate that the Committee proceed to the
next phase. For example, the proposal from Phase One was
for a definition of community policing; Phase Two involved
developing a design, and so on.
The Definition Stage
The consultant designed a flow chart of the planned
changes to act as a visual aid. The strategy was to display
the chart whenever and wherever the community policing
concept was discussed. Each of the eighty-four boxes on
the chart represented a step forward in the planning
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process. As each step was accomplished, the box describing
that step would be colored in. This way, the planned change
began to take on an "inevitable" characteristic.
According to the consultant:
The strategy was to give the public and the
[police employees] the impression that we had
a large, well-oiled state-of-the-art machine that
was cranking out the various steps of the plan.
What we in fact had was a three-person office
and a copy machine • • • like looking behind the
curtain in Oz and finding a little man. • • •
The response was, 'We've never seen anything like
this. You're really going to do this. You're
really serious ••• You have a plan (Marshall,
personal communication, 1992).
Once the preliminary flow chart was drafted, it was
used as a tool for persuading various key persons inside
and outside the Bureau to buy into the planned change.
For example, members of the Community Policing Work Group
presented the chart to various subgroups within the Bureau
- females, minorities, and transfers from the County
Sheriff's Office \~ho had previous experience with the
Neighborhood Team Policing concept. The purpose of these
meetings was to solicit suggestions for ways to remove
any perceived structural obstacles to full and equitable
utilization of the special attributes of these groups in
the planning process (Marshall, personal communication,
1992).
The chart also was presented to community leaders
and Bureau management personnel with a request for their
suggestions and comments. The question usually asked at
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these meetings was, "What have we overlooked? What needs
to be considered that we haven't thought of?" All
suggestions for change were given serious consideration.
Not only did the members of the Community Policing Work
Group want citizens, city officials, and police personnel
to "buy into" the planned change, they also believed that
these various perspectives would produce a plan design
that would have something important to offer to everyone.
The outcome of these early contacts was several
iterations of the flow chart before being finalized.
Members of the Work Group then presented the final draft
to individual members of the City Council, inviting their
comments and recommendations. The basic strategy was to
have a plan that people felt was community-based, in keeping
with the philosophy of neighborhood government in Portland.
Whenever the plan was presented, the successes of previous
police-community problem-solving activities, both in
Portland and in other cities, were recounted to convince
people of what the planners hoped the community policing
approach could accomplish.
It was projected that as the planning process evolved,
and once the public understood the possibilities of
community policing, it would create a strong demand for
the change. The Bureau could then use that demand to get
additional resources for the transition, as well as to
convince members of the Bureau that they had a public
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mandate to change (Marshall, personal communication, 1992).
Once key persons and groups in the community were
contacted and brought into the process, five open community
meetings were coordinated by the ONA staff. The meetings
were held at various locations around the city and were
well-publicized and attended. The Mayor and police
officials were apprehensive about these open meetings
because of the atmosphere of severe public criticism -
especially from the media - and the prevailing lack of
public confidence in both City Hall and the Bureau. They
were concerned that the meetings would become venting
sessions and that the message of community policing would
not get through.
However, Chief Walker began each meeting with the
remark, "We know that what we have been doing is not
working." The consultant recalled, "This statement would
bring total silence to the auditorium. It was unprecedented
to hear the Chief of Police admit that the police were
not doing a good job" (Marshall, personal communication,
1992). After a pause, the chief continued, "And that's
why we're here. Because we need your help to find a better
way to prevent crime and disorder in our city." The
consultant observed that "There was not a single incident
of finger-pointing or venting in any of the five meetings."
The agenda for these meetings requested help from
the citizenry in redefining the role and function of the
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police. An ONA Crime Prevention staff member, the Mayor,
the Chief, and the Commander of the precinct of the district
attended and spoke at each meeting. After ian open question
and answer session, the citizens were askem to respond
to a written survey soliciting their views Ion the
effectiveness of the meeting; police repporise to chronic
problems in their neighborhoods; the copcept of community
policing; and the most pressing community safety problems
facing their neighborhoods.
Later that spring, in May, 1989, tne Bureau's Crime
Prevention, and Planning and Research D~visions were
integrated into a new Community policin9 D~vision, and
Potter was appointed administrator. Th~ new Division
consisted of Captain Tom Potter, Lt. Dave Williams, and
Sgt. Austin - all of whom were members 9f bhe original
small work group - and some of the staff from the Planning
and Research, and Crime Prevention Divi~ions.
Potter conceived of the strategy t9 have the
organizational change mandated by a Cit~ Council Resolution
to remove some of the onus of the chang~ from Bureau
members. It was believed that if the c~ange was perceived
as a public mandate, it would temper th~ intensity of
internal resistance. By July, 1989, a qefinition of
Portland's version of community policin~ was compiled from
information gleaned from the literature, from interviews
with key community members, surveys, anq the community
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meetings. The proposed definition was then presented to
the City Council. In open hearing, the Council heard
testimony from the community. In an unprecedented show
of support, the African American community's most
influential leaderS appeared at the hearing to represent
the community's support for the proposed change. The
community policing definition was adopted by a unanimous
vote of the City Council.
The definition originally proposed in the concept
paper drafted by the Community Policing Work Group was
extended to include those suggested by the community:
Community policing will coordinate with efforts being
made by private, non-profit and public agencies to
bring a comprehensive approach to Portland's problems
of crime and disorder. Community policing reflects
the values of: Citizen participation; problem-solving;
officer involvement in decision-making; police
accountability; and deployment of police personnel
at a level closer to the neighborhood (City of Portland
1989).
The Design stage
At the time the first resolution was passed, the
Community Policing Work Group was preparing to survey all
of the police agencies around the u.s. with 100 or more
officers, to learn whether some form of community policing
had been adopted; whether the program adopted was
agency-wide or confined to a special unit or district,
and if the program was designed with citizen participation.
Various operational questions also were included. Of the
366 agencies surveyed, 90 agencies responded. Seventy-seven
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reported community policing projects either in place or
developing. A request for printed material accompanied
the survey, and the information and material received was
assessed for usable programmatic elements to incorporate
into the Portland version of community policing.
Shortly afterward, Sgt. Austin contacted several
nationally recognized community policing and criminal
justice experts to solicit advice about structural redesign.
These experts became the Bureau's Academic and Operational
Advisory Committees and would function as part of a review
panel for the planning decisions as they were developed6 •
Through his contacts with these outside experts, and review
of other agencies' involvement in community policing, Austin
recommended the formation of a number of transition
committees that would serve to assess the present
organizational structure in relation to the projected
changes in service delivery, and to make recommendations
for change. Committee facilitators were selected from
among uniformed personnel. The officers were selected
on the basis of their expertise in the area of committee
interest, as well as their demonstrated task orientation
and organizing abilities observed during their participation
in the planning and coordination of the International Chiefs
of Police Conference hosted by the PPB in 1988. These
facilitators in turn, selected their committee members.
Transition committees. The first committee formed
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was the Menu Committee. The Menu Committee was tasked
with organizing:the information obtained from the various
community meetings, interviews, surveys, and literature
reviews, and compiling this information into a list of
known p~oblem-solving techniques, together with their
desired outcomes; recommending a course of action; and
giving ~xamples of the types of situations in which the
techniq~es migh~ be applied. Committee members included
uniform~d officers from each of the three precincts and
from ea~h Bureau Division, and representatives from other
city se+vice agencies.
Th, Media and Education Committee members represented
the loc~l newspaper and television stations, uniformed
officer~ involved in the Bureau's public information
service~ and various media and promotion consultants.
The Com~ittee generated a Community Policing promotional
brochur~, suggested that the Bureau begin publishing an
in-hous~ Newsletter, and recommended dedicating a Public
Information Officer position.
An Evaluation Committee of uniformed officers
determi~ed the kinds of evaluations that would be needed,
both of the community policing program and of officer
performqnce.
Th~ ProductQvity and Workload Analysis Committee
suggest~d various methods for reducing the workload of
officer~ to create time for community policing activities.
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Members included representatives from the Bureau of
Emergency Communications which handles Portland's 911
emergency response system, DNA staff, and a downtown
Business organization, the Association for Portland
Progress. This Committee recommended that differential
response to calls for service be extended to five
categories:
1. Immediate Uniform Response.
2. Delayed Uniform Response.
3. Referral to the Telephone Report Unit (TRU).
4. Dual dispatching in situations in which the
responding officer finds no criminal evidence and refers
the complainant to the TRU.
5. Referral to a more appropriate agency.
The Information and Referral (I & R) Committee was
tasked with developing an Information and Referral system.
The members created a training video for patrol officers
to promote awareness of problem-solving techniques and
of the importance of making accurate, appropriate referrals
under the community policing philosophy of customer service
orientation. The Committee also recommended creating a
civilian employee position in the Community Policing Support
Division to create and update an I & R Manual, and train
the officers in its use.
The Legal and Legislative Committee members explored
the legal ramifications of non-traditional (and possibly
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extra-legal) tasks and the discontinuation of certain other
activities, such as first response to security alarms.
The Committee also made suggestions for law changes; changes
in the General Orders to facilitate community policing
objectives, and identified issues that might potentially
affect union contracts.
Training and Recruitment Committee members examined
training and recruitment issues relating to the transition
to community policing. The members developed lesson plans
for the in-service training of Bureau personnel, addressing
the topics identified by the Menu Committee.
The Grants and Finance Committee examined grant
opportunities and determined other possible funding sources
for community policing. The Committee also carried out
an analysis of current and future Bureau budgets to assess
the adequacy of available and potential funding for the
planned change. It turned out that the conversion process
was carried through without any outside funding.
Finally, the Criminal Justice Committee was comprised
of members from city and county courts, drug and gang task
force members and Bureau personnel. The members recommended
that the Bureau begin immediately to coordinate with, and
continuously involve, other public and private social
service agencies and persons in the justice system in the
change and implementation processes. Among the
recommendations was that police officers should be
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encouraged to seek alternative sanctions for selected
offenders through the various social service agencies ~n
lieu of arrest.
The formation and the activities of these committ~es I
succeeded in moving the design phase away from the center I
of involvement within the Bureau to include other service'
agencies and groups. This was a devised strategy to g~t
as many individuals as possible involved in the change
process, as well as to make the design representative of
the interests of the wider community. The next generation
of leadership within the Bureau would come from key officers
who served on these various committees (Marshall, personal
communication, 1993).
The Committee reports represented the second round
of police-community involvement in the design phase of
the plan. Information from these reports was compiled
in the fall of 1989 and presented to the City Council in
open hearing. A second resolution was passed (see Appendi~
B). It contained a list of expected outcomes, together
with a list of the primary structural changes necessary
to begin implementing the planned change.
It is important to note that the Portland Citizen'p
Crime Commission? (CCC) supported the planned conversiop
to community policing. The Bureau actively solicited tne ,
assistance of the Commission in both the planning and d~si9n
phases. Eager to participate, in 1989 the Commission f~nded
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an assessment by the Institute of Law and Justice (ILJ)
of the Bureau's operations. The Report was extremely
supportive of the Bureau's proposed conversion to community
policing. The Bureau issued their response to the CCC
in March, 1991, delayed by the immersion of Bureau personnel
in the initial stages of the process of reorganizing and
restructuring throughout 1990. The bureau ultimately
adopted 88 of the ILJ's 98 specific recommendations for
change.
The transition plan. Throughout the autumn months
of 1989, the Bureau actively reached out to strengthen
its new, interactive relationship with all of the interest
groups in the community. An intimate working relationship
had developed between the police and the ONA staff.
Increasingly, Bureau administrators publicly commended
this agency for "laying the foundation for community
policing" (Potter, 1989) and for coordinating community
involvement in the planning process (Walker, 1990). Crime
Prevention Specialists from the various Neighborhood
Coalition offices also were actively involved in the
education and training of police personnel in the cultural
traditions of the various neighborhood communities, and
in public relations.
In the fall of 1989, an Organizational Transition
Committee was formed and tasked with consolidating the
reports of the various committees into a plan for action.
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Committee members included members of the original small
work group, representatives from other city bureauq and
agencies, uniformed officers representing each preoinct
and Bureau division, and a representative from a
professional consulting firm with expertise in org~nization
development. By early December, 1989, the Committee
produced a draft of an action plan to begin a five-year
transition toward an organization-wide conversion to
community policing. Copies of the draft were circulated
to over 500 individuals and groups throughout the cpmmunity~
requesting review and comment before being finalized.
A five-year transition period was chosen on the advicel
of both the Academic Advisory Committee, and Operational
Advisory Committee. Many of these experts, from both
the u.s. and Canada, had been involved in the evolution
of community policing since its conception. They w~re
aware that the single greatest obstacle to the tran~ition
would be internal resistance and thus, the pace of ~hange
was a critical factor. A five-year transition time~ine
would provide time for employees to become aligned with
the new organizational mission and role redefinitio~.
These committees reviewed the proposed plan, and th~ir
feedback was incorporated into the final draft.
The final draft of the Transition Plan was pre~ented
- on schedule with the original planning timeline - to
the City Council the following January, 1990. The ~lan
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was unanimously adopted by resolution (see Appendix B)
and the bureau was instructed by the Council to begin th~
implementation process.
The Organizational Transition Committee reviewed th~
expected outcomes and community policing objectives whicn
were collectively generated during the developmental and
planning stages. This information was integrated with
the principles and philosophy of community policing,
producing a new mission statement and a set of five majo+
goals (see Appendix C). A list of specific strategies
was developed for achieving each goal, using data generated I
by the various transition committee reports, surveys,
literature reviews, interviews and various other
data-collection methods.
The final Plan was an 86-page document which outlin~d
the projected changes over a period of five years (1990
- 1995). Specifically, the Plan:
Described the philosophy of community policing;
published the new mission of the Bureau;
listed the goals and objectives designed to fulfi~l
the new mission;
prioritized first-year implementation strategies
and outlined a progressive developmental process
toward institutionalization of the planned change;
specified activities and outcomes expected to
be either achieved or set into motion during the
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first year;
and assigned area responsibility for implementation
and projected resource requirements.
Summary: Planning Phase
The community policing concept was i~troducedlto the
community through three stages of planning: a form~tive
stage, a definition stage, and a design stage. The planning
products were submitted to the City Council for adIDption
by City Resolution.
The formative stage consisted of the work of two
groups. The first was an informal small work grou~ that
(a) identified the problem (the limitation~ of the:
traditional policing approach to effectively deal with
the emerging changes in the pattern of cri~e and disorder
in the city), and (b) proposed community pplicing as an
alternative approach.
The second group was a formal, 34-memper Community
Policing Work Group tasked with producing ~ concept paper
that included a tentative definition of community policing;
specified its principles and elements; and proposed a
strategic plan of action for introducing the change.
The design stage was a process by whi9h the community
participated in redefining the Bureau's ro~e in public
safety. The design stage included assistance from outside
experts and various transition committees to identify
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requisite changes in the organization's structure and
activities. These changes were outlined in an 86-page,
Five-Year Community Policing Transition Plan.
Implementation Phase
The planning process identified three basic
deficiencies in the Bureau's capacity to implement the
planned change. First, the shortage of personnel and the
heavy call load restricted officer activity to responding
to calls for service. Second, numerous procedural and
operational inefficiencies had been identified by external
auditors. Third, supporting structural changes needed
to be put into place to reinforce new behaviors and
operational changes. These three critical issues were
labeled, respectivoly, Rebuilding, Refining, and Retooling.
Rebuilding and Refining the organization would include
change, by incremental steps, to create the capacity to
alter the style of service delivery. Retooling would
require reconfiguration of the existing bureaucratic
structure to accommodate the alteration. Rebuilding,
Refining, and Retooling were prerequisites to achieving
the organizational capacity to fully begin the conversion
process.
Rebuilding
The rebuilding process sought to restore basic support
functions that were either severely curtailed, such as
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the detective division and drugs and vice, or altogether
suspended, such as crime prevention and planning, by
cutbacks in prior years (Burden, 1992). To help restore
basic services and launch the implementation process, the
Mayor initiated "Operation Jumpstart," with a promise of
60 additional officers during the first year of transition.
The need for additional police officers was an issue that
surfaced often during the planning process. Although the
City Council authorized these hirings in November, 1989,
the immediate effects would not be felt during the initial
rebuilding stage because of the amount of time required
to put a new officer on the streets. The Bureau's training
requirements exceed that of any comparably sized city in
the u.s. (U.S. Department of Justice, 1992, p. 57). Officer
training includes 616 hours of academy training and 2,504
hours (14 months) of field training.
An additional 40 officers were requested to replace
those anticipated to take early retirement because of the
planned change8 • The Bureau planned to allocate ninety
percent of the new officers to re-staffing the precincts,
representing a 20 percent increase in patrol resources
(Portland Police Bureau, 1990, p. 20). The Production
and Workload Analysis Committee estimated that an additional
140 to 170 personnel, including both sworn and non-sworn,
would be needed over the course of the five-year transition
period9 • The goal was to reduce the amount of time officers
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spend responding to calls for servite to 35% to provide
time to engage in problem solving partnerships with the
I
community.
Refining
The refinement process involved responses to several
analyses of the Bureau's operating efficiency. These
I
included a performance audit of several Bureau operations
and functions by the City AUditor10~ the Productivity and
Workload Analysis Committee Report 111; and an analysis of
operating procedures by the Institune of Law and Justice,
funded by Portland's Citizen's Crime Commission.
I
Throughout the initial rebuilding and refining
processes, the Community Policing D~vision12 was assigned
an integrative role in the ~n-going strategic planning
I
process. It was decided that the Onganizational Transition
I
Committee would remain intact, unden the auspices of the
I
Community Policing Division, and wOUild meet monthly to
advise and guide the transi~ion. This committee became
I
known as the Project Team.
Retooling
The establishment of the Community Policing Division
I
in May, 1989, was crucial to the retooling process. The
Community Policing Division staff served as the Project
Team. The Project Team worked in concert with the various
I
outside consultants, assisted in coordinating the Chief's
I
public relations activities, and helped develop strategies
128
to deal with internal resi~tance.
The Project Team also performed a public relations
role. Members acted as coqsulbants for other adopting
organizations, hosted visi~ing observers of the Bureau's
community policing initiat~ve,and coordinated a National
Community Policing ConfereI1;ce, hosted by the Bureau in
September, 1992.
The specific structural changes perceived to be
requisites to retooling were spelled out in the second
City Resolution adopting the Menu Committee's
recommendations for redesign of the organizational
structure. Among the recommendations were:
A. Recruitment and Hiring Practices. Develop procedures
to recruit and hire qualified applicants who represent
the broad range of cultural and ethnic diversity found
in Portland. Design a hiring process which tests
applicants' problem-solvingi ability and their
ability to work with th~ community.
B. Training. Develop traiping programs from entry level
through management leve;l which emphasize community
orientation, problem so~vin9, empowerment strategies
and cross-cultural comm].1nication.
C. Employee Recognition. ~eco9nize the value of our
employees, encourage pr9fes$ional growth, and reward
members for Community P9licing endeavors.
D. Management Strategies. Develop managers who create
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environments conducive for Community Policing. Managers
need to have both leadership responsibilities and
opportunities to jointly plan with Bureau members and
citizens. Develop ongoing planning which enables the
Police Bureau to change according to community
expectations and conditions (see Appendix A). Develop
a budget process which allows for flexibility, community
and employee input, accountability and long-term
planning. As part of employee and community
empowerment, as well as efficiency and effectiveness,
decentralize operations and decision-making whenever
possible.
E. Accountability. Develop methods and measurements by
which the Police Bureau is accountable to the community,
to its members and to the City Council.
F. Coordination. Ensure coordination [of operations]
within the organization, with the criminal justice
system, other City bureaus and service providers and
all elements of the community.
As planned, the conversion process began immediately
upon the acceptance, January 1, 1990, of the Five-Year
Transition Plan by the City Council. By then, the Project
Team already had begun plans for in-service community
policing training for all Bureau personnel.
The Training and Recruitment Committee, guided by
the summary report of the Menu Committee, identified four
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training topics considered to be "generic" to community
policing:
1. Customer service/citizen satisfaction.
2. Problem-solving techniques and procedures.
3. Communication skills.
4. Information and referral.
Requirements for management training were not
considered by the Training and Recruitment Committee (see
page 120). A later challenge was to develop a training
curriculum that included the different but overlapping
elements of training required for command officers,
responsibility unit (RU) managers and supervisors, officers
and non-sworn personnel. All Bureau personnel -
approximately 1,000 persons - would be trained.
The Project Team was aware that the immediate need
was for problem-solving skills. The new style of service
delivery would be expressed by patrol officers - the bulk
of Bureau personnel. The Team recognized the importance
of effecting the role change as quickly as possible in
order to maintain the imminent character of the change.
Sgt. Austin, who had been assigned to the Community Policing
Division at the outset, and who, as previously mentioned,
carried out the bulk of research on community policing
for the Bureau, maintains that identifying the kind of
initial training required was the "single most important
piece of information" to come out of his survey of 366
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police departments (see page 115).
Initial Training - May, 1990. Through his contacts,
Austin learned that the Northwestern Traffic Safety
Institute in Milwaukie, Wisconsin offered training in the
use of the SARA problem-solving method developed by Newport
News, Virginia police officers. SARA is an acronym for
Survey, Analysis, Response, and Assessment - a systematic
workplan to guide problem solving projects. The Institute
was contracted to send a team to Portland to conduct a
3-day training seminar for 45 key Bureau personnel and
several representatives from DNA. Two days of special
instructor training was also provided for a cadre of Bureau
personnel so that training for the rest of the officers
and support staff could be provided internally.
A full community policing training curriculum would
not be developed for another seven months. However, basic
skJLII development in problem solving would equip the
officers to engage the new strategy as opportunities for
problem solving became apparent. At the same time however,
the officers would require support from their supervisors,
and supervisors would need support from managers.
Outside expert assistance. To assist with management
reorientation and training, and in response to the ILJ's
recommendation (see page 121) that the Bureau seek outside
assistance with the conversion process, an outside
management consultant firm was contracted in June, 1990.
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The firm specialized in assisting organizations in aligning
their operating practices with their mission and goals.
The Bureau specifically sought help with (a) developing
a systematic process for community involvement and
collaboration to meaningfully involve Bureau personnel
in the change process; (b) overall project management;
(c) developing a training curriculum that would include
all of the component skills required of employees in their
new community policing roles, and (d) evaluating the process
and outcome of the project (Potter, 1990).
Management orientation. Pursuant to these objectives,
the first task of the consulting firm was to interview
all of the RU managers and supervisors to assess their
receptivity to the Bureau's conversion to community
policing. The interviews revealed a general lack of
understanding of the concept of community policing, and
how the concept could be integrated into the Bureau's
day-to-day activities. Thus, the consultants perceived
that their maj or task \-lould be to build "alignment through
involvement" among Bureau members (eMSI, 1990a, p. 2).
Aware that RU managers and supervisors would playa pivotal
role in the planned alignment through involvement
strategies, it was decided that influential policing experts
from outside the organization should be brought in to
clarify the concept both in operational and in philosophical
terms.
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The Project Team arranged for three outside experts
to visit the Bureau in June, 1990 to conduct a 2-day
orientation seminar for the m~nagement staff. The guest
speakers were Robert Trojanow~cz, Director of t~e National
Center for Community Policing at Mich~gan state University;
Chris Braiden, Superintendent of Police in Edmopton,
Alberta, Canada; and Tom Corn~lius, allieutenant involved
in coordinating the implement~tion oflcommunity policing
in the Aurora, Colorado polic~ department. It was hoped
that the orientation seminar would clarify the ~oncept
of community policing, and br~ak downlthe stere9types which
surfaced in the interviews th~t community polic~ng was
"soft" policing and excessivelY dependent upon +esources
(CMSI, 1990, p. 3). Concern was also expressed over the
non-commitment toward the chafige by Chief Walke+.
The strategy of the orie~tation meetings w~s to fo~m
break out groups to provide t~e opportunity for the officers
to freely discuss their feeli~gs and concerns a~out the I
change. One of the groups wa~ asked to develop a list
of community policing activit~es already being ~arried
out by the Bureau. Another gll:OUp was lasked to f~ocus on
perceived barriers to implemeqting community po~icing.
The information generated by ~he seminar led th~ consulbants
to re-emphasize the scope of ~heir work with th~ Bureau.,
The major emphasis should be qn
(a) expressing the Chi~f's V1S1on and support for
the change; (b) developiqg an operational ~tatement
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of goals and objectives, and (c) compiling a list
of community policing activities currently under way
(CMSI, 1990a, p. 4).
The awareness a~ong Bureau personnel that the Chief was
non-committed toward the community policing philosophy
was perceived by the consultants to be a major barrier
to gaining coop~ration and acceptance of the change 13 •
Furthermore, th~ office~s needed a clear picture of how
the concept wou~d be operationalized on the streets. The
consultants believed that examples of successful community
policing projects, and public recognition of persons
involved in the~e projects, would provide incentives for
the officers to begin applying the new problem-solving
approach.
Proceeding on this new course, the consultants
developed a set of key attributes and success factors (see
Appendix D) tha~ would reflect desirable operational
characteristics of community policing, and ways that these
could be measur~d. To provide concrete examples of how
this would work, the Project Team began compiling an
inventory of ex~mples ofl successful police-community
problem-solving partnerships that embraced these key
attributes and ~uccess factors. By December, 1991, a
141-page book o~ 1990-911 Community Policing Success Models 14
was produced. ~ach success model was framed in terms of
the problem; major goal;: action to be taken; resources
involved, such ~s the names of other agencies and service
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organizations involved and their role; the names of the
officers involved; and the names of the non-Bureau
individuals involved and their organizational affiliation.
Copies of Community Policing Success Models were distributed
throughout the Bureau.
The consultants continued concentrating their efforts
on the Bureau's management personnel. The Orientation
Seminar had clarified the community policing concept for
the management staff and had peaked their interest. Many
of the managers expressed some enthusiasm for the
possibilities of community policing and the consultants
did not want much time to pass before providing them with
the opportunity for deeper involvement and role
clarification. They planned three consecutive management
training seminars for Fall, 1990.
Management training. The seminars focused on (a)
changing the management structure from the traditional
command and control to a team-leadership approach; (b)
developing a customer service orientation; and (c) orienting
the officers toward a projected change from line item,
to program budgeting. Because workplans (see Appendix
E) would be integral to this new budgeting process, the
workplan concept was introduced during the first session
(CMSI, 1991, p. 4).
At the second seminar, a banking vice-president
described customer service policies used by the banking
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industry. This session was structured as a wqrk shopi in
which break out groups discussed ways that cu~tomer
orientation might be applied in policing situqtions. IThe
third session focused on planning skills and qn the value
of program budgeting in driving a customer service focus 15 •
The introduction of workplans. The Menu Committee's
proposed structural changes, adopted by the s~cond City
Council resolution, stressed coordination of Qommunity
policing operations within the Bureau. The consultants
believed that building alignment through involvement would
achieve this objective by breaking down the command and
control management structure. They planned to achieve
this change by introducing the use of workpla~s. Workplans
would serve several purposes: (a) they would require lateral
coordination of activities and resources between RU
managers, supervisors, and officers; (b) they would
structure in accountability for achieving a projected I
outcome; and (c) they would allow the consultants to carry
out an on-going assessment of the conversion process, using
alignment as a barometer of the general change, i. e., I "how
far along and how many people are 'on board' with community
policing" (CMSI, 1991a, p. 3). The consultants were
assuming that workplans would be optional, believing that
their use would serve as an important assessme~t of the
degree of internal resistance during the first 3 years.
It turned out that workplans were not used to ~ssess
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internal resistance. During year four of the transition,
workplans became mandatory.
Training all Bureau personnel. Training began in
January, 1991 for the remainder of the personnel, including
non-sworn employees. Eight hours of training included
clarification of the community policing philosophy; roles
and expectations; problem-solving; community contact and
community meetings; cultural diversity; and introduction
to the newly-adopted human goals statement (see Appendix
F) and Bureau values 16 • By the end of May, 1991, all of
the Bureau's employees had received eight hours of
rudimentary in-service training.
Between October, 1991 and May, 1992, all personnel
received additional training in cultural diversity;
information and referral; customer service; false alarm
response; problem-solving partnerships and landlords' rights
and responsibilities.
Special training. In June, 1991, the Field Training
Officers (FTOs) received 8 hours of training and
re-certification in community policing. The training
included information and referral, community partnerships,
the SARA problem solving method, and customer service.
Each new recruit is assigned to an FTO for a probationary
period of 14 months. Although the State Training Academy
began providing an introductory course in community policing
in 1991, recruits receive the bulk of their community
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policing training in the Advanced Academy at Bureau
headquarters and from their FTO. The Advanced Academy
provides 4 weeks of field training and 5 weeks of class
training, after which the officers' community policing
skills are evaluated.
Sergeants were provided with additional training in
employee motivation, and interpersonal and leadership
skills. This 4-hour training was provided by a private
human resources management consultant who used the Blanchard
Situational Leadership model. This model emphasizes a
flexible management style, contingent upon the needs of
both the subordinate and the situation.
The District Attorney's office provided training in
civil rights and liability issues in connection with the
new informal relationships between officers and law-abiding
citizens. This training was important to the behavioral
changes expected of the officers. Patrol officers were
made aware that the authoritarian demeanor and communication
styles used in law enforcement activities are inappropriate
to a customer service orientation. They also needed to
be made aware of the changes in public expectations and
the potential for misunderstandings of officer intentions
during informal encounters with the public.
A private consulting firm provided additional cultural
awareness and diversity training. Similar to other police
organizations, the Bureau had a history of poor relations,
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both internally and externally, with minority groups.
Although the Neighborhood Liaison Officer program
(see page 17e) was expanded to all three precincts in
February, 1993, specialized training for this role was
not proviped until the following June. aNA's Crime
Prevention staff, in cooperation with Bureau personnel,
developed and taught the 8-hour training seminar. The
curriculum included (a) basic skills in community
organizin9; (b) tips and techniques for facilitating
community meetings; and (c) communication skills. Concrete
examples 9f ~revious police-community problem-solving
partnersh~ps:were provided to demonstrate roles and
procedure~.
In p~eparation for this training, a proposed General
Order was drafted defining the Neighborhood Liaison Program
and the rqles and expectations of all ranking officers,
including the Chief and the Chief's staff (see Appendix
G) •
New ~ecruitment policy. Lee P. Brown17 (1989), a
leader in the development of the community policing concept,
maintains th~t the community policing approach requires
the recrui.. tment of those that have the "spirit of service"
rather tha,n bhe "spirit of adventure" (p. 2). Both the
Bureau's ~ransition Plan and a new recruitment brochure
stress th~ spirit of service. Since adopting community
policing, the Bureau has relaxed its educational
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requirements from a mandatory two years of college, to
two years of either college-level liberal arts education,
or the equivalent in experience and community volunteer
work. This change was made to accommodate the differential
educational opportunities of minorities. The Bureau also
adopted an affirmative action goal of 20 percent minorities,
exceeding the City's goal of 13.4 percent.
The strategies developed to assist in minority
recruitment are:
Adoption of a Minority Recruitment Action Plan.
Designated recruiters to reach out to various
minority populations.
Designation of a deputy chief or a commander to
oversee the targeted recruitment programs.
Provision of workshops and training in the community
for candidates prior to the police exam.
Adoption of a new exam format that minimizes the
effect of cultural diversity.
The creation of a law enforcement trainee program
to improve the skills of candidates who qualified
for all or nearly all of the testing process but
failed to score high enough to be hired.
New reward and promotion policies. The city of
Portland's Bureau of Personnel has established promotional
guidelines for all city employees. These guidelines specify
the "rule of five." Administrators may choose from a list
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of the top five candidates for promotion. Th~s procedure
allows flexibility in fitting personal skills, experience,
and personal attributes to the job.
In addition to competency, as revealed by the wr~tten,
performance, and oral examinations, the criteria for
productivity that obtained under traditional policing is
replaced by the quality of the work performed, As one~
officer put it, "it's [no longer] how many apples you pick,
but how you pick them" (Clark, 1991). The new promotion
policy added a new criterion - community poliqing:
What has the candidate done with commun~ty
policing? Has the candidate demonstrated an
understanding of community policing throu~h some
job-related experience? While this fact may be
evaluated as part of the exam, community policing
will also be the focus of the final interviews
(Portland Police Bureau, 1992b).
After Potter was named Chief, this criterion was,:
with few exceptions, one of the most importan~ in the '
promotion process. The strategy was to promo~e only those
who were supportive of community policing to positionsl
of authority (Potter, personal communication, 1991).
Clearly, by this criterion, Charles Moose18 w~s elevated
from lieutenant to captain, and later to comm~nder of Worth
Precinct within the span of 2 years, and was ~amed Chief
of Police when Potter retired in 1993.
Moose had demonstrated a strong and active interest
in the City's Neighborhood Revitalization Plan19 • He ~sed
part of the Plan's concept of comprehensive service delivery
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in his administration of North Precinct's demonstration
project, the revitalization of a large public housing
project. Moose's doctoral dissertation, completed in 1993,
was an evaluation of this project.
These promotions are in essence "rewards. 1I Since
the adoption of community policing, awards ceremonies are
held annually at City Hall. In addition to recognition
for traditional policing activities, community service
awards are given to both officers and to private citizens.
Administrative Issues
Profile of the Bureau's traditional command structure.
In spite of the traditional scalar chain of command, the
Bureau's quasi-military managerial arrangement was loosely
structured and very political. There was little
accountability among rank positions for their management
styles, yet, on the other hand, administrative
responsibilities were strictly controlled. There also
was minimal coordination of activities between
responsibility units (RUs).
The Bureau is organized under four branches:
Operations, Investigations, Operations Support, and
Administrative Support, each headed by a deputy chief.
In 1990, there were 16 RUs within these branches, most
of which were administrated by a captain, several managerial
lieutenants, and numerous supervisory sergeants. The RUs
were distributed among three precincts 20 , each of which
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was headed by a captain.
Each precinct had its own set of' standard operating
procedures and operated under the umbrella of a single
set of General Orders. A functional analysis of the
Operations Branch in late 1991 disclosed the political
nature of the chain of commanp, referred to by the officers
as "the good old boy network. v' The analysis also discovered
a widespread desire for chang~. For ¢xample, street patrol
officers complained that serg~ants la9ked supervisory
skills, were unavailable for ~dvice, direction, and cover,
and often were unfamiliar with procedures.
Many of the sergeants vo~ced similar complaints about
the lieutenants. In addition l sergeants complained that
as promotions were earned up ~hrough the ranks, there were
no provisions for training to equip them with the skills
necessary for effective performance in their new role,
or in the management of routine tasks ,such as scheduling,
coordinating activities, and preparation of reports.
The detached nature of t~e quasi~military scalar chain
of command was further charac~erized by complaints by
officers, at all levels, that when they submitted
suggestions for improving tas~ efficacy and effectiveness,
the proposals frequently were not acknowledged. There
was very little feedback from higher Levels up the chain
of command. Officers also noted a lack of lateral
collaborative communication between shifts and between
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RUs. The officers complained also that a request for
support or assistance from special units often created
conflict. This conflict is, in part, attributable to the
structure of the rewards system. Police reward systems
are based on the quantity of individual production, such
as the number of citations issued, or number of arrests.
Each individual wants to earn credit for the numbers he
or she generates. This system obstructs inter-unit
cooperation and information-sharing.
Each rank level had very little decision-making
authority. They could not personally discipline their
subordinates, nor assign promotions or transfers. They
had minimum control over their budget expenditures. The
most common complaint among the captains was that they
were not allowed to have the kind of authority over their
precincts necessary to do internal problem solving.
Top administration in transition. Walker, who served
as Chief for the first eleven months of the transition
(January 1990 - November, 1990) did not assume an active
leadership role in the conversion process. He assigned
responsibility for coordinating the Bureau's conversion
process to Potter, whom he earlier appointed Captain of
the Community Policing Division. Potter and his staff
coordinated the implementation of most of the major projects
and programs, described earlier, that were put into place
during the eleven month period. still missing however
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was a mechanism for citizen input directly to the Chief.
Potter got the idea for a Chief's Forum (see page
158) through networkin~ with other adopting
organizations. Upon baing named Chief in November, 1990,
he enlisted the Com~un~ty Policing Division staff to
immediately coordin~te Ithe assembly and installation of
a Forum. The first Forum met less than a month later.
The second ord~r of business was to establish an
assistant chief pos~tion. Potter anticipated that he would
need to be maximally accessible to the media, citizens'
and business groups, and the City Council to advocate for
the major changes o9curring in the Bureau, and to allay
critics. The assistant chief would oversee the daily
administrative and 9perational functions of the Bureau,
and would be respon~iblle for ensuring that the new community
policing policies w~re put into practice. Potter selected
Wayne Inman, commanger of the East Precinct to fill this
new position. Inman had a history of community involvement
at East - the only precinct with a Citizens' Advisory
Council. He also hqd been a member of the original small
work group that initiated the Bureau's conversion to
community policing.
Potter planned that he and his staff would work
together as a manag~ment team. His first 90 days as Chief
however were consum~d with fighting a threatened 16 percent
cut in the Bureau's budget as a result of a property tax
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limitation that was voted in the month he was appointed
chief, Gulf War demonstrations, and responding to the
recommendations issued by the ILJ report (see page 121).
It turned out that there was an extremely high demand,
from the media, the community, and beyond, for the Chief's
time. Throughout the spring and summer, 1991, he
concentrated on developing and maintaining critical and
strategic external political relationships that ensured
sustained support for the planned change.
Meantime, the Assistant and Deputy Chiefs were
inundated in work. The daily operations of their branches,
together with the increased demands on their time by
numerous meetings and decisions relative to the transition
process, left little time for team building and team
collaboration. At the same time, the management consultants
were pushing the Chiefs and their staff to drive the
transition forward through the implementation of an
elaborate set of change strategies.
The Bureau's loose management structure was in a state
of flux as RU managers and supervisors struggled with
translating existing roles, operations and resources into
new community policing policies. The deputy chiefs in
charge of the operations and investigative branches were
especially burdened with problems of disorganization and
uncertainty among their branch RUs. RU managers were being
allowed to proceed with the change at a their own pace.
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And going unnoticed were a few influential officers who
were gathering together a constituency of recalcitrant
officers to attempt to subvert the change at the operational
level.
The Chief learned of this activity when he returned
from vacation in late August, 1991. The management
consultants, assisted by the Project Team, developed a
plan of action to counter the organized resistance. The
plan was to implement an "internal communications strategy"
designed to convince resisting officers of both the
inevitability of the change, and of the perceived advantages
of the community policing approach. The subversive movement
had caught the Chief's staff and the project Team by
surprise. They admitted to having underestimated both
the persistence and the intensity of internal resistance
to the planned change (Potter, personal communication,
1993; Williams, personal communication, 1994).
Although supporters of the change at higher levels
of command were reassigned to positions of influence and
authority, all of the 114 lieutenants and sergeants could
not arbitrarily be repositioned because of rank, seniority,
and union protection. Furthermore, the loose management
structure had tolerated a wide range of management styles
and options for how each RU manager and supervisor would
"run his or her shop." Seeking to begin integrating the
community policing philosophy and principles into management
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routines, Potter had held two meetings with RU managers
and supervisors during which he relayed his expectation
that they should be thoroughly familiar with (a) the
Transition Plan, (b) command and supervisory expectations
(see Appendix K), (c) the workplan concept, and (d) the
change strategies pertinent to their RUs (Potter, 1991).
There was no plan of action however for holding the officers
accountable for complying with these directives.
The internal communication strategies developed by
the management consultants and Project Team members sought
to turn Potter's attention inward to focus on the Bureau's
"internal customers." The plan produced an array of
"internal marketing strategies." Most of the strategies
focused on actions that involved personal attention from
the Chief to reinforce demonstrated community policing
activities. It was agreed however that the willful refusal
by some to comply with Potter's expectations, and the
"continual carping criticism" (CMSI, 1991a) needed to be
firmly dealt with. This was done by way of a personal
memorandum from the Chief to each RU manager and supervisor
issued in October, 1991.
The memorandum reminded the officers that they had
been advised at two recent managers' meetings of the chief's
expectations. Potter reiterated his expectations and added:
As managers and supervisors in the transition to
Community Policing, your role cannot be a passive one.
I expect each of you to be cheerleaders, facilitators,
coordinators, and to concentrate on what can be done
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rather than what can't be done. You must be role models
and change agents. Your job is to make Community
Policing a reality (Potter, 1991, p. 3).
Potter concluded the memo by stating that he would
be meeting with each of the officers in six months to
determine the progress they had made in transitioning their
RU to community policing, "both in philosophy and in
results." He requested that each officer be prepared to
discuss, in specific detail, (1) what they had done to
champion community policing and the results; (2) what
community policing activities they had been involved in;
(3) their progress on developing the use of work plans;
and (4) their relationship, in detail, with other units
in the Bureau, other public and private agencies, and the
community. Potter later intimated that he also intended
to include a "surprise question" that asked, "What public
meetings have you attended and what speeches have you
given?" (Potter, personal communication, 1992).
Executive management team. As products of the culture
that they were trying to change, the assistant and deputy
chiefs were reluctant to share power by pushing decision
making down to the RU managers and supervisors within their
branches. They found it difficult to place their trust
in the officers, especially because they were uncertain
about who was, and who was not on board. Therefore, their
subordinates were receiving mixed messages. The goals
were to empower the officers and facilitate participatory
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management, yet the Chief's staff were reluctant to do
so because they were ultimately accountable for the outcome
of their subordinates' actions.
The Deputy Chiefs expressed frustration with their
roles as change agents in addition to being branch
administrators. They were expected to both manage the
daily operations of their branches and to lead the change
in the operational expression of the new community policing
philosophy. They questioned how they could push decision
making downward and still maintain control over their areas
of responsibility. How could they deal with the resistance
to change? How could they hold their administrative,
management, and supervisory personnel accountable (CMSI,
1991a)? They also needed to overcome differences in
personal agendas and personal management styles. Each
was accustomed to making decisions for his or her Branch
independently of the others.
A training consultant was hired to design a special
executive team-building and training program to equip the
Chief and his staff with the skills to lead the change
process. During several retreats, the training consultants
attempted to structure a management routine for the
Assistant and Deputy Chiefs that would emphasize driving
the transition process consistently forward. The change
strategies developed earlier by the management consultants
had been intended to drive the work flow. Instead, they
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had become peripheral to other day-to-day responsibilities.
The team management concept was not fully accomplished.
Potter assumed that the Assistant and Deputy Chiefs were
coordinating their activities to drive the transition
process forward. In reality, much of the transition process
was guided forward by dedicated managers and supervisors
at the RU level, and by the Community Policing Division
staff.
Mid-course review. A mid-course review of the Bureau's
transition progress began January, 1993. The review process
was coordinated by the planning consultant originally
involved in the strategic planning for the Bureau's initial
5-Year Transition Plan. The major findings of the review
were (a) community policing principles, values, and
activities were poorly coordinated among the various
responsibility units; (b) unit managers and sergeants were
not being held accountable for the management and leadership
training they had received, nor for following through with
the chief's expectations; and (c) non-sworn personnel were
being overlooked in applying community policing principles
and values to the Bureau's "internal customers." These
personnel were not being included in decisions that had
major effects on their jobs and working conditions. The
planning consultant stressed the importance of non-sworn
personnel:
The non-sworn are back-stage people. If the back
stage doesn't work, sets don't get made; the curtain
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doesn't go up; the lights don't go on - you don't have
a play (Marshall, personal communication, 1994).
These and minor problems relating to officer behavior,
indicate the difficulty of developing a method for holding
RU managers accountable for integrating the community
policing philosophy, and participatory management into
their units. This problem was exacerbated by the frequent
turnover of deputy chiefs of Operations. Four different
officers had served in this position since the Bureau's
adoption of community policing in January, 1990. This
position was (and is) critical to managing the
reorganization and complexity involved in translating
community policing policies into practice.
A new strategic plan. The review led to the
publication in March, 1994, of the Community Policing
strategic Plan (Portland Police Bureau, 1994) to replace
the original 5-Year Community Policing Transition Plan.
The Plan was drawn to coincide with the 1994-1995 fiscal
budget biennium, beginning July 1, 1994.
The new Plan added clarification to the Bureau's
mission (underlined):
The mission of the Portland Police Bureau is to
maintain and improve community livability by working
with all citizens to preserve life, maintain human
rights, protect property, and promote individual
responsibility and community commitment (p. 2).
(Compare with the former mission statement, Appendix
C) •
The original goals - service orientation; partnership;
empowerment; problem solving; and accountability - were
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recast as values to guide the Bureau's revised mission
and goals. The new Plan lists four goals (see Appendix
H). The first two address the mission directly, and the
latter two address the organizational factors identified
as being necessary to support the first two goals:
1. Reduce crime and fear of crime. The goal is to reduce
the incidence of both reported and unreported crimes, and
give priority to those crimes and conditions that most
directly produce adverse effects on community livability.
2. Empower the community. This goal includes seeking
stronger community partnerships, focusing on customer
service, maintaining open and responsive communications,
and delivering programs that promote community involvement
in problem solving and crime prevention.
3. Develop and empower personnel. This goal provides
for internal procedures that are consistent with the mission
and values of community policing including training,
recruitment, hiring and promotions. It also seeks to
provide an internal working environment supportive of
customer service, innovation, personal accountability,
and team contribution.
4. strengthen planning, evaluation, and fiscal support.
This goal promises continued effort by the Bureau to provide
accountability through evaluation, analysis, practical
long-range planning, and effective budgeting and fiscal
management.
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The new Plan is designed primarily to serve as a manual
for developing unit workplans. Workplans (see Appendix
E) require setting a specific goal; a statement of
objectives; and the planned strategies by both the number
and description listed in the strategic Plan, for each
planned activity. To assist in workplan development and
the correct categorizing of goals and objectives, each
objective lists examples of current activities in progress,
and the outside agency, organization, or group appropriate
for including in interagency coordination of problem solving
efforts. Finally, the Plan includes the findings of the
mid-course review - both positive and negative.
Performance measurements. The value placed by the
Bureau on accountability and service orientation requires
a system for evaluating performance. Workplans are
outcome-based and goal-oriented, providing an instrument
for assessing both whether the Bureau is accomplishing
its goals, and the quality of the services provided. The
University of Oregon and Portland state University assisted
the Bureau in obtaining a two-year grant, funded by the
National Institute of Justice, to develop a method of
performance measurement that might serve as a model for
other adopting organizations.
The researchers identified key indicators for assessing
performance in achieving the four goals listed above.
Indicators for the first two goals are:
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Goals 1 and 2: Incidence of crime; victimization rates;
neighborhood nuisance issues; fear of crime; community
stability; percentage of officer time spent on problem
solving; response time; citizen-police involvement; citizen-
community involvement; citizen satisfaction with the Bureau;
citizen awareness of community policing and crime prevention
activities; applied crime prevention; and interagency
coordination.
Goals 3 and 4: Job satisfaction; diversity and
multicultural sensitivity; internal communications;
timeliness of performance measurement results; use of and
satisfaction with performance measures; employee
empowerment; officer safety; assignment stability; training
effectiveness; and internal culture.
The primary sources of performance data are (a) annual
community surveys; (b) experiences of citizens who have
interacted with the police including victims, suspects,
information sources, and others; (c) appraisals by
organizations and groups that cooperate with the police
in delivering services to neighborhoods, and (d) assessment
by Bureau personnel (Stipak, 1993).
Summary: Implementation Phase
The implementation process was preceded by (a) a
capacity-building stage in which the organization's
operating efficiencies were enhanced, and (b) reinforcing
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structural changes introduced to support the planned changes
in the style of service delivery. structural changes,
identified as key to reinforcing behavioral changes,
involved (a) the quasi-military management structure, (b)
promotions and rewards criteria, and (c) training and
recruitment practices~
The Bure~u relied on the services of several different
outside consu~tants, each with a different field of
expertise, to assist with the conversion process.
Integrat~on of community policing in internal
procedures wa~ achieved during year three of the Five-Year
Transition Pl~n by changing from an annual line-item, to
a biennial pr9gram budgeting process. The new form of
budgeting car~ies a requirement for the use of workplans
to ensure acc9untability both for work performance, and
for goal achi~vement. The workplan management format became
the key integ*ating factor in the coordination of community
policing activities toward the achievement of organizational
goals among a~l of the Bureau's RUs.
Administ~ative issues dealt with integrating the
community pol~cing philosophy, routines and activities
into the Burequ's various RUs. This involved developing
strategies fo~ (a) holding RU managers and supervisors
accountable fqr complying with the chief's expectations
for involvemeqt, and (b) reinforcing compliance using an
informal syst~m of rewards.
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The strategic plapning process led to a mid-course
review. The review re~ulted in a restatement of the
Five-Year Transition P~an. A clearer mission was produced
and new, clearer goals were adopted. The new plan, called
the Community Policing strategic Plan, serves as an employee
manual for the develop~ent andl use of workplans.
Implementation Products
Several innovativ~ programs were initiated during
the first three years qf the implementation process. These
programs have become i~stitutiIDnalized as integral
components of the Bure~u's organizational structure. Each
represents a substantiql departure from the Portland Police
Bureau's traditional pqlicing model.
Chief's Forum
The Chief's Forum is a policy advisory group to the
Chief and top command s.taff. ']~he 22-member group represents
a broad range of constituencies. Membership is rotated
and there is a long wa~ting list of those wishing to
participate.
Torn Potter first conceived of the idea of a policy
advisory group while Captain of the Community Policing
Support Division. When he was Inamed Chief in November,
1990, his first priority was to establish the Forum. The
first Forum met less than a month after Potter became Chief.
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Potter described what he had in mind for the group:
I wanted a mechanism in place so citizens could
offer input on policy; to advise, to review
operations, and help support the transition, and
that would serve as a window into the Bureau.
The Chief's Forum serves two important functions for
the Bureau: One is that it represents the operationalization
of the key attributes of "service-orientation,
community-driven, accountability, open communication,
feedback, and empowerment" (CMSI, 1991). The other is
that it serves to strengthen community support for the
Bureau's conversion to community policing.
The importance of community support for the change
was emphasized again and again throughout the change
process. From the first meetings of the original small
work group, through the developmental, planning, and
implementation stages, special emphasis was placed on
strategies for garnering this support among the many groups
and committees developing strategies for the change process.
The support of key figures in Portland's political arena
was especially important at the outset; individuals who
had considerable influence on not only City Hall, but on
a wide and influential constituency as well. The demand
by such groups that the change proceed as planned could
act as a mandate for change, possibly providing valuable
leverage in countering the inevitable resistance that would
surface (see page 113).
Selection of members. The Bureau identified areas
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of interest tnat should be represented and contacted various
groups that r~presented those interests to ask that a
representativ~ member 'be selected to serve on the Forum.
These interests included aNA and the Neighborhood
Associations, business, the Police Commissioner and City
Council members, the Police Union, police advisory groups,
police fiscal services, police precincts, and the Chief.
Role of the Forum as a group. The Forum serves to
(a) advise th~ chief on policy issues, and (b) as a public
review and involvement' body for the Bureau on issues such
as setting prtorities for community policing objectives.
The group rev~ews and makes recommendations on the budget
and on the gerleral decision-making process. "We run all
major changes - organizational policies, not operations
- by the Forum before finalizing," said Potter.
Initially, Potter~was concerned that a perception
would develop that he was using the Forum as a rubber stamp
for his agend~. However, prior to a meeting in January,
1993, he expl~ined:
• • • I asked the City Council members to meet
with the Forum members and commit to adding 100
more offiqers. The Forum recommended 57, and the
Forum won. We usually reach consensus. The only
times we ~ave disagreed was on Ballot Measure 9
(a Gay Rights Billithat would provide the same
fringe be~efits for working Gay couples as for
married cquples), and on the number of officers.
I won on ~easure 9~
On iqsues as minor as a choice of deciding
whether tq change from chemical mace to pepper
mace, we a,sk the Forum, "What do you think?" On
matters s~ch as police shootings and abuses of
power, we explain to the Forum what happened and
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the Forum offers input.
Role of individual members. Each individual member
is expected to (a) represent the views of h~s or her
interest group as well as the community as ~ whole, (b)
act as a communication link between his or ner group and
the community as a whole and the chief, and (c) be an active
community advocate for the Bureau I s convers;ionto community
policing.
When a new city ordinance included a s~nset clause
stipulating review by the Forum, Potter saw this as a formal
acknowledgment by the City Council that the Forum had
established itself as an "integral part of t~he
organization."
Neighborhood Response Teams
The concept of Neighborhood Response T~ams I (NRT) is
consistent with the philosophy that to be effective, police
services must be targeted to the specific n~edslof the
different communities the Bureau serves. NRTs use non-
traditional methods to focus on chronic nei~hborhood
problems that are perceived by the resident~ to: interfere
with the livability of the neighborhood. A latent goal
of NRT is to minimize the use of the crimin~l jmstice system
(PPB, 1992b).
The NRT program grew out of the integr~tion of
communi ty policing/problem-solving and a prqposE:!d City
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Neighborhood Revitalization Plan19 • When the Bureau's
community policing project began to develop in 1989, the
Revitalization Plan faded in anticipation of the
problem-solving capability of the community policing
approach. The Plan had targeted a 128-unit public housing
project. Chief Charles Moose was then a Lieutenant at
North and in charge of the Bureau's participation in the
Revitalization Plan. It turned out that the housing
project, Iris Court, was selected as a community policing
demonstration project. Moose was placed in charge of this
project, and coordinated the involvement of the NRT to
assist in the project.
The original NRT consisted of Moose, two officers,
and two non-sworn Public Service Officers (PSOs). The
team's initial effort targeted the problem of car prowls
and drug and alcohol problems involving dock workers at
the Port of Portland shipyards. The team investigated
the problem and recommended specific changes in the layout
of the parking lot to assist patrol officers in the
detection of suspicious activity. The team also suggested
that the Port and its various contractors establish programs
for drug and alcohol rehabilitation for their employees.
In addition, the team stressed that the employers establish
written policies that substance abuse by employees would
not be tolerated.
This was one of the initial experiences of the Bureau's
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later tendency to expand i~s operational domain to include
coercive tactics to encourqge sound management practices.
The Bureau uses a carrot a~d stick approach which sends
the message to business owners Iand managers that it will
not guarantee deployment to repeat calls for service
generated as a result of lax or poor management practices.
Operation Target. Problems in the inner city continued
growing in volume and intenpity. By 1991, the sounds of
gunfire in the community hap become commonplace. Moose
had by this time been promoted to Commander at North
Precinct. Moose had developed Ian amicable working
relationship with ONA's District Coalition Crime Prevention
Coordinators, and together, they developed a strategic
plan to address the increas~ng Igang violence and drug
problems in the community. They named the plan Operation
Target.
To begin Operation Target~ ONA Crime Prevention
Specialists designed a surv~y instrument to identify
specific problem locations ~)erC'eived by the community
residents to impact the liv,bility of the neighborhoods.
District street patrol offi~ers, Crime Prevention
Specialists, and Police Res~rve Officers spent 3 months
conducting a door-to-door s~rvey within the targeted 128
square block area. The pro~lems identified in the surveys
were grouped into four cate~ories: Drug houses; gang houses;
drug/gang houses; and misce~laneous complaints such as
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loud parties, abandoned autos, building code violations,
and abandoned houses. The targeted area also included
2 city parks that were sites of drug-dealing and disorderly
conduct.
Ninety-six problem locations were identified and a
NRT was put together consisting of a Lieutenant, 6 officers,
and the two PSOs. The officers and PSOs received special
training to identify code and ordinance violations, and
each officer was assigned eight problem addresses. The
officers also received training from the ONA Crime
Prevention Specialists who familiarized them with the
neighborhood history and focused their perspective on
service and on respect for the "neighbors," and the
particular culture and lifestyle of the community.
Operation Target was begun in November, 1991, and
by the following January, the project was completed. The
number of problem locations grew during this period from
the original 96 to 144. Within the three month period,
91 of the problems had been completely resolved, and the
remainder were being monitored. Those that were monitored
consisted mainly of landlord/tenant issues. The two parks
had been reclaimed, 6 noise problems and 8 code violations
had been resolved, 17 houses had been vacated and boarded,
and 165 abandoned autos were tagged for towing.
The success of Operation Target led to Operation Target
II, begun in April 1992, in an area adjacent to Target
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I. Target II addressed 120 problem locations, with 80
resolved and the remainder monitored by the following July.
The following November, Operation Target III began.
During this period, East Precinct also began targeting
similar problems in apartment complexes in their
jurisdiction. Although the officers at East had not
formally put together a NRT, their activities were identical
and their efforts produced similar results (Merrill,
personal communication, 1992). In February, 1993, NRT
became standard operating procedure for all Precincts.
Landlord Training Program
The Landlord Training Program was born out of the
frustration of an ONA Neighborhood Coalition board member,
John Campbell. When a drug house became established in
his neighborhood, Campbell and other members of his
Northeast Portland Neighborhood Association fought a ten-
month battle to have the drug house closed down.
The effort began in 1988, when the Bureau was operating
under the traditional law enforcement mode. The traditional
policing approach required absolute evidence, observed
and documented by a police officer, before a drug house
could be closed down. This method required dangerous
undercover work and its operation was carefully scrutinized
for civil rights violations by the district attorney's
office. In addition, Oregon statutes heavily favored the
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rights of tenants over the rights of landlords, I making
it difficult for landlords to evict troublesome:renters.
Compounding the problem was landlords' reluctance
to cooperate in evicting a paying tenant. The drug house
appeared in Campbell's neighborhood at tne same time that
the number of drug houses increased markedly throughout
the city. The problem prompted the City Council to pass
a drug house ordinance in December, 1988, that imposed
heavy sanctions on landlords who knowing~y permitted illegal
drug activity on their property.
Campbell and his neighbors made pho~e calls
totaling well into the hundreds to the landlord,
911, the police Drugs and Vice Divis~on and ,various
other police agencies and community ;resource.s"
(Campbell, 1989).
The calls continued over a ten-month per~od before the
operation was shut down. This experienc~ prompbed Campbell
to develop a training program for landlords.
Campbell approached the Bureau with his idea and the
Bureau agreed to assist by applying for ~ federal grant
from the National Institute of Justice t9 develop the
program. The grant was approved in Janu~ry, 1990.
The training is a five-hour course covering
prevention and problem-solving techniques including:
applicant screening, proactive manag~ment, warning
signs of drug activity, how to work with neighbors,
eviction options, and police/landlor~ relations.
Included with the training is a comp+ehensi~e manual
of the material, complete with appli~able laws
and references to support organizati9ns (PPB, 1992a,
p. 2).
The training is free of charge. A fee of $5.00 is charged
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to cover the printing cost of the 106-page manual. As
I
of March, 1994, 5,759 landlords had received the training,
representing nearly 100,000 rental units.
I
The City's Drug Hous~ Ordinance20 levies heavy
penalties for non-compliance. Landlords and owners of
I
properties targeted by citizens' complaints receive a letter
from the Chief of Police, ~ encouraging their attendance
at an upcoming training seminar. The Chief reminds them
,
that the Drug House Orciinance "carries stiff penal ties"
and that landlords
who permit dealers, distributors, or manufacturers
of illegal drugs on their property may face fines
of up to $500 a da~, ~nd closure of their property
for up to one full Iyear • • • because we prefer
to work with landlords to ensure the problems never
reach this level, ~e offer the Landlord Training
Program (emphasis ~n original) (Portland Police
Bureau, 1991).
A recent survey shows that as a result of the training,
I
91 percent of the participants made changes in the way
they manage their prop~rty; 92 percent of those who dealt
I
with drug activity on their properties used information
,
from the course to address the situation; and 99 percent
of the respondents remarked favorably about the program.
I
In 1989, Campbell received an additional grant, with
assistance from the city of Portland, to publish a booklet
for distribution to hotel and motel owners and managers
to help prevent clandestine drug lab operations on their
I
property (City of Portland and Campbell, 1989).
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Community Contact Offices
There are 15 community contact offices strategically
located throughout the city. Local merchants and concerned
citizens donate space for these offices. In some instances,
the phones also are donated. The offices are staffed by
volunteers.
The first community contact office was opened in June,
1990 in Portland's historic old Town. The District contains
Portland's skid row and houses many of the charitable
services for indigents. Public drunkenness, panhandling,
and various other street problems are a frequent source
of conflict between the indigent population and district
merchants. The district served as the Central Precinct's
Demonstration Project during 1990 and 1991.
Other community contact offices are located either
in business districts or public housing projects. The
facilities serve to make the police and police services
more accessible to citizens. The volunteers who staff
the offices receive training in filling out reports,
information and referral, and provide a victim call-back
service.
There are also 7 field offices, also donated by
merchants. District officers use the facilities for
interviewing and writing reports. Each office is equipped
with a telephone, a copy machine, and restroom facilities.
aNA Crime Prevention Specialists or Neighborhood
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Association volunteers assist with the establishment of
the offices. In some instances, a community partnership
agreement is drawn up to delegate responsibility and
delineate goals and services.
Information and Referral (I & R)
A system for dispensing reliable information and for
making referrals in response to neighborhood problems is
a natural outgrowth of community policing. For most
adopting organizations, the need for an I & R service
becomes apparent as officers engage in assisting citizens
to solve community problems. However, in this case, the
need for an I & R system was anticipated, during the
developmental phase, by the suggestion of a female member
of the Bureau21 •
In follow up, Sgt. Austin learned, through his survey
of other police organizations, that some police officers
reported spending as much as fifty-percent of their time
responding to citizens' requests for information. This
information substantiated the employee's suggestion that
I & R was an important community need which had been
overlooked in the delivery of police services. The high
demand for this service, solicited both by calls for service
and by the apparent need of many with whom the police corne
into contact, established I & R as a legitimate function
of the police. For this reason, Austin recommended the
169
formation of an I & R C~::>mmittee :(see page 118) to assess
the Bureau's capacity t9 fill th~s need, and to make
recommendations about h~)w an I & R system could be
developed.
From the perspective that I & R is a form of police
response, it would be n~cessary to consider ways to maximize
the efficiency and effe~tiveness'of the service. Efficiency
could be obtained by supplying all Bureau personnel with
the same information anq referra~ resources. Effectiveness
would be maximized by p~eparing a reference guide that
would include all known community resources so that
referrals could be prop~rly made~
The I & R Committe~ recommended that a full-time I
& R Specialist position be established to develop the
system. The purpose of the system would be to
help refer citize~s in theldirection of a solution
to problems that th~ police are neither qualified
or able to serve, a~d to offer assistance to
citizens in a way tnat maximizes the chances of
their finding a solqtion to the problem (Portland
Police Bureau, 1989q ). I
The goal would be to requce timelspent on problems that
are more appropriately nandled by some other agency.
Austin took the problem to a private I & R company.
One of the employees referred him to a former employee
of the company. It tur~ed out that the Bureau hired both
of these individuals to job-share a full-time position.
Said one of the Specialists, "Unitil we were hired in
october, 1990, I & R was a rolodex on someone's desk."
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As a tef-l,m, :the Specialist~ began developing an
Officer's Re~ource Guide by asking officers for a list
of the resou:rces which they mo!pt often used. From that
point, they ~sed the telephone dir~ctory and snowballed
the informat~on by direct cont,ct with city agencies and
community re!?ource groups.
A pocket-sized guide was produced, and distributed
to officers ~t roll call. The officers viewed a short
training vid~o which included ~nstruction on problem
assessment, ~ctive listening, qnd the use of the Guide.
The Guide is continuously upda~ed. For example, later
additions inGluded the names aqd addresses of all public
buildings; P4blic and private ~choQls, colleges and
universities; parks, and city ~treets. The Guide is thus
both a quick~reference directory and a Resource Guide.
The Dir~ctory includes li~tings of addresses and FAX
numbers of t~e three precincts andlall community contact
offices; the most frequently u~ed hot lines and emergency
numbers; city bu~eaus and agenoies;: federal, state and
local law enforcement and criminal justice agencies; a
zip code map andlthe location, and:hours of operation of
fingerprinti~g services.
The Resource section is organized alphabetically by
problem type, from AIDS to Youth Services. Each listing
includes resources available, location, hours of operation,
area served, contact person, and ifi necessary, a brief
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description of services.
I
Officers have also 'found the Problem-Solving
Guide useful in de~elopingla written agreement
with citizens, business owmers, and other service
providers to share ,responsibility for solving
community problems. Applying this procedure,
officers work with citizens to identify a problem
area, such as a particular Istreet corner where
there is an ongoing drug traffic. Using the guide,
the officer may contact the water bureau to turn
off a water founta~n, the telephone company to
restrict calls from a nearby phone booth so that
drug dealers canno~ be contacted at that site,
and city building inspectors to condemn buildings
or order a vacant lot cleared of debris that could
provide undercover to drug 'users 22 (Austin and
Sweet, 1992, p. 65). i
In August, 1992, the I & R system was institutionalized
by the creation of an Information and Referral Unit, as
part of the Bureau's Operations Support Unit, with a non-
emergency telephone line to provide direct services to
citizens. The line also serves as an expedient referral
I
when situational factors do nob afford officers the time
to refer to their guide.
Neighborhood Liaison Officer P~ogram
The Bureau's most ~ignificant innovative change has
been the Neighborhood Liaison Officer (NLO) program. The
NLO program emerged from pursuit of objectives set out
I
in the Bureau's transition plan. As the strategies for
achieving the goal of partnership were addressed, it became
I
apparent that a systematic program for officer involvement
in joint police/community problem-solving activities was
I
needed.
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The idea develope~ from a proposal by the Bureau in
January, 1990, that "Nl'3ighborhood Association Police
Officers" be assigned to each targeted neighborhood as
part of the public saf~ty component of Portland's
Neighborhood Revitaliz~tion Plan23 • The proposal suggested
that selected officers be given special training in non-
traditional police iss~es such as neighborhood economic
development, and housiflg and employment. The Bureau's
proposal also suggeste~ ride-alongs, and attendance by
the officers at neighbqrhood functions to "improve the
officers' and community's abilit-y to work together to seek
innovative, effective methods to help solve neighborhood
problems" (Portland Pol.. ice Burea.u, 1990a, p. 3).
In June, 1990, an ONA Crime Prevention Specialist
suggested that an offiqer be assigned to each one of the
eight Neighborhood Dis~rict Coalition offices throughout
the city. Chief Moose, then a lieutenant at North Precinct,
instituted the program in North 1's jurisdiction immediately.
Moose requested distriqt officers working the afternoon
shift to volunteer to begin attending Neighborhood District
Coalition crime preven~ion meetings, and to work with the
Crime Prevention Specialists tOlbegin addressing problems
of concern to the neig~borhoods~ The afternoon shift
provides NLOs the opportunity to attend Neighbor Association
meetings and to be available to ,interact with both business
owners and citizens after normal working hours.
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Most police organizations adopting community policing
use the split-force approach. A select group of officers
receive training in community policing and problem-solving.
These officers are removed from regular motor patrol and
devote full time to community policing activities. These
community policing officers are assigned as special units
to each of an organization's precincts. Officers who are
not members of these teams engage in traditional policing
activities.
In contrast, Portland Police Bureau NLOs are not
relieved of regular patrol duties. Instead, the detail
sergeant arranges for blocks of time, free from radio
dispatch, for attending meetings and for engaging in
problem-solving projects with the community. All of the
Bureau's officers receive on-going, in-service training
in community policing, and all are expected to engage in
problem-solving and other non-traditional activities
whenever the opportunity arises.
The NLO program was extended to the East and Central
precincts in February, 1993. With minor variations,
determined by the demographic differences among the
precincts' jurisdictions, the operational structure of
the NLO program is basically the same across the 3
precincts. North's and Northeast's programs are guided
by written standard operating procedures. Central developed
a sophisticated procedure manual that includes a mission
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statement, goals, roles and responsibilities of officers,
supervisors, managers, command, ONA Crime Prevention
Coordinators, and neighborhood residents. Appended to
the manual are examples of the standard forms routinely
used by NLOs in the performance of their duties.
Problems at Central are identified by the NLOs in
a number of different ways: Problem identification forms
are available to the public at the precinct, community
contact office, and Neighborhood Community Centers. The
forms can be completed either by citizens or precinct
officers. The forms are forwarded to the NLO for
disposition. In addition, local area businesses are
provided with "Troubleshooter" cards. The cards are
postcard size and are addressed to Central precinct, postage
paid. Similar to the problem identification forms, the
cards include a list of problems which the complainant
can check off, and space for comments.
Police Activities League (PAL)
In March, 1989, a group of minority police officers 21
proposed establishing a recreation program wherein volunteer
police officers could interact with at-risk juveniles.
In follow-up, the Community Policing Division staff,
together with several other metropolitan police
organizations, established a chapter of the National Police
Athletics League. PAL is a juvenile crime prevention
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program that was first developed in the 1930s by a New
York City police officer. The initial program involved
teaming police officers and boys together to play baseball.
The "Greater Portland PAL" program initially targeted
boys and girls at risk for dropping out of school and
becoming involved with drugs and gangs (Austin and Braaten,
1991). These youth are still targeted and are provided
with special sports activities, and a summer camp, in which
they experience personal interaction with police officers.
The program has expanded to include a PAL Youth Center.
The Center was opened in summer, 1994 in a renovated,
fire-damaged elementary school. The Center was built with
donated money, labor, and materials and includes a new
indoor gym. The Center accommodates all children, ages
8 to 16, with a variety of recreational activities.
Decentralization of Detectives
A 1989 report by the Chief's Investigative Advisory
Committee supports the claims related on pages 11-12 that
a shift is occurring in the norms and values of the police
culture. Reflecting this change, members of the Committee
commented, "Gone are the days of isolationism and
interagency rivalries and jealousies • • • luxuries that
can no longer be tolerated in law enforcement" (Portland
Police Bureau, 1989a, p. 5). The Report also indicated
a need to end intra-organizational isolation and rivalry
176
between detectives and patrol officers.
Detectives typically are sequestered in a centralized,
special Investigations branch. This is because specialized
areas of investigations such as homicide fraud, property
recovery and missing persons do not readily lend themselves
to precinct level follow-up (p. 2). Rivalry between patrol
officers and detectives is an historical phenomenon in
pdlice organizations. One reason for this is the perception
of elevated status when assigned to Investigations. Another
reason is that detectives and patrol officers are often
reluctant to share information that may lead to sharing
the distribution of rewards. This is especially true of
patrol officers aspiring to promotion to the Investigations
Branch. The Committee acknowledged that the result of
the unwillingness of officers in each organizational branch
to share information and work cooperatively as a team
reduced efficiency and effectiveness.
In keeping with the Bureau's planned shift to a service
-~-
focus, the Committee suggested that certain investigative
functions be transferred to the precinct level. This
recommendation indicated a major break both with the
structure and the culture of traditional policing. The
basis for the recommended decentralization of detectives
was that burglaries, larcenies, and auto thefts are
habitually committed by the same individuals, using the
same mode of operations, in the same geographical area.
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The Committee noted that these kinds of offenses are
particularly conducive to successful investigation at the
precinct level by combining the street knowledge and
experience of the patrol officer with the investigative
expertise of the detectives.
The Report acknowledged that retaining centralization
of those types of investigations that do not lend themselves
to precinct level operations would mean retaining the schism
between some members of the Investigative Branch and patrol
officers. To fully open up the lines of communication
between the two functions, the Committee recommended that
a detective from each Investigative detail, e.g., homicide,
drugs and vice, etc. be designated a liaison between his
or her detail and each precinct. The liaison would be
responsible for disseminating information at roll calls
and with fliers, and act as the contact person to provide
assistance to officers within their area of expertise.
These recommendations led to the assignment in
November, 1990, of six detectives and a Sergeant to the
East Precinct on an experimental basis. The success of
this effort led to a Bureau-wide institutionalization of
the program in February, 1993.
Summary. These programs remain at the core of the
Bureau's operational expression of community policing.
To date, they are solidly entrenched in the organization's
structure and design, and serve as an avenue for the
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expression of the changing values and perspectives of the
organizational culture.
End Notes
1. Index crimes represent the crime index of the
eight most serious crimes reported in a given j~risdiction.
These crimes are: murder; forcible rape; robbery; aggravated
assault; burglary; larceny-theft; motor vehicle theft; I
and arson. The Federal Bureau of Investigation regular~y
collects these data from over 17,000 local poliQe agencies.
2. The initial gangs identified themselve~ as the I
Bloods and the Crips.
3. See the recommendations of the Crimina~ Justice
Committee, page 119.
4. Specifically, Potter's recommendations for changes
within the Bureau were first, to (a) provide
culture-specific training relative to the popul~tions served
by each Precinct; (b) decentralize decision-mak~ng to the
lowest level of responsibility, with methods for holding,
the decision-makers accountable for the outcome; (c) build
and strengthen organizational values with an emphasis on
public service and helping others; and (d) develop the
capacity to provide opportunities for creativity and
experimentation, and reward community-oriented Qehavior.
Second, Potter recommended forging closer ties with the
community by (a) developing community contact offices,
similar to Japanese kobans, to enhance the acceqsibility
of the police; (b) sponsoring youth-oriented programs which
build trust between the police and youth, such qS Police
Explorer and Cadet programs, and a Police Athle~ic League;
(c) helping to establish a citizen's volunteer Qank to
assist the police in proactive strategies; (d) ~sing
problem-solving as a basic police strategy; and (d) using
a "community agenda" whereby a strategic plannillg process
is developed in collaboration with the community to
encourage long range planning.
5. Ron Herndon, founder and co-chairpersoll of
Portland's Black United Front is presently the qirector I
of Portland's Head Start program.
6. The Operational Advisory Committee, comprised
of progressive police leaders in the U.S. and Canada,
included Joe Balles, Madison, Wisconsin; Chris Braiden,
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada; Mike Masterson, Madison,
Wisconsin; Dennis Nilsson, Evanston, Illinois; Tim
Oettmeier, Houston, Texas; Frank Palombo, Clearwater,
Florida; and Bill Smith, San Bernadino, California. The
Academic Advisory Committee included Robert Friedmann,
Georgia State University; Joseph Hornick, University of ,
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Calgary, Canada; Carl Klockars, University of Delaware;
Peter Manning, Michigan state University; Robert O'Brien,
University of Oregon; Dennis Rosenbaum, University of
Illinois at Chicago; Jay Sexter, John Jay College of
Criminal Justice; Lillian Shyu, Chicago, IL; Carol Thompson,
E. Carolina state University; Robert Trojanowicz, Michigan
state University; and Mary Ann wycoff, Police Foundation.
7. The Citizen's Crime Commission is an affiliate
of the Portland Chamber of Commerce. The Commission
represents the interests of the business community on issues
of public safety.
8. Only 6 officers opted for early retirement (PPB,
1993a). The city expedited a planned change in the City
Charter dealing with the Police and Fire Pension Fund to
get voter approval in the 1988 November election to reduce
vested interest in the Pension Plan from 20 to 5 years.
It was hoped that those strongly opposed to the adoption
of community policing would opt for this added benefit,
thus attenuating the anticipated resistance to the planned
change.
9. By June, 1993, 211 additional sworn personnel,
and 51 non-sworn personnel had been added.
10. The Portland City Auditor's Office conducts
periodic performance audits of Portland's public bureaus
and agencies as a system for ensuring budgetary
accountability. The audit in question sought enhancement
of efficiencies in the Police Bureau's fleet management.
11. This committee was described on page 117 as one
of the community policing transition committees formed
to make recommendations for changes to accommodate community
policing.
12. Once basic operational changes got under way,
the name of the Community Policing Division was changed
to Community Policing Support Division. When basic
reinforcing structural changes were in place, the name
of the Division was changed once again to Planning and
Support.
13. During Richard Walker's brief tenure as Chief,
he resisted letting go of command and control. The
management consultants complained that Walker allowed only
uncommitted (off-shift) RU supervisors and managers to
attend the management training seminars conducted in the
fall of 1990. Members of the Commanding Officers' Advisory
Committee complained of Walker's unwillingness to
decentralize authority and empower the officers to assume
more control over their areas of responsibility.
14. In the first edition of Community Policing Success
Models, each problem-solving event was analyzed within
the framework of the key attributes and success factors
(see Appendix D). Later, updated editions deleted these
as an analytical tool and they fell into disuse. However,
at the outset, they served to focus community policing
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activities on the new goals and objectives.
15. Program budgeting was approved for the Bureau
beginning July, 1993.
16. The new organizational values are explicitly set
forth in the second City Resolution adopting a design for
Community Policing (See Appendix B).
17. Lee P. Brown served as Multnomah County Sheriff
in the 1970s. In 1975, Brown implemented a Neighborhood
Team Policing program. Brown later served as Public Safety
Commissioner in Atlanta, Georgia; Chief of Police in
Houston, where he implemented the NOP community policing
initiative; and in 1990, was named Police Commissioner
in New York City where, once again, he influenced the
implementation of community policing. Brown is presently
a member of the Clinton Presidential Cabinet, charged with
establishing anti-drug policies.
18. Charles Moose was the Bureau's first African
American officer to serve as Precinct Commander, and
subsequently, as Chief of Police, in the 130-year history
of Portland's municipal police force.
19. The Neighborhood Revitalization Plan was developed
in September, 1988, prior to the decision to adopt community
policing. The Plan was in response to pressure on City
Hall by African American community leaders concerned with
the growing drug and gang problems in Portland's
inner-Northeast neighborhoods. The community leaders
claimed that the increase in visible street crimes and
gang violence was creating not only serious livibility
problems, but also seriously impinging on the community's
efforts toward long-term economic development. The Plan
was the outgrowth of the community's insistance on bringing
in the Oregon National Guard to restore peace to the
neighborhoods. Once the decision was made, in November
1988, to adopt community policing, the Neighborhood
Revitalization Plan was integrated into community policing
objectives. The area was later targeted by the Neighborhood
Response Teams (NRT).
20. Noted earlier. in 1993, three years into the
transition process, the Bureau expanded to 5 precincts.
21. In March, 1989, as Community Policing Coordinator
(prior to the establishment of the Community Policing
Division) Tom Potter arranged to meet with female officers,
minority officers, and transferees from the Multnomah County
Sheriff's Office familiar with Neighborhood Team Policing,
to hear their concerns and perceptions of community
policing.
22. The example given by Austin and Braaten was drawn
from the experience of two street patrol officers, who,
in 1986, prior to the officers' knowledge about community
policing, used a number of community policing strategies
to clean up Portland's most notorious drug market. The
market had existed for approximately two decades, permitted
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by "containment by neglect" policies (see page 6). See
the Portland Police Bureau publication, Community Policing
Success Models, available from the Portland Police Bureau,
Planning and Support Division, 1111 SW 2nd Avenue, Portland,
Oregon 97205.
23. The Specified Crime (Drug House) Ordinance, was
enacted in December, 1988. Shortly after being named ONA
Crime Prevention Manager, Blackburn was looking through
the office files and discovered an old proposal for a
Specified Crime Ordinance that dealt specifically with
prostitution. He approached the City Attorney with the
idea of a similar ordinance to deal specifically with drug
houses. Since most drug houses operate on rental property,
the ordinance imposes sanctions on landlords who knowingly
permit illegal drug activity on their property.
CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The Bureau's change process was assessed using the
summary guidelines, derived from the theoretical and
empirical propositions and concepts, outlined in Chapter
I. The guidelines are categorized as follows: requisite
structural changes; the organizational change process;
internal resistance to change; and organizational design.
Requisite Structural Changes
1. Change from a quasi-military, command and control
management structure to a non-authoritarian and
participatory management style.
A September, 1993, employees survey indicated that
most officers, at all rank levels, believe that they are
given the right level of independence and decision-making
authority (Portland Police Bureau, 1993). They also
indicated that they are encouraged to use initiative in
their work. The insignificant variation in these responses
between RUs and across all rank levels indicates a
relaxation of the quasi-military, command and control
management style. Earlier, a PPB commanding officer
remarked, "Those who \'lant it [who want to participate in
the decision-making process] get it" {Schenck, 1992, p.
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2) •
However, officer initiative is insufficient to
guarantee inclusion in the participatory process.
Opportunities for participation vary, depending upon
assignment and shift. Detectives, officers involved in
NRTs, the NLO program, the Gang Enforcement Team, and the
Youth and Family Services Unit for example, have a greater
opportunity than street patrol officers and traffic officers
for routine participation in decision-making. The latter
are provided the opportunity for participation in policy
decisions through membership in their respective Chief's
Advisory Committee.
The revised Community Policing Strategic Plan
recognizes the need to continue efforts to decentralize
decision making (Portland Police Bureau, 1994, p. 25).
2. The criterion for reward must emphasize quality
service.
3. Promotion criteria must be based upon a demonstrated
ability to carry out community policing strategies;
competency; and leadership ability.
It is generally believed that extrinsic rewards are
necessary to elicit and reinforce desired behaviors. This
assumption is not borne out by the 1993 survey mentioned
above. The responses indicated a general feeling that
the reward and promotion systems are unfair. Yet the
majority of the respondents agreed that working closely
with the community, and involving citizens in fighting
crime are very important. These perceptions indicate a
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behavioral change that is intrinsically motivated, rather
than motivated by a promise of tangible reward.
By mid-1994 however, participation in community
policing strategies officially became the key criterion
by which promotion is granted and performance evaluated.
It was not ascertained by this study how the "rule of five"
(see page 140) selection procedure accommodates the
variability in opportunities for participation in community
policing strategies1 •
4. Recruitment policies must include seeking qualified
candidates who reflect the ethnic and cultural diversity
of the community served.
The Bureau's new recruitment goals meet or exceed
the City's affirmative action standards for ethnic and
cultural minorities, and females 2 • A position has been
dedicated to outreach in minority communities across the
United states. Gays and lesbians also have been actively
recruited (Duin, 1994).
Educational standards have been relaxed, tests have
been revised for cultural neutrality, and special
pre-training provisions have been established to take into
account the differential educational opportunities for
racial minorities.
5. Training must include community policing skills. Role
redefinitions must take place concomitant with
retraining.
Although 8 hours of In-Service community policing
and problem-solving training was provided early on for
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all Bureau members, training in supportive leadership and
management skills was not immediately forthcoming. Thus,
the initial application 9f bhe community policing skills
acquired by street offic~rs was fragmented, both in quality
and consistency, dependirlg uipon the level of coromi tment,
and the personal managem~nt style, of individual RU managers
and supervisors.
Roles were not clearly redefined at the time that
re-training was provided. Although the roles of all sworn
Bureau personnel were reqefined by General Order in June,
1993, these are yet to b~ formalized. It must be noted
that until it was clear exactly which of the many different
kinds of tasks experimented with in the early stage of
the change process would become integral community policing
strategies, clear definitions of roles were not possible
(refer to Figure 1., Chapter VI). It should be noted also
that strict role definitions may limit flexible responses
to novel situations and problems.
Organizational Change Process
6. The chief executive snould initiate the change process
by enlisting an outside consultant or expert to act
as a neutral-party chpnge-agent to assist in developing
and coordinating the ~hamge process.
It is not clear whetherlthe use of outside consultants
provided added leverage fpr inducing employee acceptance
of the change. The perception that the strategic planning
process was "well oiled" pndihighly professional may have
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influ~ncem the officers' view that the change was immin~nt,
but this Was not ascertained.
Gertainly, bringing in the t~ree outside experts -
Troja~owi~z, Sloan, and Braiden tp orient RU managers and
super~isors (see page 133) - had ~ positive influence on
these officers I perception of the community policing corlcept
and i~s philosophy and principles~ Although some remained
cautiqus, :most were receptive to :/.earning more about th~
concept.
7. Tne CHief executive must be c9mmitted to the idea tijat
cnange: is necessary, and committed to the alternative
s~lected.
qhief Walker was neutral tow~rd the change3 • The
managemenb consultants and comman4 officers felt that
Walker's non-commitment was an impediment to the planneq
change. This perception was not ~orne out by this study.
The chief "s skepticism had little apparent effect on th~
forward motion of the change. Th~ Community Policing
Division staff and committed RU m~nagers and supervisors
drove the change forward, with strongl support from City
Hall and DNA, independent of suppqrt from the chief.
8. Goals must be clear.
Tne original set of goals ou~lined in the initial
Community Policing Transition Plaq - ~artnership;
empowe~ment; problem-solving; accQunt~bility; and service
orientation - were a good choice ~t the outset. They
provid~d a clear statement of the kin&s of changes the
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Bureau hoped to achieve. They also provided a measure
of Bureau accountability to the community for carrying
through with the proposed change. A 1993 mid-course review
resulted in the recasting of these goals as values, and
the adoption of four new goals that encompassed these values
(see page 152).
9. Relevant actors and groups from both inside and outside
the organization must be included in the planning and
implementation processes.
The Community Policing Project Team, through a lengthy
survey and interview process, identified the broadest range
of interests in the community and involved all of these
interests in the planning and design phases, and
implementation process. Although the community policing
principles and philosophy was a Hobson's Choice4 , a
"Portland version" of community policing was designed by
the community. The group with the least opportunity for
participation, and which was solicited least for help with
the planning and design, consisted of Bureau employees
themselves. The transition committees accommodated only
about ten percent of Bureau personnel. The other 90 percent
were learning about community policing, and the transition
process from the media.
All Bureau personnel were surveyed in February, 1989,
almost a year before formal implementation was begun.
The chief's cover letter stated that the purpose of the
survey was to provide Bureau employees with the opportunity
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to influence development of a definition and design for
community policing and to "be involved in shaping a version
of community policing unique to Portland's specific needs
and desires."
The cover letter also included a brief synopsis of
"successful" community policing projects in Houston, San
Francisco, and Newport News, Virginia, a definition of
community policing, and the justification for change.
The three survey questions 5 were extremely ill-conceived
and inappropriate - given the officers' level of knowledge
and understanding about the concept - to the stated purpose
of the survey. So much so that an apparent rumble went
out, and of the 926 surveys distributed, only 105 (11%)
were returned.
This study found that this initial survey enhanced
resistance to the change. This was evidenced by the results
of a May, 1990 Attitude Survey of street patrol officers.
Of the twenty-five percent who responded, eighty-six percent
indicated they were uninformed and lacked the necessary
education to implement community policing strategies, and
75 percent said that they did not believe the change would
last. This level of alienation may be compared with a
1991 study by Weisel and Eck (1994) of six adopting
organizations, including Philadelphia, which indicated
that 75 percent of the responding officers believed that
the change to community policing would be permanent.
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The cynicism indicated by the street patrol officers
may reflect a dynamic different than the cynicism of ranking
officers. "The officers do not trust the chang,e agents,"
said the PPB Training Division captain. But according
to an outside training consultant, liThe supervisors do
not trust the change," (Deciple, personal communication,
1994) •
10. Once the problem is diagnosed, experiments Iare designed
to test the innovation.
Each of the Bureau's original three Precin~ts carried
out a one-year demonstration project. Community members
identified problems of concern, and participatem in
developing and implementing the strategies ~or gealing
with the problems. All 3 projects produced lasting,
positive results and demonstrated the effectiveness of
interagency cooperation and the value of citizen
participation in problem solving.
Although the projects were invested with an unrealistic
amount of energy and resources, they functi9ned:to provide
concrete examples of what police-community ~artnerships
can accomplish. They also provided valuabl~ experience
for both officers and citizens as a new coo~erative
relationship was forged and defined.
Of greater possible value than the demQnstnation
projects were the routine problem-solving p~ojects compiled
into book-form and distributed to all of th~ RUs. These
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Community Policing Success Models ~erved as more realistic
examples of the "normal" use of resources in applying
community policing strategies.
11. Successful change requires time and repeated effort.
A 5-year transition period was chosen during which
the Bureau would gradually convert the entire organization
to community policing. During the rebuilding and refining
stages, the perception among many Bureau personnel was
that the change was proceeding too slowly. However, it
was noted that those opposed to the change complained that
the change was moving ahead too rapidly, an~ those
supportive of the change complained that itlwas moving
too slowly. It was observed that the change moved forward
at a tenacious and consistent pace.
12. Progress must be monitored to ~nable mid-course
corrections.
The Community Policing Divisiop staff carried out
on-going documentation of the organ~zational changes and
events related to the conversion prpcess, nmting both
successes and failures. Beginning tn January, 1993, and
continuing to early 1994, independe~t analysts conducted
interviews with representative individuals and groups within
the Bureau, and with individuals an~ focus groups external
to the Bureau. The compilation of this information produced
the new Community Policing strategi~ Plan, ~ublished in
March, 1994. The Plan redirects th, Bureau~s conversion
process, summarizes both the succesges and flailures of
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the community policing strategies since the transition
began, and specifies areas of needed improvement.
Internal Resistance to Change
13. In the case of innovative change in police
organizations, public support for the change must
be garnered to help counter internal resistance.
Part of the strategy during the planning phase included
currying the support of influential segments of the
community to act as a mandate for change. It was believed
that employee acceptance of the change could be leveraged,
or at least moderated, by community mandate. This study
did not determine whether, or to what degree, this
assumption was borne out. A speculation however, is that
the observed strength of community support, and especially
the enthusiastic support from influential business groups,
city hall, and the media, was and is sufficient to drive
the change forward regardless of the level of resistance
inside the Bureau.
14. A redistribution of power must be effected within
the organization, i.e., decision-making authority
must be pushed down to the lowest level of
responsibility.
Officers who supported the change at the outset were
later repositioned as RU managers. When Potter was
appointed Chief, members of the initial small work group
who attained the rank of captain became the assistant,
and deputy chiefs.
15. Power redistribution must occur through a developmental
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process of change rather than by sudden and arbit~aryl
appointment.
As noted above, supporters of the planned change were I
appointed to influential positions early on in the
transition process. This was a rational strategy.
Currently however, the revised promotions criteria, anq
on-going leadership and management training is effecti~g
increased power-sharing through lateral coordination,
cooperation, and enhanced communication between and among ,
ranks and RUs. This new lateral communication system
is replacing the bureaucratic, vertical channel of
communication and decision-making that was the source of
the monopoly on power.
16. Those directly affected by the change should be brought
into the change process at the earliest possible stage.
A thorough review of the literature informed the
original small work group that the success of the planned
change could pivot upon the level of acceptance of the
change by Bureau personnel. The community policing
initiative most thoroughly studied by the group was the
Madison, Wisconsin community policing pilot project (se~
page 53). This initiative emphasized that employee
participation in the planning and design of the project
would be critical to its success. Acting on this
information, the survey/questionnaire packet was distri~uted
to all personnel two months before the planning process
began. As noted in the discussion of Guideline 9, this
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poorly con~eived questionnaire served only to lentrench
and enhanc~ the existing level of resistanqe, land may have
caused res~stance among those who before, might have been
willing to give the planned change a chanc~. This study
did not fi~d a conclusive explanation for this phenomenon6 •
17. The n~ture and purpose of the change should be
expre~sed clearly to reduce ambiguity and resistance.
A survey of street patrol officers in Ma~, 1990 -
17 months ~fter the Community Policing Concept Paper was
drafted - qisclosedl that 60 percent of the 237 respondents
claimed to have reoeived no information about community
policing. Comments made by the responding officers
indicate tnat the concept of community policing - even
if clearly articulated - would not become clear until the
officers understood how it would affect their jobs in
concrete terms. This survey was carried out at the same
time that the initial in-service community rolicing training
began. By that time, some of the respondents had received
5 hours of training; and because of scheduling~ others
had not yet received any training.
18. Role redefinitions must take place con~omatant with
retraining.
Although 8 hours of in-service training was provided
for all Bureau personnel between May and October, 1990,
role redefinitions were not forthcoming for the reasons
listed above. However, it was not until late n989 that
the Project Team had a clear idea of the kipd of initial
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training that would be needed. And even th~n, it was not
yet clear how this training would be applieq on thelstreet.
Tentative role definitions would wait for the 1991
in-service training sessions (see Appendix J).
19. Experiments are carried out to test the innovation.
positive results yielded by the experiments are used
to reinforce the change and encourage acceptance at
all levels of the organiza~ion.
Community policing was adopted by the Bureau - without
prior experimentation - based upon the claims of su~cess
by other adopting organizations. However, because the
evolution of the planned change necessarily involved a
learn-as-you-go experimental approach (Willipms, personal
communication, 1993), early problem-solving project~ served
as testing grounds for the concept. In fact today, :each
problem-solving project tests the concept an~w. If la
selected approach to a targeted problem fail~, another
approach is tried. This trial-and-error propess continues
until a solution is found, or if a solution ~s not fiound,
the problem is closely monitored (Garvey, pe~sonal
communication, 1992).
Problem-solving projects were tracked a~d compiled
(see Guideline 10) as a strategy for reinfor~ing the merits
of the change, and thereby for encouraging its acceptance.
This study did not ascertain whether this st+ategy was
successful.
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Organizational Design
20. The kind of organizational design required to develop
the capacity to achieve organizationi:ll goals l is
contingent upon the kind of environment in which the
organization operates: Bureaucratic ~tructures are
inappropriate for turbulent, unstable task
environments.
The Bureau's new goals are compatible with the actual
assessed needs and demands in its task environment. The
achievement of the new Community Policing strategic Plan's
condensed organizational goals - reduce c~ime andl fear
of crime; empower the community; develop ~nd empower
personnel; and carry out long-term strate~ic planning -
(see Appendix H) requires a reconfigurati~n of the
bureaucratic organizational arrangement t~ accommodate
flexible response to sudden and turbulent change in the
task environment.
Relaxation of the bureaucratic organtzation structure
is evidenced by (a) the Bureau's capacity to deallwith
an expanded domain of problems requiring ~on-traditional
tasks; (b) contrasting the Bureau's curre~t respomse
patterns with its inability to deal with ij proliferation
of street crimes and with the incursion o~ violent youth
gangs into the Columbia Villa public hous~ng project in
1986; and (c) decentralization, and redis~ribution of
decision-making power to RU managers and ~upervisors, giving
them greater authority over budgetary allqcations Ifor their
RUs. This change eliminates "through-chal1nels"
authorization enabling quicker response to novel and
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unpredictable changes in the task environment.
21. There is no "one best way" to organize.
Figures 1. and 2., illustrated in Chapter VI, indicate
that organizational structure and design is contingent
upon an organization's goals, tasks, and environment.
22. Bureaucratic structures will respond to an increase
in environmental instability by differentiation and
integration.
23. The degree of complexity in the organizational design
will mirror the degree of complexity in the
organization's environment.
The changing patterns of crime and disorder, described
in Chapter IV, created a crisis that broke the Bureau's
inertia. It is evident, by comparing the Bureau's
pre-transition, 1989 and 1994 organizational charts (see
Appendix I) that the organization is adapting, by
differentiation, to the new problems that it has brought
into its domain. This adaptive response is occurring
through the implementation of new training and recruitment
practices, and the addition of precincts, community policing
contact offices, and special, multidisciplinary units and
teams. Integration of the organizational goals among the
various RUs has been achieved through the mandatory use
of workplans.
End Notes
1. Furthermore, traffic officers' productivity is
still rated quantitatively by the number of citations and
arrests. Traffic tasks are primarily reactive, and provide
limited opportunity for proactive problem-solving.
197
2. Portland's rac~al minority population is 15.4
percent. Yet the Bureap's affirmative action goal for
minority recruitment is 20 percent. The goal for female
recruitment is also 20 percent, although the percent female
population is given to pe 50 percent. Thus the Bureau's
goal that the diversity of Bure~u personnel reflect the
mix of diversity in community reflects an arbitrary policy
decision.
3. Recall that Wa~ker came out of retirement to take
over as Bureau chief as a favor!to the Mayor. The Mayor's
purpose for appointing Walker was not to lead the Bureau's
transition to community policing, but to mend Bureau-City
Hall relations. The Maror and Walker agreed that Tom Potter
would coordinate and di~ect the I conversion process.
4. This name come~ from Thomas Hobson, a
seventeenth-century liv~ryman in Cambridge, England, who
rented out horses but r~quired each customer to take the
one nearest the door. $ince thi.s study was begun, community
policing itself, as a m~ans of police service delivery,
has become a potential ijobson's Choice for many police
organizations. The 1994 Violentl Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act promisei federa~ funding and subsidies-
to local police agencie~ contingent upon their adopting
the community policing ~pproach.
5. The questions ~hat Bureau employees were asked
on the initial employee survey were: 1) Given what you
currently know about "cqmmuni ty :policing," what would be
the best method for eva~uating it? How do we know if we
are successful? 2) Wha~. is the single most important
step the communities of Portland could take to strengthen
the community-police par·tnership against crime and disorder?
3) What is the single mqst impo~tant step the Portland
Police Bureau could tak~ to strengthen the community-police
partnership against cri~e and disorder?
6. As a conjectur~, a partial explanation for this
phenomenon may lie in t~e Bureau's new vocabulary, adopted
during the planning proqess. The Bureau's traditional
vocabulary did not inclqde the language necessary to
conceptualize or descriQe its new role. For example,
"problem-solving," "police-community partnerships," and
"empowerment," are foreign terms in traditional policing.
The term "internal customer," used to reference Bureau
personnel, was borrowed from Madison, Wisconsin's "total
quality" managerial arrangement and contradicts the internal
application of the term "empowerment." This new term,
used frequently by Chief Potter during his tenure, reveals
difficulty with letting go of the top-down, command and
control managerial tradition. Conceptualizing the term
"internal customer" requires identification of an internal
proprietor. In this context, if! empowerment and relaxation
of the command and control management style is an
administrative goal, one must ask, Whose internal customer?
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND COMMENTS
Summary
This study was guided by four research questions:
th~ first asked what events or circumstances created the
pe+ceived need for change in the role and function of the
Po~tland Police Bureau (PPB). Organization theory suggests
th~t organizations change in adaptive response to changes
in the environment. This study explored the kinds of
chqnges occurring in police environments in general, and
foqnd parallel changes in the PPB's environment that
pr~ssured the Bureau to alter its role and function.
Broader social changes also were explored to gain
a ~eeper understanding of why a change the magnitude of
community policing is occurring, and why it is undergirded
by the phi~osophy of citizen participation. It was found
th~t (a) the change is part of a larger paradigmatic change
in the way:that public organizations do business, and (b)
th~ public lis making stronger demands on police services
for noncrime-related, and low priority crime problems that
have proved to be immune to traditional policing tactics.
However, because these problems are perceived by the police
and the cibizens to be responsive to collaborative problem-
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solving, the police are, by popular consent, placing the
responsibility for I solutions to these problems onto the
broader community. :
The second question sought to identify the process
I
by which the community policing approach was selected as
an alternative to uraditional policing tactics. A
comparativ'E! analysis of traditional and community policing
I
was carried out in Isearch of a justification for the
I
selection. It was found that the PPB selected the community
policing approach because (a) it's operational philosophy
I
is consistent with the city of Portland's neighborhood
I
government structure, and it's developing problem-solving
orientation, and (b) because of the normative assumption
that crime prevention through problem solving is a
demonstrably more effective and efficient use of police
I
resources.
The third and fourth questions represent the most
critical issues in the adoption of this innovative change.
I
McElroy, et al. (1993) sum up the implications of adopting
,
,
the community policing approach by stating that it forces
I
"a reconsideration of virtually all departmental operations
I
and struct~lres" (p.' 186). This begs the theoretical
,
questions of (a) what kinds of structural changes are needed
to develop the capacity to accommodate community policing;
and (b) by what process can these changes be introduced
that will maximize the probability that they will endure
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and become institutionalized.
These questions were addressed by first ascertaining
the dimensions of th~ change, and second, by reviewing
past attempts, within the organizational set, to introduce
changes of similar dimensions. It was concluded that
community policing represents an innovative change that
conflicts strongly with policing traditions. Past attempts
by police organizations to introduce changes of similar
magnitude have consistently failed to endure1 • To
understand the implicptions of this for the Bureau's planned
change, the processes by: which these unsuccessful projects
were implemented were analyzed, and these were contrasted
with the PPB's change process. It was found that, in the
past, change was intrpdu~ed incrementally, in a piece-meal
fashion, that left th~ traditional organizational structure,
and cultural traditions, I intact.
Conclusions
This comparative analysis leads to a hypothesis that
a change the magnitud~ of, community policing must be
implemented organizat:j..on+wide, in an "all-or-none" fashion.
This requires a gener,l reconstruction of the entire
organization to not only develop the capacity to
effectively implement the change, but to eliminate any
relics of the former ~tructure that might facilitate falling
back into old pattern~ and traditions.
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Three key changes, critical to the stqbility ofl the
Bureau's change process, were identified: ~he first :was
the establishment of the Community Policing Division
midpoint in the planning phase. This was ~n important
strategy because it placed responsibility for initiating
and implementing the change in the hands of the Comm.unity
Policing Division staff, circumventing control of the
conversion process by an non-committed chief 2 .
The second key change was the City's adoption of
biennial program budgeting to replace an annual line-item
budgeting process 3 • It was fortuitous that this change
did not occur until year three of the trans~tion. Line-item
budget restrictions forced the development pf programs
and practices that emphasized the efficient use of
resources. At the same time, the lack of apy basis in
line-item budgeting for comparing fiscal output to
goal-achievement4 during the period of tria~-and-error
learning, provided the latitude for experim~ntation with
a variety of community policing tasks and programs that
otherwise may not have evolved. Thus, the ~rograms that
endured, although aimed toward greater effe9tiveness~
developed also in the direction of greatest efficiency.
The managerial component of program bu~geting, that
is, accounting for the outcome of resource ~llocatiom,
and the requirement for strategic long-rang~ planning,
requires the use of workplans. Workplan construction
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requires lateral coordination of activities and resources
by teams of persons across rank and units. Workplans thus
"structure in" accountability, decentralization and
empowerment, teamwork, and participatory management. The
result has been a gradual relaxation of the quasi-military,
command and control management style.
The third key change was the revision of the Bureau's
mission statement, and the formal adoption of a set of
organizational goals. Efforts to develop tasks sufficient
to carry out the new mission drove the restructuring and
redesign of the organization. In other words, the structure
and design of the organization is determined by, and
anchored to, the organization's mission. Figure 1.
illustrates this relationship:
______---..:'...:.. --, 2.
IPrinciples~ Philosophy~ IMiSS:~9_--=-:::>GOalS
Predefined & Prescribed ~efined Py
by Police Bureau tie c1mmurity
4. ~ ~ 3. ,
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Figure ,. The Portland Police Bureau's Dynamic Community
Policing Organizational Model.
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The Community Policing concept paper (see page 105)
listed seven community policing principles "to guide [the
Bureau's] thinking and behavior." These principles were
used to "define [the] philosophy [and] management style,
and determine the process for the development and
implementation of programs and activities" (Portland Police
Bureau, 1989b, p. 5).
The principles and philosophy of community policing
were predefined and prescribed by the Community Policing
Work Group. These were selected from a review of community
policing initiatives already in practice around the u.s.
The community policing principles and philosophy,
demonstrated in the Bureau's first police-community
problem-solving partnership, would become the foundation
upon which the Bureau's new organizational model would
develop. Schon (1971) states that the more radical the
change to be introduced, the more central must be the
element chosen as the entry point to change (p. 39). The
basic principles and philosophy of policing qualify, by
Schon's criterion, as a logical point from which to develop
the planned change.
The input received from the community during the three
planning stages informed Bureau planners that the quality
of life in Portland's neighborhoods was of equal or greater
concern to the citizens than crime. This information shaped
the Bureau's new mission, which, in turn, generated the
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organizationallgoals.
The term '/communi ty policing philpsophy" is widely
used as a short-hand method for contrapting traditional
and community policing. The philosoph~cal differences
between these nwo policing approaches ~re punctuated by
the Bureau's "old" and "new" mission statements. The old
mission statement read:
The Bureau of Police is responsible for the
preservation of the public peace, protection of rights
of persons and property, the preveiltion of crime, and
the enforcement of all Federal law~, Oregon state
st~tutes and city ordinances within the boundaries
of the city of Portland.
The new mission statement reads:
rhe mission of the Portland Poliqe Bureau is to
ma~ntain and improve community livqbil~ty by working
with all citizens to preserve life, maintain human
rights, protect property, and promqte individual
re~ponsibility and community commi~ment.
This n,w mission statement reflects a qew Philosophy of
policiIlg that
, • • advocates a broad social rQle for the police
an4 enhanced community responsibil~ty and participation
in policing (Murphy, 1988, p. 77).
It is clear that the community policing philosophy,
defineq by the principles of community policing, drives
the ne~ mission~ In turn, "a mission statement can drive
an ent~re organization, from top to bottom'~ (Osborne and
Gaebler, 1992, W. 131). The old missiop snatement reflected
the police defimition of the critical environmental problem
- crim~ and disorder. The new mission ~tabement reflects
the ci~izens' definition of the critica~ environmental
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problem ~ whatever kinds of social and physical disorder
impinge 9n the quality of life in the community.
The original set of goals listed in the Five-Year
Communit¥ Policing Transition Plan - partnership;
problem-~ol~ing; empowerment; accountability; and service
orientation - crystallized from the new mission. The
objectiv~s - designed to achieve organizational goals -
were det~rmined partially by the community policing
transitiqn committees, and partially by circumscription
by availqble, and/or projected resources. The kinds of
tasks required to achieve the objectives was not immediately
clear, b~cause the objectives represented non-traditional
goals. Therefore, their achievement would include
non-trad~tional tasks.
And until the tasks became clear, role definitions
were not possible. Through trial-and-error, tasks and
roles began to take form, and during that process,
accommodating structural changes were implemented. Thus,
the tasks that developed from the pursuit of objectives
determined the structural elements of the organization,
for example, the communication patterns; managerial
arrangement and style; RU structures; and administrative
policies (Bemeain, 1980, p. 78).
Feedback loop. Tasks that include police-community
problem-solving partnerships, compliance and norm
enforcement, :and other non-traditional applications of
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police authority (see page 20) effect cha~ges in the
organization's task environment. Theoretically, these
changes, in turn, elicit adaptive organiz~tional response.
The continual interactive process of change and adaptation
requires structural flexibility to accommodate the rapid
development and deployment of new, and perhaps I novel tasks.
For example, although the Neighborhood Response Team program
(see page 160) has been institutionalized, team activity,
team membership, management style (structured, 1 or
unstructured), and resources, vary accordipg to the problem
addressed. Situations in the environment which require
immediate attention cannot wait for bureau~ratic, top-down
permission and directives for team mobiliz~tion.
This interdependent feedback loop alsp in~ludes mission
and goals. This is clearly evidenced by t~e revised mission
and goals that resulted from the mid-cours~ review (see
page 152). During the initial trial-and-e+rorllearning
period, many of the objectives that were s~t f~rth in the
original Community Policing Transition Plan were determined
to either not be feasible, or not attainab~e. ITherefore,
the tasks that were developed to achieve these lobjectives
also were not required. Reliance on the strat~gic planning
process (see Appendix A) enables continual revision of
the mission and restatement of the goals in adaptive
response to changes in the Bureau's task e~viranment.
This process substantiates Wilson's (1.989)1 and Schon's
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(1971) claim that t~e elements of an organization are
interdependent, and a change in anyone element effects
change in the others. The ffiureau's strategic planning
process has been designed t~ accommodate this phenomenon.
This interdependency has guided the Bureau's change through
a developmental, self-designing process, in which "form
follows function" (Clark, personal communication, 1994).
That is, the organiz~tional istructure evolved from the
process of translating community policing principles into
practice.
Hission~Roles-,7' Law Enforcement
(Law ' Tasks
",o«.oootl {«io. r"tOOl{
Organizal:ional
structure g Design
r--------------,
: Order Maintenance :
I & Service Tasks IL ~
Figure 2. Traditiona~ Policing Organizational Model.
Figure 2. illustrates bhe traditional, bureaucratic
policing organizatiopal model, described in Chapter I (see
page 3), in contrast to community policing. Traditional
policing organizatio~s have not strictly adhered to a stated
philosophy or a form,l set of goals. However, because
of the interdependen~y of the organizational elements
discussed above, thege can be extrapolated from the core
tasks and from the structural elements. For example, the
core tasks of tradit~onal policing are (a) preventive,
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or random patrol; (b) rapid response to calls for service;
and (c) retroactive, or follow-up investigations. These
tasks reflect a primary goal of apprehending law-breakers.
In turn, this goal reflects the kind of legalistic mission
portrayed by the Bureau's former mission statement, quoted
above. Similarly, the traditional policing philosophy
can be extrapolated from the mission - to preserve order;
protect rights and property; prevent crime (by random
patrol); and enforce criminal laws. The achievement of
this mission focuses on the legitimate use of coercive
force. Therefore, the underlying philosophy of traditional
policing rests upon the exclusive authority to carry out
its mission. There is no justification in this model for
citizens and police to jointly work to achieve policing
goals.
Furthermore, the traditional police organization is
designed primarily to carry out the legalistic mission.
Tasks which are perceived to be peripheral to the mission
that is, order maintenance and service-related tasks, are
carried out with minimal investment in resources, and
minimal structural support.
The rigidity of this model is evidenced by the Bureau's
inability, prior to adopting community policing, to respond
to the changing patterns of crime and disorder requiring
enhanced order maintenance and service-related tasks.
The range of roles and official tasks of police officers
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was restricted by the organizational structure. For
example, when the Peninsula Neighbors District Coalition
staff (see page 96) requested police foot patrols, they
were denied on the basis that the Bureau was not structured
to provide foot patrol officers (Grimsrud, personal
communication, 1991). Nor could the Bureau respond
effectively to the increase in street crime and drug houses
because the mission, goals, tasks, and organizational
structure precluded the capacity to accommodate
problem-solving strategies.
The political mobilization of organized neighborhood
groups to demand responsive action by the Bureau was the
direct result of the restraints of the traditional
bureaucratic structure on the range of police tasks.
Integrating law enforcement and order maintenance.
There is concern among police scholars about how the two
major and sometimes opposing police functions - law
enforcement, and order maintenance - can be equally
emphasized and integrated under a single policing philosophy
and management structure. Discussing the fundamental
differences between these two function, Wilson (1969) notes
that:
••• law enforcement require[s], or [is] facilitated
by, specialization, strong hierarchical authority,
improved mobility and communications, clarity in legal
codes and arrest procedures, close surveillance of
the community, high standards of integrity, and the
avoidance of entanglements with politicians. Order
maintenance, on the other hand, is aided by departmental
procedures that include decentralization, neighborhood
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involvement, foot patrol, wide discretion, the provision
of services, an absence of arrest quotas, and some
tolerance for minor forms of favoritism or even
corruption. ••• There is no magic formula that can
tell a police chief how to organize a force to serve,
with appropriate balance, these competing objectives
(p. 135).
At the operational level, the Bureau is developing
this balance by de-emphasizing the importance of roles
(which are rule driven and focus attention only on one's
job) and emphasizing responsibility (See Appendix J) toward
achieving organizational goals. At the management level
however, the integrative factors are not as clear. The
Bureau, after all, remains a bureaucracy and, by necessity,
roles remain segmented. The Bureau clings to random patrol
as a law enforcement function. Street patrol officers
have limited opportunity for participation in coordinating
this activity, its resources, and deployment strategies.
Deployment strategies for street patrol officers require
minimal dialogue. Scheduling and deployment is a matter
of rational decision-making, often aided by computerized
data. However, the values of human worth and dignity that
have guided the change in police management philosophy
buffer the structured management necessary for this, and
law enforcement tasks (see Appendix K).
So long as the chain of command is in place however,
there remains an option for invoking its power. A former
Deputy Chief of Operations explained that:
What you do is manage that pyramid and you decide
at what point the decisions are going to be made, and
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what kinds of decisions are going to be made there.
If you m~nag~ it so that the decisions are going to
be m~de ~t the officer-level, then that's what you
get. ••• community policing creates a different
way to think about management (Noelle, personal
communicption, 1992).
For exa~ple~ although neighborhood liaison officers
(NLOs) engag~ inlregular street patrol, they also have
the responsipility for working jointly with residents in
their assign~d districts to resolve problems of concern.
The officers' law enforcement task - street patrol - is
bureaucratic~lly:controlled,while tasks involving police-
community pr9blem-solving are achieved through lateral
coordinat~on~ or Iteamwork.
In cpnt+ast" units which function as teams-on-demand,
i.e., whi~h ~ssemble in response to a particular problem,
and which va+iously include civilian members, such as
Neighborhpod Response Teams (NRT), multidisciplinary teams
from the Xouth and Family Services Division, and the Bias
Crime Unit, 40 not require structured (bureaucratic)
management, ~ven Ithough, similar to NLOs, law enforcement
tasks are integrated with order maintenance/community
policing tas~s. IThese teams are a product of bureaucratic
different~at~on, land operate as relatively independent
functiona~ u~itsJ
The per~od during which this bifurcated management
structure developed appeared to be the most critical period
of the ch~ng~ process. A state of flux occurred during
which the fo~mer Imanagement structure lost some of its
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identifiable form. It was a period which began the
purposeful shift from an emphasis on law enforcement toward
an emphasis on order maintenance and crime prevention
through problem solving. The onset of this period was
marked by the initial in-service training in the use of
the SARA problem-solving strategy. Many officers began
applying SARA immediately. However, leadership training
lagged, and structural reinforcements such as workload
reduction strategies were not yet in place. It was during
this period that resistance to the change - especially
at the mid-management level - was the most intense.
Brewer and deLeone (1983) refer to this tenuous state
as the "creation through destruction phenomenon" (p. 288).
Sparrow (1988) describes it as a period of "directed
imbalance" during which the change "may look and feel
destructive rather than constructive" (p. 3). Gersick
(1991) maintains that disorganization is a fundamental
characteristic of the "dismantling" that occurs with the
the introduction of innovative change (p. 19).
During this period of disorganization, marked by the
least amount of managerial oversight by RU managers and
supervisors, the greatest amount of practical learning
took place. Formal procedures were relaxed to provide
officers with the behavioral latitude to experiment with
creative alternatives to traditional policing strategies
- to learn "what works" (Patton, 1987, p. 18). And similar
213
to "revolutionary" leaps of change among organizations
(systems) in nature, this state began with a "nucleus"
from which it eventually spread across the entire
organization (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984, p. 187). The
nucleus in this case was North Precinct, where the
Neighborhood Response Team (NRT) and the Neighborhood
Liaison Officer (NLO) programs were initiated by RU managers
in June and July, 1990. Critical to this process was the
latitude for each RU (permitted by top command) to proceed
with the change at its own pace. Each had different
budgetary restraints. Each served a different set of
population demographics and problems, and each struggled
with varying levels and kinds of resource constraints.
During this time, administration assumed the roles
of cheerleader and change-agent. The consistent message
from the top was, "Serve the customer," and, "Do anything,
but do something." The message from supportive RU
supervisors and managers to street patrol officers was,
"Don't ask permission, just do it." The message to all
personnel from Chief Potter was, "If you're not doing
community policing, make sure you're working for someone
who is."
As the officers increasingly integrated problem-solving
into their patrol routines, supportive workload reduction
strategies began taking shape. This marked the beginning
of the gradual alignment of the organization's capacity,
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goals, and tasks, with the needs and demands in both the
internal and external environments. Absent a reliable
model by which to map the Bureau's change process, changes
in the various organizational elements were effected
whenever an elemental factor was perceived to be an
obstruction to the achievement of organizational goals
and objectives.
Outside, expert assistance. Several outside experts,
change agents, and consultants played crucial and essential
roles in guiding the Bureau's conversion process. The
management consulting firm however was not able to achieve
the results it promised. After a year and a half, the
firm withdrew from its contract. The Captain of the
Bureau's Investigative Branch summed up the apparent
ineffectiveness of the consultants: "You can't fine tune
an organization until there is a clear idea of what the
organization will turn out to be" (Clark, personal
communication, 1994). The firm specialized in organization
developmentS for private-sector organizations. In addition,
the multidimensionality of the Bureau's change process
rendered it so complex that the demands on the consultants'
time made further assistance prohibitive under the terms
of their contract.
Internal resistance to change. At mid-point in the
Bureau's transition process, internal resistance was viewed
by the top command as the greatest obstacle to change,
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especially at thellevel of mid-managers. As the transition
progresses, o~position to the change is becoming less
potent, less fashionable, and less appropriate within the
organizationa+ culture. Although conjectural, this may
be attributed to the perception that continued resistance
is futile. T~e change has taken on the character of
inevitability and ,permanence. For example, the new
Northeast Preqinct boasts large letters identifying it
as "Northeast Community Policing Center." In addition,
many reinforc~ng structural changes are solidly in place.
General Orders ha~e been revised (although not yet
formalized) to re£lect community policing values, and
community policing programs are standard operating
procedures in all Precincts. Furthermore, the shift to
program budgeting institutionalized police-community
problem-solving partnerships. These partnerships have
become an integral component of the Bureau's overall
policing strategy.:
weisel ano Eck's (1994) examination of community
policing initiptives in six cities reveals that the problem
of internal re~istance - as regards the potential for
undermining th~ change process - may be overestimated.
These writers tounS that time spent developing strategies
to overcome or counter resistance to change could be better
spent by forging ahead with the change.
Indeed, t~e tbree outside experts brought in by the
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PPB to orient RU supervisors ~nd Imanagers to the community
policing concept and philosophy tsee page 133) advised
the Bureau to "Make a reasona~)le leffort to convert the
resistors, but work around th9se Iwho persist in resisting
the change" (CMSI, 1990, p. 9). The Bureau's former
Assistant Chief agrees, confeEising that, "Initially, we
spent ninety-percent of our t~me on the ten-percent hard-
core resisters. A wise manag~r will know that ten-percent
of the organization does not qeserve ninety-percent of
his or her time" (Inman, persQnal communication, 1994).
It turns out that, overa~l, the Bureau's lower-level
personnel, specifically street patrol officers, detectives,
and sergeants, have been supportive of community policing.
Not only have these personnel shown remarkable resilience
during the ebbs and flows of the transition process, they
have strongly enabled the change process through exuberant
involvement in police-community problem-solving
partnerships. Moreover, they havE~ demonstrated to police
administrators that lower-leve~ personnel are a reservoir
of intellectual ability and cr~ativity.
Indicating that relatively few street patrol officers
have been stringently opposed to the adoption of community
policing are two employee surv~ys: the first, carried
out in August, 1990 - 8 months into the transition process
- indicated that 44 percent of the respondents favored
community policing, 33 percent were neutral, and only 19
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percent expressed opposition to the change (Portland Police
Bureau, 1990b). When surveyed again in September, 1993,
street patrol officers rated working closely with the
community 4.1 on a 5-point Likert scale, and they rated
the importance of involving citizens in fighting crime
at 4.0. And the overall rating for job satisfaction was
4.2 (Portland Police Bureau, 1993).
Community involvement. Friedman's (1994) study of
community involvement in Chicago's community policing
project concludes that police-community problem-solving
partnerships are crucial to the success of community
policing. The critical elements are (1) grassroots
organizations through which volunteers can work and be
educated; (2) informed local leadership; and (3) the
presence of organizations that can support local
neighborhood efforts with training, education, and technical
assistance (p. 268).
Fulfilling these criteria, the city of Portland's
Office of Neighborhood Associations (DNA) network played
a key role in the development, planning, and implementation
of community policing. In addition however, the Community
Policing Work Group went to great lengths to identify other
individuals and groups in the community, not necessarily
organized for political activism, whose input and support
also was believed to be vital to the acceptance and
sustainability of the change.
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It is apparent, ~rom a review of the descriptions
and evaluations of various community poli~ing projects
around the country, that most adopting orHanizatilons have I
implemented community policing absent any organized,
community-based pressu,re for change. Portland, Seattle,
and Chicago are relatively unique in thei+ experiences
of protracted and consistent pnessure from community-based
organizations to "do something"l about str~et crime and
disorder.
The review also disclosed Ithat the l~vel of citizl9n
involvement, not only in the developmenta~, planning, ~nd I
implementation phases, but in the Bureau'~ on-going
strategic planning, and policy~making proGesses, is
unparalleled among adopting organizations~ For exampl~,
of the 36-member Commupity Policing Work Group that dr~fted
the Community Policing concept paper, 21 were civilian,.
And of the 182 member-positions on the various community
policing transition cOlnmittees, I 102 were qivilian ..
Fourteen, of the 23 me~bers of the Chief'~ Forum are
civilians.
Comments
The Portland Poli~e Bureau I began its transition f~om
a starting point of bu+eaucratic hierarchy and control~
with all of the characteristics Iof the traditional,
bureaucratic policing model described on page 3. The ~oal
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was participation and involvement, and development of an
organization that more closely resembles the structure
described on page 176 (see also Appendix B). In the process
of this conversion, most of the guidelines for change,
developed in Chapter I and discussed in Chapter V were
followed, albeit inadvertently. Many of these guidelines
were generated from research that involved private-sector
organizations. This suggests that the process of
organizational change may follow a general pattern that
spans both public- and private-sector organizations.
Further research is needed to ascertain whether such
guidelines are indeed useful for mapping the process by
which innovative organizational change is implemented,
for the purpose of maximizing the probability of
institutionalization.
Of those guidelines that were violated, the first
(Guideline 1) called for change from a quasi-military,
command and control management structure, to a
non-authoritarian and participatory management structure.
This change went forward, through a developmental process,
but necessarily stalled at a point just shy of
de-bureaucratization. The Bureau's management structure
cannot "flatten" out - characterized by carving out middle
management. The quasi-military rank structure holds the
bureaucratic hierarchy firmly in place, entrenched by a
long history of tradition, and guarded by militant unionism.
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Guyot (1979) maintains that changing this rank structure
would be akin to "bending granite." On the other hand,
this structure may be a functional necessity for law
enforcement tasks in emergent situations in which there
is not enough time to coordinate a command hierarchy.
Furthermore, among some organizations, a strong management
structure may be indispensable for ensuring accountability
to both constitutional law and to the Bureau's "customers."
Seeking to balance law enforcement and order
maintenance tasks under this managerial structure has
resulted in a hybrid, quasi-bureaucratic structure that
may be unique to police organizations. This is working
so far because somewhere during the development of this
hybrid structure, the changes gradually came to be guided
by new organizational principles and values. The Bureau,
in other words, is beginning to "walk its talk" insofar
as its new management philosophy is concerned. Therefore,
so long as invoking the command hierarchy remains an option,
it must be under the control of consensual mechanisms.
That is, if a decision does not come about by consensus,
it is imperative that employees have access to the
definition of the basic goals and values underlying the
command decisions (cf Heckscher, Eisenstat, and Rice, 1994).
Guidelines 5 and 18, regarding early role
redefinitions, also were not adhered to. However, these
may be moot for adopting organizations. At the outset,
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the Bureau was stressing group responsibility toward the
achievement of organizational goals rather than individual
roles. At some time in the future, the Bureau will have
to address the tension between the tradition of earning
reward based upon individual merit, and an emerging
philosophy of prioritizing mutual effort, through team-
work, toward attaining organizational goals.
Guideline 7, requiring commitment to change by the
chief executive, was negated in this instance. This was
the only apparent instance in which the theoretical
guidelines did not apply because the Bureau is a public
organization. In this situation, the Mayor had the power
to bypass the Chief's authority because of a previously
negotiated agreement, between the two, at the time of the
Chief's appointment (see page 100).
Guidelines 9 and 16, stipulated the involvement of
all employees in the planning and design of the change,
and at the earliest possible moment. Related to this,
Guideline 17 advises that the nature and purpose of the
change should be clearly expressed at the outset. Noted
earlier, it was conjectured that this blatant oversight
may be attributable to the quasi-military command and
control communication style. The rank structure of police
organizations obstructs dialogue, and communiques are
primarily transmitted as non-negotiable orders. Sadd and
Grine's (1994) evaluation of community policing in eight
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cities found that, without exception, resistance to change
could be traced to inadequate efforts by police
administrators to "communicate the philosophy and goals
and tactics [sic] of community policing to the officers"
(p. 36). And Chief Torn Potter later confessed that, on
hindsight, he and his staff had not communicated the
community policing concept as clearly or as concretely
as they might have (Potter, personal communication, 1993).
Daft (1983) notes that this also is a common mistake among
private organizations. Managers tend to assume that people
understand the change. Daft suggests that administration
should provide far more information than it thinks necessary
in order to make sure that employees are properly informed.
In addition, police administrators planning to adopt
community policing must be aware, up front, that their
military communication style may blunt their sensitivity
toward the level of employee involvement needed to "buy
into" the change.
The Portland Police Bureau continues to change at
a rapid pace. Tasks and structure continue undergoing
refinement through practice, monitoring, and evaluation.
This continual change is partly because the boundaries
of the Bureau's broadened domain have not yet been
delineated, and partly because the Bureau has taken on
the characteristics of a "learning organization"8 through
its adoption of strategic planning. The new Community
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policing strategic Plan gives priority to crimes and
conditions that most adversely impact community livability
(Portland Police Bureau, 1994, p. 3). Crimes and conditions
are unpredictable. So long as the Bureau's adaptive
response is guided by the strategic planning process, it
will continue to change without a particular organizational
model in mind. At present, it's role and function cannot
be fully defined because it's task environment has not
been delineated. Instead, the boundaries are determined
by the public's perception of "livability." It will
function as a law enforcement agency by the power of the
law, and it will function to enforce norms by the consent
of the citizens. In this way, the Bureau has become a
catch-all agency.
Pointing to evidence, accumulated over the past two
decades, that indicates little correlation between policing
and public safety, Bayley (1985) states:
If police can not reduce crime and apprehend more
offenders, they can [in a community policing role]
at least decrease fear of crime, make the public feel
less powerless, lessen distrust between minority groups
and the police, mediate quarrels, overcome the isolation
of marginal groups, organize social services, and
generally assist in developing 'community' (p. 228).
Bayley then asks, "But, are they what the police should
be doing?"
Similar to other community policing organizations,
the Bureau has become willing to step in and fill a void
where prohlems were incubating and hatching, and for which
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there were no corresponding services available (Schon,
1971). The domain boundaries for the Bureau therefore,
can be delineated only by a vigilant citizenry.
Furthermore, advocates claim that community policing
promises fairer treatment than traditional policing of
politically and socially powerless citizens,
disproportionately represented by the poor, and by racial
minorities. This promise is expressed, not only by the
principles and values of community policing, but by the
permanent assignment of patrol officers to neighborhoods
for the expressed purpose of developing mutual trust and
cooperation between the residents and the police. The
character of organizations however, may render this an
empty promise. James Q. Wilson's (1989) dramatic claim
that: "only two groups of people deny that organization
matters: economists and everybody else" (p. 23) emphasizes
an earlier claim by Chambliss and Seidman (1971) that,
indeed, with regard to the unequal application of the law,
organization matters. In their discussion about why the
powerless are treated more harshly by the criminal justice
system, these authors explained that
the most salient characteristic of organizational
behavior is that the ongoing policies and activities
are those designed to maximize rewards and minimize
strains for the organization. ••• this general
principle is reflected in the fact that in the
administration of criminal law, those persons arrested,
tried, and sentenced, who can offer the fewest rewards
for nonenforcement of the laws [are primarily those]
who can be processea-with undUe strain for the
organizations ••• (pp. 84-85; emphasis in original).
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Enforcing the law against those who are visibly
interfering with the "livability" of a neighborhood
community no doubt is more popular among the citizens,
and therefore carried out with less strain on the
organization than is enforcing the law against less visible
white collar criminals, for example. Without administrative
diligence, community policing strategies risk intensifying
the organizational characteristic described above.
Notwithstanding the potential obstacles, the magnitude
of the change that has taken place in the Portland Police
Bureau since adopting community policing was recently summed
up by two former Bureau chiefs. When asked what they
thought about the changes in the Bureau, they replied,
"What Bureau?"
End Notes
1. This phenomenon is not confined to police
organizations. Heckscher, Eisenstat and Rice (1994, p.
132) note that change of similar magnitude commonly fails
to endure also in private corporations.
2. See Chapter IV, End Note no. 13.
3. See Weston (1976, pp. 68-69) for a detailed
descriptive comparison between these two budgeting
processes.
4. Ibid, p. 69.
5. The general purpose of organization development
is to help an organization enhance its capacity to
effectively carry out the tasks necessary to achieve its
mission. Taylor and Vertinsky (1981, p. 155) cite three
specific goals in relation to this process: First, it seeks
to increase organizational members' interpersonal
competencies and their receptivity to change; second, it
seeks to establish a built-in organizational maintenance
capability by helping to institutionalize open channels
of communication, confrontation of conflict, and teamwork.
Third, it works to raise organizational performance by
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clarifying organizational opjectives, increasing members'
commitment to organizationa~ goals, I creating a problem-
solving climate, and discov~ring more effective use of
resources.
6. This conceptualization is borrowed from Heckscher,
Eisenstat and Rice, (1994, p. 130).
7. Bayley, (1988, pp. 226-237) assumes the role of
"devil's advocate" in his d;lscussion of some of the
potential unanticipated con~eguences of community policing.
8. By Argyris and Sch9n's (1978) criteria, the Bureau
has become a learning organtzation by developing the
capacity (through reliance 9n strategic planning) to learn
from experience and incorpo~ate what is learned into its
activities (Lynn, 1987, p. ~37).
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Abbreviated Terms
CCC. Citizens' Crime Commission.
FTO. Field Trainin~ Officer.
I & R. Information ~and Referral.
ILJ. Institute of Law and Justice.
LEAA. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration.
NDC. Northeast Disbrict Coalition.
NLO. Neighborhood Diaison Officer.
NRT. Neighborhood Response Team.
NTP. Neighborhood ~eam Policing
ONA. Office of Neighborhood Associations.
PAL. Police Activities League.
PCR. Police Community Relations.
PNDC. Peninsula Neighbors' District Coalition.
PPB. Portland Police Bureau.
PSO. Public Service Officer.
RU. Responsibility Unit.
SARA. Acronym for Survey, Analysis, Response, Assessment.
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Throughout the process of l~evelCiping Ihe strategies and programs for Communil~' Policing. commu-
nily and other outside input havel played a J..:e~· role. A Sirategic Planning Process has been devel·
oped 10 formulate future strategie1s and programs. The Planning Process is a loop thai starts and
continues with outside inpl!t. \'ViP. can only broadly suggest the direction and needs for fulure years
based upon the input received thus far. As each year approaches and the planning cycle conlinues.
desired outcomes and activities will change as the needs of the community change. This process
allows for greater accounlability to the community for any additional resources. Resource need,
evolve, not from the Police Bureau. but from the expectations of the community.
Slep 1. Input: The foundatioll for the planning consists of extensive inpul from all segmenls of lh('
community. C'lizpns. outside agennes. various City and State governmenl, and the Police Bureau ,1!!
have oppor!unit,ps to conlrlbLite 10 iUlure planning.
Step 2. Outcomes: Desored qr expPflpd outcomes from Community Policing are identiiled basC'd up'Jn
the InpUI received in Slep 1.
Step 3. Activities and Strategies: ACit,vllles and strategies needed to achieve desired oulcomes .1re
de,·eloped. Communily InpUI is still 1.1 ke~' componenl because act"'ities and stratej;;es may e,·oll·p rrorn
many sourc('.~, not just lhe Police f)ur,e.1lJ.
Step 4. Current Resources: !\iter the delerminatlOn of activities and strategies, a thorough examln.1lllll1
of currenr resources is done. R-re wei using currenl resources in Ihe best way to meel community nl:'pd i
Do we need to move resources from 'currenl aClivities and strategies thaI are no longer needed? Onl~
afler this is done do we look .11 adoil,:onal nl'eds to implemenl new slralegies and activities.
Step 5. New Resources: New resouo'Ce needs Ihat are necessary 10 accomplish colleclively idenlified
stralegies are idC'nlified and p,!orit.zed. NelV n('('(f~ of lower priority may be moved to future years.
depending upon avail.1blC' iun\J>. Tllesp MC' nol discarded bUI only suspended unlil resources are
available.
Step 6. Implementation: Stral\~gies .1ind activities are implemented. This implementalion may be a
program of short duration (one year or less), long duration (one to five years), or indefinile duralion
(beyond five years),
Step 7. Measurement: Actual oulcoltnes oi stralegies and activities are measured (or evalualion.
Step 8. Program Evaluation: The anual and expected outcomes and stralegies are compMed ,lno
evaluated. Did the striltegies accomplish the desired outcomes, or somelhing else? Was the progr.lm
e((ective, or should il be chang,ed? Th,s evaluation information becomes just one piece of the input lor
the next year's planning cycle. The slJalef\ic planning process then repealS in order to accurately
determine the next yrar's needs.
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Adopting a defdnition of Community Policing for Portland and
supportingi the Portland Police Bureau in proceeding with
t~e development of the Design Phase of its Portland Plan
for COlI\mun:i ty Po lie ing.
WHEREAS, crimel and disorder are community problems that
r~quire th~ total commitment of a community and its
pq lie e; anid
WHEREAS, tradi~ional police methods of responding to emer-
g~ncy qal~s and investigating individual criminal
incide~ts are often not sufficient to reverse crime and
i~s deQilitating effects on our community; and
WHEREAS, c~ti~s throughout the country are implementing ver-
s~ons qf Community Policing, providing a wide variety of
e~ampl~s and experiences; and
WHEREAS, iij recent years, the Portland Police Bureau has
entere4 into partnerships with the community in many
instanees to address chronic crime and disorder problems;
and .
WHEREAS, the Portland Police Bureau is developing a five-year
p~an fQr making Community Policing the operational phi-
IQsophy of the entire Bureau; and
WHEREAS, the planning for the Definition Phase of the Plan
h~s in~luded large and small community meetings, inter-
vtews with representatives of the criminal justice system
and other government agencies, and meetings with members
of the Portland Police Bureau; and
WHEREAS, the City has received the support of Portland area
State ~eglslators on Community Policing, and a bill to
fpnd Oreg()n Community Policing projects has been intro-
dpced ~n the Legislature;
NOW, THEREfORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of
Pprtlapd 1that the Council hereby adopts the following
statem~nt as its definition of Community Policing:
"CommunitJ~ Policing is based on a philosophy which recog-
nizes the interdependence and shared responsibility of
t~e policl~ and community in making Portland a safer, more
livable city. It is a method of policing which encour-
ages a partnership that identifies community safety
i~sues, determines resources, and applies innovative
strategies designed to create and sustain healthy, vital
neighborhDods. Community Policing will coordinate with
Page I of 2
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RESOLUTION No.
efforts being made by private, nonprofit; and public
agencies to bring a comprehensive approach to Portland's
problems of crime and disorder. Community Policing
reflects the values of: community participation; problem
solving; officer involvement in decision making; police
accountability; and deployment of police personnel at a
level closer to the neighborhood."
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the Council supports the Police
Bureau in proceeding with the Design Phase of its Port-
land Plan for Community Policing. The Design Phase will
include:
o Expected outcomes designed to measure the effective-
ness of the citizen-police partnership in enhancing
public safety and the success of the Police Bureau in
organizationally changing from a traditional
incident-driven agency to a more pro-active,
community-based agency.
o The programs and activities designed to accomplish
these outcomes.
o An organizational structure to facilitate transition
to a Community Policing agency.
A~opted by the Council, JUL 5 1989
Mayor J.E. Bud Clark
SAM: trn
June 22, 1989
BARBARA ClARK
Audito the Ci tY of Pllll.l;U:U;'-~-:/': '--7~'"
BY~~~~~=:~~~
/"'" Deputy
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Adopting D design for Community Policing for Portland and supporting the
Portland Police Bureau in proceeding with the development of the Implemp.n-
tat ion Phase of its Portland Plan for Community Policing. (Resolution)
WHEREAS, City Council passed on July 5, 1989, Resolution No. 34587, which
adopted a definition of Community Policing and supported the Police Bureau
in proceeding with the Design Phase of its Portland Plan for Community
Policing; and
WHEREAS, the Portland Police Bureau has conducted since July 5 over a dozen
focus group meetings with groups representing business, neighborhoods,
minority communities, churches, schools, social service providers, sen-
. iors, the media, fraternal associations, unions and Police Bureau
employees; and
WHEREAS, an organizational structure which begins to reflect the values of
employee participation, initiative and empowerment is necessary to facili-
tate the planning for a transition to a Community Policing agency; and
WHEREAS, the Portland Police Bureau has established committees which include
Bureau members, other City staff and citizens for the purpose of develop-
ing a Community Policing Plan; and
WHEREAS, the Community Policing Menu Committee has produced a report designed
to provide police officers and citizens with a variety of problem-solving
programs and activities;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the Council of the City of Portland that thp.
Counc i1 hereby adopts the fo 11 owi ng as expected outcomes of a fll lly illlp 1('-
mented Community Policing program:
INCREASED PUBLIC SAFETY
D Reduced incidence of crime
• Increased neighborhood livability
• Reduced fear of crime
I Increased citizen satisfaction with services provided by the Police
Bureau
• Increased citizen empowerment to prevent and fight crime and disorder in
a partnership with the Police Bureau
• Engagement by appropriate City bureaus to support this partnership
• Better coordination and allocation of responsibilities among social,
criminal justice.and other servJce agencies to prevent and solve
problems
INCREASED OPPORTUNITIES FOR OFFICER INITIATIVE
• More time spent by officers on pro-active missions
• Empowerment of officers to design strategies to solve problems
• Increased job satisfaction by Police Bureau members
Page 1 of 3
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the attached Menu Committee report reflects a list
of proposed programs and activities designed to provide police officers
and citizens with an array of problem-solving tools. Each activity is
designed to achieve a particular outcome under a fully implemented Commu-
nity Policing program. This menu is meant to be a preliminary report and
will be subject to refinement by the Police Bureau and citizens.
BE JT FURTHER RESOLVED that in order to implement Community Policing, the fol-
lowing constitutes an organizational process which hrgins to inst itllt ion-
alizc the value~. nf community and employee participi\l.ion, initialivt' ill 11 I
empowerment:
PLANNING
Increase community and employee influence on planning decisions concerning
reduction of current workload, development of alternative programs and
organizational changes. Implement those strategies and evaluate their
impact on the Plan's expected outcomes.
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
Redesign the organizational structure to enable the Police Bureau to tran-
sition into Community Policing. Design components shall include:
• Recruitment and Hiring: Develop procedures to recruit and hire quali-
fied applicants who represent the broad range of cultural and ethnic
diversity found in Portland. Design a hiring process which tests appli-
cants' problem-solving abilities and the'ir abilities to work with the
~ommunity.
• Training: Develop training programs from entry level through management
level which emphasize community orientation, problem-solving, empower-
ment strategies and cross-cultural communication.
• Employee Recognition: Recognize the value of our employees, encourage
professional growth and reward members for Community Policing endeavors.
• Empowerment Strategies: Imbue the organization with the recognition
that individual and community empowerment is the key to problem-solving.
• Management Strategies: Develop managers who create environments condu-
cive for Community Policing. Managers need to have both leadership
responsibilities and opportunities to jointly plan with Bureau memhrrs
and citizens.
• Operational Strategies: Develop programs and activities in partnership
with the many~ommunities of ,Portland to· assist-in resolving immediate
problems and to begin to jointly define with the community strategies
for the resolution of the root causes of crime. drugs and disorder.
• Accountability: Develop methods and measurements by which the Police
Bureau is accountable to the community, to its members and to the City
Council.
Page 2 of 3
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e Planning: Develop ongoing planning which enables the Police Ilurrilill to
change according to cOrT111unity expectations and condition~. I
• nudgeting: Dr.vclop a budget process which all(lw~. flll' flexihilily, (1011I
munity and employee input, accountability and long-term planning. I
• Decentralization: As part of employee and cOrT111unity empowermen't, as
well as efficiency and effectiveness, decentralize operations and I
decision-making whenever possible.
• Coordination: Ensure coordination within the organization: with th.
criminal justice system, other City bureaus and service providers amd
all elements of the community. I
JMPILEMENTAT! ON
The Police Bureau shall use its current organizational design to begi~ the
transition to Community Policing. That organizational design inc1ludes the
comnittees established to develop the Community Policing Plan:
• Chief's Steering Committee
• Chief's Five Advisory COrT111ittees
II Community Po Iic ing Work Group
• Media/Education
• Evaluation
• Productivity/Workload
• L,egal/Le'gislative
• Information and Referral
• CiDJTJIlun ity Po1i ci ng Menu
• Criminal Justice System
• Training/Recruitment
• G:rants/Finance
• Transition and Policy
• Demonstration Project
~E IT' FURTHER RESOLVED that the Counc il supports the Port1and Po1i ce Bureau in
pnJ,ceeding with the Implementation Phase of its Portland Plan for',CorrTl'U-
nlty Policing. The five-year plan for implementation shall include: I
u A revised Bureau mission statement
• Goals and objectives for each year
• An incremental plan designed to transition the Police Bureau into alCom-
munity Policing agency
• Projected resources needed to fully implement the Plan's goals ~nd
objectives
Adopted by the Council, 0CT 25 1989
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Mayor J.E. Bud Clark
SAM: tm' ,
October 16, 1989
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Adopting a Community Policing Transition PI~ll. (Resolution)
ImEREAS, City Council:passed on July 5, 198~. Resollitiof)
No. 34587, which ~dopted a definition of Community Polic·
ing; af1d
liIlERF.AS, City cOllne.il ilHI5S~U on October 2:', 19B9. Rcsolojl inn
No. ~"6.27, which .ldoptc::(1 cxpcc:t,~c1 Ollt.(".IlII1C'~ \Ir iJ 11111;'
implemented Comllllll~lity Policing ;>rogralll, i1PIll'OVell " pre,-
li1l1ini,r)' report cd' <Ir\"ivitil:~; l~,~'~i!,.nccl In prnl'icll; pI/lill'
off icc: r S Ci nd cit b: ens \~ i t h iln ;, r r ,Iy 0 f Jl r () b Jcm- :, () ) v j 1I1.~
tools, Cipproved an organizational process reflectins the
values of Community Policing and supported the Poli~e
BureCiu in proceeding with the Implementation Phase qf its
PortlCirjd PlCin forlCommunity Policing; and
~riEREAS, ii multi-bureau Transition Committee has consol~dated
the re~ort5 from over fifteen Community Poli~ing commit-
tees, recommendedla prioritizing implementation sch€lclule
with assigned res~onsibilities; iJnd
liIlEREAS, t~e Police BtJreau has circulated approximately five
hundre~ copies ofla draft Transition Plan to indivi~uals
and organizationsl for review and comment; and
WHEREAS, t~e Police Bareau has received comment and cri~iquc
on its draft Plan from a national board of academic
advisors; "nd
~HEREAS, t~e Police Bareau has o~tlined a proposed budg~t for
FY 199Q-91 which reflects the shift to Community Po~icing
and ha~ outlined a chart of projected resources neeqs
tied tq the achievement of specific performance outqomes
throug~ FY 1994-9S; and
WHEREAS, City Councillhas received over the course of tryree
public hearings testimony from a wide cross-section of
the community supporting Community Policing;
NOW, THEREFORE, ~E ITIRESOLVED by the Council of the Ci~y of
Portlaf)d that the'Council hereby adopts the attacheq Com-
munity Policing Transition Plan and directs the Pol~ce
Bureau to proceed with addressing the implementatioij
$trate~ies coritai~ed in it.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the City Council will use the
attach~d proposedlbudget outline for FY 1990-91 as ~
guide quring upcoming budget deliber"tions.
Page 1 0 f 2
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DE IT. FURTHER RESOLVED that the City Council will incorporate
the Clttitched five-ye"r projections throliRh FY 1994-95
into the Environmental SCCln component of 'its current
Strategic Planning process.
Adopted by the Council, JAN 3I 1990
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Mayor J.E. Bud Clark
SAM: tm
January 26, 1990
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BARBARA Q.ARK
Auditor of lhe City.of Porlland
By '7M.et, ~tk-r 0 Deputy
APPENDIX C
ORIGINAL COMMUNITY POLICING
FIVE-YEAR TRANSITION PLAN: MISSION AND GOALS
MISSION
STATEMENT
The mission of the Portland Police Bureau Is to work
with all citizens to preserve life, maintain human
rights, protect property, and promote individual
responsibility and community commitment.
GOALS
PARTNERSHIP
Develop a partnership with the community, City
CounCil, other Bureaus, service agencies and the
criminal justice system.
EMPOWERMENT
Develop an organizational structure and
environment that reflects community values and
facilitates Joint citizen and employee empowerment.
PROBLEM SOLVING
Enhance community livability through use of
proactive, problem-solving approaches for
reduction of incidence and fear of crime.
ACCOUNTABILITY
Foster mutual accountability for Public safety
resources and strategies among Bureau
management and employees, the community and the
City Council.
SERVICE ORIENTATION
Develop a customer orientation in our service to
citizens and our Bureau members.
PROJECT MANAGEMENT AND
DIRECTION
Develop aprocess lor overall management and
direction of the Community Policing transition.
D£YnOP[l) IT TH[ PORTUUO 'Ol1C( IUR(.lU T1UIHIHO DNlSlOH
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r---·-------communitY POI~cingSU:cess F~C;OI.~-···-····_-_··--~·
I Community/Neighborhood Livability
Citizens perceive that Community and Neighborllood livability is good or
significantly improved.
Interagency Coordination I
!3etter coordination and allocation of responsibilities among spcial. criminal justice and
other service agencies to prevent and solve community pl~blic safety problems
is being realized.
Citizen Empowerment
Citizens perceive that they are empowered to set priorities for police activities in their
neighborhoods and the community and to participate with the police in problem solving.
Job Satisfaction
Police Bureau personnel are showing increased job satisfaction.
Fenr of Crime
Citizens perceive that the fear of crime in the Neighbomood a,nd the Community is not
significant or is significantly reduced.
Citizen Satisfaction I
Citizen satisfaction with services provided by the Police Bureal..l is high or is significantly
higher than before.
Emploj'ee Empowerment
Police bureau employees perceive that they are empowered to use their initiative and
resources to solve problems with aminimum of man:~geria1 restraints.
City Burenu Support I
City Bureaus, outside of the Police Bureau, are demonstrating awillingness to support
and to participate in Community Policing ~fforts. I
Long-Term Stability ,
The Police Bureau is enjoying ongoing support from the Commlllnity and City
Government for its programs and budgc;.ts. I
Incidence ofCrime I
Citizens perceive that the incidence of crimes which are of g;reatest'concem to their
Neighbomood and the Community is significanl1Y redu,ced.
Officer Safety
Police Officers are experiencing fewer and less severe line-of-<\uty injuries and feel safer.
Problem Sohing J
More time is being spent by officers on proactive problem-solving activities.
L..--__,__
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Citizens Assumc Responsihility
'Ihc community assumcs increasing respoll~ibiJity for solving its 0\\11 problcms.
General Ordcrs Support Empowerment
Police Bureau gcncrJI orders are revised to providc gcncral pJr;unc!crs for decision
making authority and discretion which empower employees and encourage initiative
in problem-solving.
Employees arc Accountable
All members of the Police Bureau arc accountable to each other and to the corrununity
for exercising their empowerment to serve the needs of the conm1unity and the Bureau.
Information Sharing is Responsive and Timely
Police Bureau members provide responsive and timely feedback to one another and
citizens on problem-solving initiatives and strategies.
Employees are Service Oriented
Police Bureau personnel at all levels place a high priority in being aware of and serving
the legitimate need of their external and internal clients who depend on them to take
action or to support or direct the actions of others.
Training Programs Support Community Policing
Training programs are in place within the Police Bureau to ensure that every level of the
organization, from entry level to top management, receives training which emphasizes
Corrununity Policing values.
Employees have a Problem-Solving Orientation
Police Bureau personnel at all levels try to reduce workload by identifying problems
which create the workload. Officers answering calls for service, for example. try to solve
the problem which produced the call by engaging citizens and other agencies
. in the solution.
Recruitment and Hiring Renect Community
Recruitment and hiring procedures of the Police Bureau ensure that applicants represent
the broad range of cultural and ethnic communities found in Portland.
Budget Management is Decentralized
Police unit commanders and program managers have flexibility for Community Policing
resource alloc.1tion and program management
Employees Receive Recognition
Employee recognition and promotion procedures are in place within the Police Bureau
which encourage and reward employees engaged in Community Policing endeavors.
---------------
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Emplo)'ccs Are Empowered
Police Bureau commanders provide leadership and SUppOrl to their subordinales through
example and delegation of the requisile authority to commit Bureau resources to solving
problcms in collabomtion with thc community.
Information Systems Support Community Policing
Information systems are expanded to include the collection, analysis and dissemination
of information about community demographics and crime patterns. service providers,
police pcrfom1311ce measurements, and other data sets needed to SUppOrl decentralized
community-based problem-solving activities.
Community and Police Collaborate
Members of the community actively collaborate with the Police Bureau in making
neighborhoods safer and more livable.
Organizational Structure and Values Support Employees
The Police Bureau is unequivocal.ly committed to a style of policing whose
organizational structure and values emphasize employee participation, initiative, and
empowerment for problem solving at all organizational levels.
Resources Are Decentralized
Police resources are deployed and located to facilitate community access to Community
Policing Officers and community participation in community problem-solving activities.
Service Agencies Cooperate
Police Bureau has formal and informal cooperative agreements with other agencies to
address Community Policing problems.
Planning Process Includes Employees and Community
Community Policing planning process include not only Police Bureau personnel but also
other city bureaus and private citizen representatives.
Employee Performance is Evaluated
Performance of individuals and organizational units at all levels of the Police Bureau are
regularly evaluated on the basis ofCommunity Policing attributes and success factors.
CitizensAre Empowered
Citizens are encouraged to initiate solutions to Community Policing problems and obtain
Police support when and where needed.
Organization Performance Measured
Police Performance is regularly meastrred against the key Attributes and Success Factors
of Community Policing, as well as the traditional measures such as UCR statistics,
Calls-for-Service statistics, Patrol Unit Response Tunes, etc.
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Office Assignments Sllow Continuit)' and Longevity
Police Officcrs are assigned individual responsibility for a particular arcaldistriLt fl)r a
long period of Lime and will occome the primary conlact point octwecllthc CilizL'n .Uld
the Police Bureau. rather then the I30EC or Precinct Ollice.
Community Drivcs Priorities
'I11e Police I3ureau recognizes that a diversity of geographic, demographic and cullural
communities exist in Portland. Community values and priorities arc directly reOected in
the police services delivered.
Patrol Districts Arc Aligned with Neighborhood/Community Boundaries
Uniformed officer assignment areas are as closely aligned with neighborhood and
business district boundaries as effective use of available resources will allow.
City Bureaus Coordinate
The City Council, through its policies and administration, provides City Bureaus
requisite resources and empowerment to collaborate with each other and with citizens
on problem-solving strategies.
Open Communication Is Practiced
Decision making and problem solving involves open and frequent conununication
among Police Bureau employees and citizens that encourages discussion and negotiation
and that occurs at all organizational levels.
APPENDIX E
WORKPLAN INSTRUCTIONS
Workplans -- How to I
RU Managers arc cUrfently working to
submit \\'orkplans on majqr projects and I
programs within their divisions. Since the- tas.k of
completing \\'orkplans ma3' fall to others within
the division, The Bulletin \)ffers this brief how-to
guide:
The Portland City Council requires th~~ Police
13ureau to report back on progress made or the
1994-96 Strategic Plan and also to report oil what
services were prOVided wi~h the funds allocate~
in the budget. To provide this report, infolrmatlOn
on major programs and projects needs to be
captured.
Current workplan forrf\5 are one page land
ask for the project title, tirnelines, strategy I
number(s) and outcomes. The strategy number is
gleaned from the Strategic Plan.
Strategy numbers .,
The plan contains fOUl goals, 21 objectives
and 108 strategies, and they are all numbered.
Each goal has three to nine objectives and each
objective has two to 13 str'ltegies. I
In the plan, Strategy 1.4.2 means Goal 1
Reduce crime and fear of crime, Objective 1.4
Increase early intervention and Strategy 1.4.2
Implement approaches to r/lach school age I
children.
Goals are expressions 9f what the Bureau as a
whole is attempting to accqmplish. Objectives are
expressions of how all or s(~me divisions will
accomplish the goal. Strat~gies are expressions of
how a division or unit will accomplish the I
objective. Programs and pl'Ojects describe I.
activities that will be condllcted to accomp!lsh the
strategy. .
Here's a way to look a~ the Strategic Plan:
Mission, Values
I
Goal
I
Objective
/ \
Strategy Strategy
/ \ / \
Project Program Project Progralm
For example, an indivic/ual division I
implements a training and ~:oaching project ItO.
improve the skill level and job satisfaction clf Its
employees.
The RU manager then reports on the p~oject
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as supporting Strategy 3.7.1 (Goal 3 Empower
personnel, Objective 3.7 Improve employee
community policing training, Strategy 3.7.1
Expand specialized training for line, supen'isory,
management, investigative and nons\\'orn
personnel). _
Another example might be a problem-solnng
effort al a housing or ,'partment complex with
chronic calls for thr:ft from aulos.
The RU manager would report the project a"
supporting Strategy 1.2.7 (Goal 1 Reduce crime
and iear of crime, Objective 1.2 Increase problem
soh'ing, Strategy 1.2.7 Expand efforts to identify
and target chronic call locations).
The RU manager might also report it under
Strategy 1.1.1 (Goal 1 Reduce crime and fear of
crime, Objective 1.1 Improve crime response,
Strategy 1.1.1 Develop improved methods for
identifying and addressing "minor" crimes that
have a significant impact on neighborhood
livability).
Outcomes
The workplans also report on outcomes, i.e.
what are the expected results that the Bureau will
see as a result of doing this program or project.
Looking at the previous examples, a
workplan might list:
• Provide eight hours of training
• Implement coaching program
or
• Establish neighborhood foot patrol
• Expand Block Watch participation by 50
percent
• Reduce reported crime for theft from auto
by 50 percent
Notice how the outcomes can be either
numerical (number of hours of training or number
of reported crimes) or narrative (program
implemented or foot patrol established).
Bureau-wide reports
Reports combining all of the major programs
and projects throughout the agency will be shared
with all RU managers to post within each
division. These reports will give all employees a
quick reference for who's doing what in the
Bureau.
Questions
For questions about the workplans, call Jane
Braaten, 823-0292; for extra forms or form on
WordPerfect disk, call Planning and Support at
823-0283; for extra copies of the Strategic Plan, call
823-0283.
APPENDIX F
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HUMANGOALS
Our nation was founded on the principle that the individual has infinite dignity and
worth. The Portland PoliceBureau, which exists to protect and serve the community, must
always be guided by this principle. In all that we do, wemust show respect for the citizens
we serve, and the men and women of the Portland Police Bureau, recognizing and
encouraging their individual needs, aspirations and capabilities.
THEATIAINMENTOFTHESE GOALS REQUffiES TIIATWE STRIVE
TO attract to the Police Bureau a diverse group ofindividuals with
ability, dedication, and capacityfor growth;
TO provide the opportunityfor everyone to rise to as high a level of
responsibility and interest as possible, dependent only on thal
individual's talent and diligeJU:e,'
TO make the Portland Police a model ofequal opportunityfor all
regardless ofrace, color, sex, religion, age, national origin, marital
.status, sexual orientation orphysical challenge;
TO contribute to the improvement ofour community, especially its
disadvantaged members, by maximizing our human andphysical
resources while maintaim'ngfull effectiveness in the performance of
ourprimary mission -service.
TomPotter
Chief of Police
APPENDIX G
PROPOSED GENERAL ORDER:
DEFINITION OF ROLES, AND EXPECTATIONS: I
NEIGHBORHOOD LIAISON OFFICER (NLO) PROGRAM
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DRAFT *** DRAFT *** DRAFT
PUBLISHED DATE:
EFFECTIVE DATE:
June 10, 1993 DRAFT G.O. ??????
TITLE: NEIGHBO~HOOD LIAISON OFFICER PROGRAM
'New TitleINDEX:
REFER:
INTRODUCTION
Enhanced interaction b~tween the neighborhood crime prevention programs (NAC),
communities in generaJ, members of various goverrunental, social, and service
providing organizations as well as members of the Portland Police Bureau is critical
to the overall community policing effort. The Neighborhood Liaison Officer Program
(NLOP) is one ofmany e.ndeavors designed to attain the goal of enhanced community
livability.
PURPOSE
The purpose of this general' order is to define 'the roles and expectations of all
participants affected by the program. Such clarification will assist in creating open
lines of communication lJetween the "community" and government service providers
for the purpose of effect~ve and innovate problem solving.
POLICY
Each precinct, in conjunction with the Office ofNeighborhood Associations will have
a Neighborhood Liaiso;n Oflicer Program which follows the general guidelines
presented in this order. I
1
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PROCEDURE
In order for the NLOP to accomplish its goal, the following recommended roles and
activities for all participapts are presented.
NEIGHBORHOOD LIAISON OFFICERS (NLO)
Whenever possible, NLO'~ will be thel assigned district officer. Liaison officers, in
order to be effective, will ~nhance thei1r knowledge of:
- community reSOUI'ces and key 'neighborhood contacts
- disorder and criml'l problems I
- neighborhood con~:erns
- major incidents oQcurring in the assigned neighborhood
Neighborhood Liaison Offl,cers will:
routinely participate in (create and facilitate, ifnecessary) project teams
and make referrals to apIbropriate service providers.
in conjunctiqn with NAC and precinct command, work to develop
innovative apd effective Imethods of identifying and. addressing the
underlying cqnditions which allow problems to exist.
provide both verbal and written reports of problem solving efforts to
immediate su,pervisors. These reports will detail the problems, concerns
and recomm~ndationof citizens within the neighborhood of concern.
Such reports will be sharl~d with NAC.
become familiar with the ISARA method of problem solving and, when
appropriate, participate it,! partnership agreements.
coordinate crime updates, information and insight into public safety
issues.
involve cOIIl.Qlunity members in both the planning and resolution of
problem solving. i
Enhanced communication ·FUJlong and between shifts is essential to the success ofthis
program. Officers will be Elncouraged to contact specialized units for problem solving
assistance.
OFFICERS NOT DESIGNATED AS NlLO'S
Precinct officers not desigr~atedas NLO's should assist with directed patrol activities
related to problems ident~fied by the neigh1;lorhood liaison process. They are to be
encouraged to initiate and assist in alIi neighborhood problem solving activities.
2
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SERGEANTS
Detail sergeants are the key participants in ensuring program success. They need
to balance the NLO's dispatched workload with their coordination of proactive
responses to neighborhood problems.
It is important that sergeants know about criminal and livability issues within their
officers assigned neighborhood areas. The coordination of NLO problem solving
efforts will be a major responsibility of sergeants. When circumstances dictate they
are responsible for leading and coordinating neighborhood officer activities in a
manner which involves other city bureaus.
Sergeants will also:
facilitate officer acquisition of business cards imprinted with the
neighborhood association name.
encourage officers to attend neighborhood meetings in their entirety.
discuss solutions with officers and city bureau personnel.
monitor progress of problem solving methods and develop written
reports.
encourage the use of partnership and neighborhood agreements to
initiate problem solving activities.
identify and arrange for training.
review officer's neighborhood activity reports on monthly basis to
develop familiarity with district problems and issues.
attend the first neighborhood association meeting with an officer.
coordinate projects and information between shifts.
provide monthly updates to command.
review reports of NAC.
respond to follow up calls from the community and NAC.
attend NLO training.
reinforce community policing through evaluations and commendations.
review bi-weekly schedules for projected proactive patrol activity and
neighborhood meetings.
encourage creative problem solving and neighborhood involvement.
through everyday demeanor project a positive attitude regarding the
NLO program.
attend neighborhood or coalition yearly planning sessions depending on
the preference and structure of the coalition.
3
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LIEUTENANTS
The primary responsibility for directing the NLO program rests with lieutenants.
They are to:
ensure that the program identifies neighborhood problems and that the
problems are addressed.
coordinate resource allocations for new and on-going projects.
meet with neighborhood crime prevention staffand representative from
various neighborhoods to create yearly work plans (recommended for
December).
attend annual coalition and/or public safety community planning
meetings.
assist neighborhood planners in identifying problems, determining
strategies and tactics to increase citizen safety and neighborhood
livability.
meet with NLO's and sergeants quarterly (at a minimum).
become familiar with the roles of all participants within the NLOP.
monitor officers and sergeants written reports on activities
attend NLOP training. .
coordinate information sharing among and between shifts.
attend month meetings of shift lieutenant to discuss new and on-going
projects.
attend community meetings when policy issues involve multiple
precincts and/or details.
coordinate monthly project updates to the precinct commander (copies
to each shift and appropriate crime prevention staff).
attend the first meeting with the NLO and detail sergeant for each
neighborhood association and explain the program.
coordinate resource allocation for projects.
evaluate the program through periodical meetings with NAC and
neighborhood associations.
4
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PRECINCT COMMANDERS
Through strategic directions, projects receives long term guidance for solving
neighborhood problems through precinct conunanders.
In addition, precinct commanders:
review community policing activities.
publicly acknowledge significant achievement of goals by staff,
community volunteers and NAC staff on a quarterly basis.
attend community crime prevention forums so as to publicize the NLOP
and activities.
report to the Chief on community policing activities occurring in
neighborhoods. .
ensure intershift and intrashift coordination and information sharing
with other bureau units.
send partnership letters to neighborhood associations explaining the
program, co-signed by the precinct and NAC staff.
DEPUTY CHIEFS, ASSISTANT CHIEF, CHIEF OF POLICE
Chiefs will provide program direction and expectations. They will assist precinct
commanders in developing NLOP implementation strategies and provide overall
guidance to develop reporting and accountability functions.
In addition, Chiefs Will:
hold weekly or monthly meetings with both precinct commanders and
NAC staffs..
periodically review projects and follow-up evaluations to monitor and
understand current issues facing precincts.
NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME PREVENTION STAFFS (NAC)
NAC personnel serve as an overall liaisons between the precinct officers and the
various neighborhoods. They work with officers and members of the community to
identify and solve problems, coordinate crime updates and alerts, and provide
information about public safety issues.
NAC staff will advise/instruct Bureau personnel on meeting facilitation skills and
specific small group dynamic for particular neighborhoods or projects. Focus may
include problem locationslestablislunents, parks, etc. They will also provide training
5
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on NAC program and other community resources to officers.
Additionally, NAC personnel will:
work with NLO to identify and coordinate community policing activities.
arrange and facilitate community meetings.
provide training on neighborhood organizing fUld crime prevention
programs and other community resources to NLO's.
coordinate crime updates, alerts and information about public safety
issues - work with NLO in creating problem solving partnership
agreements.
assist the NLO in creating neighborhood profiles.
coordinate and facilitate yearly neighborhood planning sessions.
provide agendas and minutes ofmeetings on community policing efforts
to precinct NLO's, sergeants and lieutenants.
attend monthly meetings with lieutenants, sergeants, and liaison
officers.
respond to referrals from neighborhood liaison officers and other police
units.
review monthly or bi-monthly project updates from lieutenants.
work in partnership with the community and neighborhood associations
in evaluating the effectiveness of the NLOP.
work with precinct commanders to develop partnership letters for
neighborhood association.
meet quarterly with chiers and precinct commanders to review projects.
Tom Potter
Chief of Police
Dave Williams
Assistant Chief of Police
6
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INTRODUCTION:
The Community Policing Transition Plan, adopted in January of 1990, provided a sweeping
road map for transforming the Portland Police Bureau ~.o community policing.
In the three years since the plan was introduced muchl has changed and a great deal has
been learned about what it takes to implement commun~ty policing. It is time to update the
original road map. With the Community Policing Transition Plan as the starting point, we
set out to create an updatad version that will shap~ a new five year vision and provide an in-
depth activities plan for the next budget cycle. This dor-ument - the Community Policing
Strategic Plan - is the result of that process.
Development of this new strategic plan was driven by two basic requirements:
1. The plan must respond to the will and needs of the c:ommunity.
2. The plan must be easy to use.
We began the revision process by reviewing all ele1nentslof the original plan and looking for
ways to simplify what was already there. Then W"l revie'wed feedback already collected and
sought new feedback on the progress the Police B\lreau :has made to date in implementing
community policing. We conducted research and reviewed available data from a range of
sources - from formal studies to informal disc4ssions. We gathered information from
Bureau membei.'s, community leaders, business grpups, ~nd concerned citizens. We tallied
up what has been accomplished and what has bee~l left iJndone. Following this research, a
new draft plan was written. This current draft il;j being reviewed internli.!ly and with the
community to make sure we have listened and ad~iressed the basic requirements.
Those who have reviewed the original plan will fi;nd familiar concepts and actions carried
over into this plan. However, the format and organization has evolved. We believe that this
approach is simpler, easier to use, and will provide lln eff¢ctive model for the Bureau's yearly
planning process.
More change is likely in the future. As with every ~spect bfPolice Bureau operations, we are
integrating community policing into the planning procless. That means a dedication to
listening to concerns and new ideas, a willingfleSS to change, and a commitment to
implementing the innovations necessary to keep tt~e plan current, practical, and useful.
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The new plan begins with a revision of the mission statement to clarify that our core purpose
is the maintenance and improvement of community livability. The new words are shown in
italics:
MISSION
The mission of the Portland Police Bureau is to maintain and
improve community livability by working with all citizens to
preserve life, maintain human rights, protect property, and
promote individual responsibility and community
commitment.
Co=unity Policing Strategic Plan 3
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In the previous plan we called the~e goals; we now recognize them as guiding values. They
have been updated and clarified f9r tHe new plan. In addition, while all of the following
values are important, Service Orif.',ntation is placed first for emphasis - it is k~y to our
success and an area where there ifj a plarticular need for improvement.
VALUES
The Portland Police Bureau ~lust I always be guided by the principle that every
individual has infinite dignity and worth and that we owe to every part 'If the
community the best service we ~n provide. In all that we do, we must show rElspeet
for the citizens we serve, and fQr the men and women of the Portland Police Bljreau,
recognizing and encouraging th.eir individual needs, aspirations, and capabiliti~s. It
is on the foundation of this corl;'! principle that our operating values are definep.
The mission and goals of the Portland Police Bureau shall be carried out in aligrlment
with the following values: I
Sen,ice Orientation
Provide supportive, professional service to the community and to employees by
promoting human rights, mutual respect, and courtesy both within the organb;ation
and the community.
Partnership
Work in partnership with th~ community, City Council, other Bureaus, s~rvice
agencies, and the criminal justjce system.
Empowerment
Sustain an organizational structure land environment that reflects community v~lues,
encourages decision making ~t the most effective level, and promotes citizen
responsibility and involvement,
Pmblem Solving
Use problem solving methods in the c-mmunity to reduce the incidence and f~ar of
crime; use problem solving me~hod5 internally to ensure continual improvem~nt of
management and operational a,pproaches.
A.ccountability
Promote responsibility for pubHc s~fety resources, strategies, and outcomes a;mong
Bureau management and empJoYei2S, the community, the City Council, and other
agencies.
Co=unity Policing Strategic Plan 4
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GOALS & OBJECTIVES
Four goals are identified from which all objectives and strategies are developed. Two goals
address our mission directly. Two goals address the institutional factors that must be in
place to achieve the mission.
COMMUNITY LIVABILITY GOALS
The first and second goals address the Portland Police Bureau's purpose as a
community policing agency: reducing the impact of crime on community livability.
1. Reduce Crime & Fear of Crime. Identify and implement approaches for
addressing crime and fear of crime that can more effectively reduce both reported
and non-reported crime of all types. Give priority to addressing those crimes and
conditions that most directly impact community livability.
2. Empower the Community. Create a more involved, responsible ~.ommunity by
building stronger community partnerships, improving customer service, providing
more open and responsive communications, and delivering programs that promote
involvement in problem solving and crime prevention.
INSTITUTIONAL GOALS
The third and fourth goals address the internal changes we will make to
institutionalize community policing: making sure we have the personnel, training,
planning, and management practices in place to support the first two goals.
3. Develop & Empower Personnel. Implement training, management, and
organizational approaches that are consistent with the mission and values of
community policing. Strengthen staff skill level and morale. Make sure
recruiting and hiring practices are consistent with community characteristics and
needs. Ensure work environments are supportive ofcustomer service, innovation,
personal accountability, and team contribution.
4. Strengthen Planning, Evaluation, & Fiscal Support. Strengthen planning,
evaluation, analysis, feedback and fiscal mechanisms to ensure responsive
feedback, practical long-range planning, and effective budgeting and fiscal
management.
Community Policing Strategic Plan 5
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~)bject:ives are listed below, organized by the four goals outlined on the previous page.
~3pecific strategies that are linked with the various objectives are shown in the section
following this one.
GOAL 1: Reduce Crime & Fear of Crime
Identify and implement approaches for addressing crime and fear of crime that can
more effectively reduce both reported and non-reported crime of all types. Give
priclrity to addressing those crimes and conditions that most directly impact
community livability.
OBJECTIVES
1.1 Improve Crime Response. Crime response approaches shall give increased
priority to those crimes that most directly impact community livability and the
fear of crime.
1.2 Increase Problem Solving. Problems that are not effectively resolved through
crime response shall be addressed through other approaches including proactive
patrol, gaining assistance from other agencies, working with citizen groups,
pursuing civil action, and other appropriate steps.
1.3 Expand Crime Prevention. Encourage the creation of a more crime resistant
community by expanding community crime prevention efforts.
1.4 Increase Early Intervention. Develop and implement programs that reduce
the likelihood of criminal behavior by at-risk youth and violence in at-risk
families.
1.5 Strengthen Criminal Justice System Response. Work with other agencies
in the criminal justice system to stren.gthen enforcement effectiveness and
improve joint problem solving ability.
Cpmmunity Policing Strategic Plan 6
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GOAL 2: Empower the Community
Create a more involved, responsible community by building stronger community
partnerships, improving customer service, providing more open and responsive
communications, and delivering programs that promote involvement in problem
solving and crime prevention.
OBJECTIVES
2.1 Improve Customer Service Orientation. Reinforce and encourage citizen
participation by providing significantly improved levels ofcustomer service to all
citizens.
2.2 Strengthen Community Partnerships. Strengthen communication and
coordination with neighborhood and community organizations.
2.3 Offer More Community Trainings. Develop and implement community
training programs to increase citizen participation in community policing.
2.4 Improve Public Communication Efforts. Enhance community
understanding and confidence in the Police Bureau by strengthening information
exchange and awareness of community policing.
2.5 Enhance Call Referral. Strengthen citizen problem solving efforts by referring
citizens to appropriate agencies when their needs are best served by other
agencies.
Community Policing Strategic Plan 7
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GOAL 3: Develop & Empower Personnel
Implement training, management, and organizational approaches that are consistent
with the mission and values of community policing. Strengthen stafT skill level and
morale. Make sure recruiting and hiring practices are consistent with community
characteristics and needs. Ensure work environments are supportive of customer
service, innovation, personal accountability, and team contribution.
OBJECTIVES
3.1 Reinforce Commitment to Employee Needs & Satisfaction. Improve
Bureau responsiveness to employee needs, performance, and participation.
3.2 Strengthen District Officer Support. Adopt management guidelines that
strengthen the implementation of community policing by district officers.
3.3 Improve Management Practices. Strengthen the development of
management practices and policies that are consistent with the mission of
community policing.
3.4 Develop Better Internal Communication. Improve internal communication
of community policing updates, activities, and accomplishments.
3.5 Continue Decentralization. Further decentralize the Portland Police Bureau
in function and structure as appropriate and promote decentralization of decision
making.
3.6 Improve Employee Community Policing Training. Provide improved
training for all Bureau personnel in community policing strategies and
techniques.
3.7 Enhance Workload Efficiency. Reduce individual and unit workloads
wherever possible to facilitate innovations and problem-solving opportunities.
3.8 Continue Improving Recruiting & Hiring Practices. Continue
implementation of recruiting and hiring practices that are consistent with
community characteristics and needs.
3.9 Increase Staffing & Resources. Increase staffing and resources as necessary
to facilitate implementation of community policing.
3.10 Enhance System for Employee PerformnncelPromotional Review.
Evaluate, on a continuing basis, all Portland Police Bureau personnel to ensure
attainment of Bureau goals.
Co=unity Policing Strategic Plan 8
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GOAL 4: Strengthen Planning, Evaluation, & Fiscal Support
Strengthen planning, evaluation, analysis, feedback and fiscal mechanisms to ensure
responsive feedback, practical long-range planning, and effective budgeting and fiscal
management.
OBJECTIVES
4.1 Develop More Effective Performance Evaluation & Reporting. Develop
a comprehensive evaluation system, including the use of community-based
performance measures, to provide tracking and reporting of community policing
outcomes.
4.2 Improve Fiscal Practices & Policies. Ensure budgeting and other fiscal
practices and policies are aligned with Bureau goals and objectives and
accurately reflect community needs.
4.3 ProvideBetterPlanning. Establish a pennanent planning function within the
Portland Police Bureau that can provide planning efforts consistent with
community policing values and goals.
Community Policing Strategic Plan 9
APPENDIX I
PORTLAND POLICE BUREAU ORGANIZATIONAL CHARTS:
1989 AND 1994
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART
l. DRMNG UNDER THE INFlUENCI OF IHTOXlCAlm
2. RfGIOIW. ORGAHUID CRIME AIlD HARCOnCSIASK FORCI
3. MUllHOMAH COUHTY DEII!lI10N CIIIIIR
June 1989
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June 1994
1. Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
2. Regional Organized Crime and Narcotics Task Force
3. Driving Under the Influence of Intoxicants
APPENDIX J
ROLES AND EXPECTATIONS
(PRESENTED DURING 1991 IN-SERVICE
COMMUNITY POLICING TRAINING)
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OFFICER'SillETECTIVE'S RESPONSmILITIES:
PLANNER:
a) Work with community members to identify and analyze the principle
crime and order maintenance problems within the district and design
strategies to address those problems.
b) Identify the root causes of crime and order maintenance problems in
your district.
c) Have a good knowledge of persons and conditions in your district.
d) Anticipate crime trends; make plans to break the negative patterns
before they become established.
COMMUNITY ORGANIZER:
a) Know the residents and merchants in your district.
b) Identify community organizations in your district: neighborhood
associations, business associations and civic groups.
c) Work with community residents to help address neighborhood
problems.
d) Attend and actively participate in community meetings.
e) Motivate community residents to organize and assist in the
implementation of problem solving.
f) Involve community organizations and residents in crime prevention
and self help efforts.
PROBLEM SOLVER:
a) Make a serious attempt to identify factors that contribute to area
problems.
b) Devise strategies to deal with the root causes of crime and order
maintenance problems in your area.
c) Employ other Bureau members, public and private agencies in problem
solving strategies.
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d) Locate and organize resources required to implement solutions.
e) Employ problem solving techniques to produce innovative solutions.
f) Monitor involvement by non Bureau resources and follow
through to ensure satisfactory results.
INFORMATION EXCHANGE LINK:
a) Provide the police agency with information about problem conditions
and locations; suggest and implement solutions.
b) Establish two way communication: be an information source to citizens
regarding crime problems and solutions, and encourage them to
reciprocate with neighborhood information.
c) Share information with other officers and Bureau personnel.
d) Work closely with your neighborhood association, and Bureau crime
prevention program directors.
GENERAL PERFORMANCE:
a) Conduct problem oriented patrols to cover the entire district during the
week.
b) Become involved in programs and activities in your district.
c) Work with the community to devise special programs to benefit the
Portland's neighborhoods.
d) Promote crime prevention.
e) Attempt to maintain a clean district: remove abandoned vehicles and
address other liveability issues.
f) Work with other officers.
g) Treat individuals as you would like to be treated.
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SERGEANT'S AND FIRST LINE SUPERVISOR'S RESPONSIDILITIES:
ENCOURAGE NEW THINKING:
a) Encourage risk taking.
b) Encourage members to think in terms of problem solving as a primary
unit of work.
c) Encourage "accountable creativity".
d) Encourage a shift in emphasis from short term quantity to long term
quality.
e) Develop a team approach.
f) Encourage innovation and creativity.
g) Encourage members to look beyond traditional responses.
h) Be willing to evaluate and improve your performance.
CUSTOMER ORIENTATION:
a) Seek employees' input; provide feedback on how it was used.
b) Strive to develop mutual respect and trust among employees.
c) Get to know residents and merchants, use the contacts to learn about
community concerns and perceptions of officer performance.
PROBLEM SOLVING:
a) Be a fixer and improver.
b) Troubleshoot the system. Remove obstacles.
c) Encourage problem solving and neighborhood involvement.
d) Discuss solutions with members regarding community policing
problems.
e) Review problem solving progress with members.
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f) Learn what resources exist in the Police Bureau.
g) Be a good listener.
ANALYSIS AND SUPERVISION:
a) Know the roles of the officers and non sworn members and assist them
in filling those roles.
b) Be the principle link between the unit and the command.
c) Shield members from pressure to rely on traditional policing.
d) Give members freedom to make broad inquiry.
e) Help identify areas within your area of responsibility that require the
members attention.
f) Develop familiarity with officer's beats and incidents; aid in inquiry
for analysis.
RECOGNITION:
a) Encourage and praise.
b) Provide incentives to encourage community policing.
c) Reinforce community policing through evaluations and commendations.
d) Identify community policing successes and talk about them.
f) Work with neighborhood crime prevention staffto encourage and provide
avenues for citizens to recognize members.
SCHEDULING:
a) Encourage members to plan daily activities.
b) Ensure that members have adequate time and resources to utilize
community policing skills.
c) Analyze productivity and assist members in time management.
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LIEUTENANI"S AND OFFICE MANAGER'S RESrONSIDILITIES:
*Know the roles of supervisors, officers and non-sworn merr~bers, and assist them in
filling those roles.
* Ensure that the community policing philosophy is implemented and encouraged.
* Update all members regarding community policing issues..
* Seek out opportunities for community policing recognitioq.
* Update the command staff regarding the progress of implemented pr6grams.
* Be willing to evaluate and improve your performance.
* Encourage problem solving and neighborhood involvement, by all employees.
* Seek employe·~s' input; and provide feedback on how it m~s used.
* Strive to develop mutual respect and trust among employees.
* Have a customer orientation toward employees and citizeps, be visible and
accessible.
* Be willing to, and encourage risk taking.
* Consider community policing as a team effort.
* Treat employees as you would like to be treated.
* Think of your supervisors as part of the management te~n.
* Take corrective action quickly to solve operational and personnel problems.
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RU COMMANDER'S RESPONSmILITIES:
>I< Know the roles of Office managers, supervisors, officers and non-sworn members,
and aBsist them in filling those roles.
* Champion the Bureau and promote organizational pride.
>I< Streamline awards/recognition processes.
>I< Negotiate customized goals and objectives/modify structure to meet objectives.
>I< Be willing to and encourage risk taking.
>I< Be visible and accessible to employees and citizens.
>I< Encourage problem solving and neighborhood involvement.
>I< Modify structure to meet objectives.
>I< Seek employees input; and provide feedback on how it was used.
>I< Be willing to evaluate and improve your performance.
*Have a customer orientation toward employees and citizens/friendly and courteous
service.
>I< Know yoUr personnel. Strive to develop mutual trust and respect.
* Explain expectations and goals to your personnel.
>I< Deal with your personnel honestly, equally and fairly as partners in this profession.
*Take corrective action quickly to solve operational and personnel problems.
>I< Continuously evaluate your operation and take appropriate actions to improve
operating efficiency, cost effectiveness and service delivery.
>I< Involve the community and other governmental agencies in solving community
safety and liveability problems as much as possible.
* Foster open communications and a partnership attitude between Bureau
members and community members.
• Demonstrate the community/police partnership in problem solving by your
involvement and personal example.
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NON-SWORNMEMBERS RESPONSIBILITIES
*Support and promote the concept ofCommunity Policing within the Bureau and the
community
* Champion the Bureau and promote organizational pride.
* Consider community policing as a team approach.
* Adopt a customer service oriented approach.
* Know the resources within the Bureau.
* Know the resources within the community.
*Work with ali employees and citizens to solve community problems.
* Share information with other Bureau members.
* Identify, analyze and develop strategies to address problems encountered in your
working environment.
* Locate and organize resources required to implement solutions.
* Employ other Bureau members, public and private agencies in problem solving
strategies.
* Use problem solving techniques to create innovative solutions.
*Monitor involvement by non Bureau resources and follow through to
ensure satisfactory results.
* !fit is necessary to refer the customer, make the first referral the correct referral.
*Be willing to evaluate and improve your performance.
------- - --------------- --- ------
APPENDIX K
COMMAND AND SUPERVISORY
PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS
COMMAND AND SUPERVISORY PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS
•Manage your division, precinct, unit, shift or detail. uaa! by example.
• Regularly ask personnel if you can assist them in ~ny way, and provide feed back
on actions taken.
• Know your personnel (names, history, strengths and weaknesses).
• Inform your personnel of Bureau and unit goals, ~,nd performance expectations.
Give regular feedback and wall<; your talk. I
•Treat aU personnel honestly rjnd fairly.
• Insist on friendly, courteous service by your staff to the public and Bureau
members, both in person and on the phone. I
• Champion the Bureau, Community Policing, ant;! foster organizational pride.
•Take corrective action quickly to solve operational and personnel problems.
• Continuously evaluate your operation and take appropriate actions to improve
operating efficiency, cost effectiveness, apd service d~)jvery.
Involve your personnel in thi.s effort. I
• Involve the community and other agencies (both governmental and private) in
. solving community safety and livability problems.
• Conduct inspections regularly and insist UPOll a clean, neat and orderly
physical environment, I
• Set a personal exnmpJe and strive for a neat and professional appearance.
• Ride-aJongs by commanding officers are recomm.ended at leatSt once every two
months on different shifts. I
• Provide opportunities for open communication~ and a partmership attitude
between yourself, employees, and OIJr community.
• Provide training to your personnel ~.lS needed!.
• Encourage recognition of good employee performance.
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